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Abstract 
This thesis argues that contemporary views of the laws of arms among 
soldiers, and of the laws of war by legal theorists, influenced particular military 
campaigns and individual actions in a variety of armed conflicts. Elizabeth I’s 
officer corps were careful to act in wars so that their actions would be seen as 
honourable by outside observers in the belief that such actions would add to 
their personal glory. Their individual and corporate perception of the laws of 
war directly affected military practices. However, the Elizabethan military 
establishment was engaged in conflicts that did not conform to contemporary 
views of just war. Catholic popes funded military expeditions against England 
and its dominion of Ireland, where the leaders were granted commissions to 
wage holy war not just war. The suppression of armed rebellions in Ireland 
employed numerous soldiers, and much of the machinery of state was supported 
by the English military. Holy war and counterinsurgency operations had no 
parallels in just war theory. 
 The laws of war provided an important new context for re-evaluating 
military practices. Although legal discourse was predominantly ordered towards 
fighting regular wars, with careful reading of contemporary sources, there are 
important indicators that illuminate contemporary justifications for some of the 
more brutal military actions associated with the English military establishment, 
particularly in Ireland. 
 By re-examining the discourse on the laws of war, the thesis finds that 
soldiers took seriously the customs of war and through them, it reassesses the 
motivations and mentalities of commissioned officers. This discourse was then 
used as a basis by which the conduct of soldiers can be understood and 
contextualised within English political and ethical structures. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
Well, this worthie knight knowing that he should haue to doo with a sort 
of netles, whose nature it is, that being handled gentlie, they will sting; 
but being hard crushed togither, they will doo no harme: even so he 
began with them. The sword and the law he made to be the foundation 
of his goueruenment, by the one he persecuted the rebell and 
disobedient, and by the other he ruled and gouerned in iustice and 
iudgment. 1 
-John Hooker 
 
The English Protestant state had, under the leadership of Queen Elizabeth 
I (r. 1558-1603), brought within the monarch’s singular purview all aspects of 
war, peace, and defence of the church. Monarchical authority in this 
antagonistic and martial sense was embodied in the state’s official pageantry, 
iconography, and material culture. State office holders were responsible for the 
defence of the citizenry by both divine and secular mandate, and these 
responsibilities were described in a sermon given by the Protestant divine 
Stephen Gosson: 
As warre must have a just title [i.e. just cause] to make it lawfull, 
so it must also be undertaken by lawfull authoritie, that is, the 
authority of the Prince, who as he carries the sword of Justice to 
punish domesticall disturbers of the common weale [i.e. body 
politic], in respect whereof he is said Rom. 13. not to beare the 
sword in vaine: so he defendeth his people from the forraine enimy 
by the sworde of warre, and is bound so to do Psal. 82.4., He is 
charged to saue the poore and oppressed, from the hand of the 
wicked that oppresseth them. The reason of it is this, that as in a 
common weal it is requisite there should be an authoritie, to punish 
offences, and to keep the same in order: so in the wide worlde, 
that all kingdomes and commonweals might be preserued, it is 
requisit there shuld be a power resting in no one Prince in the 
worlde as superiour to al other Princes, war steps in the place of 
iust vindicatiue iudgment, God hath left no other meanes unto 
Princes to flie unto.’2 
                                         
1 Irish Chronicle, p. 369. 
2 Stephen Gosson, The trumpet of warre A sermon preached at Paules Crosse the seuenth of 
Maie 1598. By M. Steph. Gosson parson of great Wigborow in Essex. (London: V. Stimmes for 
I. Oxenbridge, 1598), f. 31r. 
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The sword in this discourse symbolises sovereign authority and the force that 
maintains obedience to the laws, which also had its parallels in practice; the 
sword was, and remains, the force that compels obedience. 
The sword featured in traditional displays of sovereign power;3 a sword-
bearer would precede the sovereign, as well as other state officials, during 
formal processions, and this symbol of authority appears in a number of 
contemporary portraits of Queen Elizabeth (figures 1. and 2.).4 
                                         
3 Fig. 1. Sir Gilbert Talbot, seventh earl of Shrewsbury (1552-1616), marches before the queen 
bearing the sword of state: National Portrait Gallery, ‘Elizabeth I and her people’, BBC 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01jwb5j/p01jwbys> [accessed on 26 January 2016], 
The procession portrait of Queen Elizabeth c. 1600-3, attributed to Robert Peake the Elder; 
the historical analysis is addressed in Roy C. Strong, ‘The Queen: Eliza Triumphans’, The cult 
of Elizabeth: Elizabethan portraiture and pageantry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1977), pp. 17-55. 
Fig. 2. Elizabeth was shown seated in her Ermine Portrait (1585) with the sword of state: 
National Portrait Gallery, ‘Elizabeth I and her people’, BBC 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01jwb5j/p01jwc96> [accessed on 26 January 2016], 
Elizabeth’s Ermine portrait is attributed to Nicholas Hilliard; the historical analysis is 
addressed in Strong, The cult of Elizabeth: Elizabethan portraiture and pageantry, pp. 147-9. 
4 The queen prayed that she would never have to use the sword: ‘[i]mpart thy spirit to them that 
I may administer justice in thy fear without acceptation of persons. [...] Do this, God of all 
charity, so that not with the fear of severity or sword, but with royal passion and divine fear I 
may administer this thy kingdom.’ This prayer was part of a group of private prayers originally 
published in Latin and written by Elizabeth in 1563 following her recovery from small pox. 
Precaliones pr’rvatae, Regiae E. R. (London: T. Purfoot, 1563) c.f. L.S. Marcus, J. Mueller, 
and M.B. Rose, eds., Elizabeth I: collected works (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 
pp. 163, 435 supra note 1 (prayer 3). The sword, despite Elizabeth’s appeals to God, 
nevertheless remained a present and real power that stabilized and preserved her reign; the 
threat of violence up held and preserved the English state: Malcolm Smuts, ‘Organized 
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Figure 1. Robert Peake the Elder, The Procession Picture of Queen Elizabeth, c. 1600-3. The 
earl of Shrewsbury (left, and enlarged at the right) is shown bearing the sword of state, also 
known as the sword of justice. 
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The sword in contemporary pageantry and iconography carried important 
symbolism for military commanders too; Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, for 
example, possessed such a bearing sword, which may have been carried in 
official ceremonies during his controversial governorship and military command 
in the Netherlands c. 1585-1587 (figures 3. and 4.).5 
                                         
violence in the Elizabethan monarchical republic’, History 99 (2014), pp. 418-443; Mark A. 
Hutchinson, ‘The emergence of the state in Ireland and England, c. 1575-1599’, Sixteenth 
century journal 45 (2014), pp. 659-682. 
5 Figure 3. ?Hendrik Goltzius, Delineatio Pompae triumphalis (c. 1586), and c.f. Roy C. Strong 
and J. A. van Dorsten, Leicester’s triumph (Leiden: Leiden University Press for the Sir Thomas 
Brown Institute, 1964), pp. 38-49, 40: depicted the triumphal arrival of the earl of Leicester 
as the governor general of the Netherlands, and showed the place of sword-bearers in his 
progress, marching just before the standard-bearers. 
Figure 4. Leicester’s sword of state now lies broken in the Nether Gallery of Penhurst Place: H. 
A. Dillon, ‘Sword of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester’, Archaeologia 51 (1888), pp. 512-3; 
John Starkie Gardiner, Foreign armour in England in Armour in England from the earliest 
times to the reign of James the first (London: Seeley, 1898), pp. fig. 33, 78. 
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Figure 2. Nicholas Hilliard, Queen Elizabeth’s Ermine Portrait. Pax 
and Justitia: the sword of state sits at the left hand of the Queen 
while she holds an olive branch in her right. 
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In Ireland, where the Elizabethan regime struggled to engross the state’s 
authority, the sword of state had still greater significance and was an 
unmistakable symbol of the lord deputy’s office and authority.6 Two of the 
twelve woodprints in John Derrick’s An Image of Ireland (1581) show the lord 
deputy, then Henry Sidney (1529-1586), with the sword of state prominently 
displayed which lent an unmistakable gravity to his triumphant return to Dublin 
following recent combat operations against rebels, and his reception of Turlough 
Luineach O'Neill, chieftain of Ulster (c.1530-1595) (figures 5. and 6.).7 Ideas 
relating to the sword and authority also manifested in Sir John Perrot’s military 
government of Munster, where John Hooker, in his Irish Chronicle, stated that 
‘[t]he sword and the law he made the foundation of his gouernement’.8 
                                         
6 The symbolic display of Leicester’s sword of state would strengthen Simon Adams’s personal 
suspicion that the closest English analogue to the earl’s governorship of the Netherlands was 
the office of lord deputy of Ireland: see Simon Adams, ‘Reviewed work: Leicester and the 
Netherlands, 1586-1587 by F. G. Oosterhoff’, The English historical review 109 (1994), p. 
718. 
7 Mark A. Hutchinson, Calvinism, reform and the absolutist state in Elizabethan Ireland (London: 
Routledge, 2015), pp. 57-9; John Derricke, The image of Ireland with a discouerie of 
woodkarne, ed. J. Small (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1883), plate X, plate XII (no 
page numbers). 
8 Irish chronicle, p. 369. 
 
 
 
 
 
Third-Party Copyright Material Removed 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Sword-bearers marched before the army’s standards in Leicester’s triumphal march. 
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Figure 4. Details of Leicester’s sword of state: fig. 1 sword hilt; fig. 2 sword pommel; fig. 3 one 
quillon. 
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Figure 5. Lord Deputy Sir Henry Sidney returned triumphant to Dublin Castle and was received 
by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen. The sword of state here is shown central and displayed in the 
hands of the lord deputy’s sword bearer. 
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Figure 6. Turlough Luineach O'Neill and the other Ulster Gaels kneel to Sidney in submission. 
Note also that the Lord Deputy Sir Henry Sidney seems to be receiving O'Neill as a fellow 
noble. The sword of state was prominently featured. It rested on a pillow to the right of the Lord 
Deputy. 
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The sword could be, in one instance, the magistrate’s sword of justice: 
‘for hee is the minister of God for thy wealth. But if thou do euil, feare, for hee 
is the minister of, God, reuenger of wrath on him that doeth euill.’9 Or in 
another, it was the sword of war that protects the realm and ‘[d]eliuer the 
outcast & poore: saue them from the hand of the ungodly.’10 It is with ‘[t]he 
sword and the law’ that this thesis is concerned. Moving beyond the symbolism 
and ideology of the state’s political power to defend and coerce, it seeks to 
analyse the relationship between the English officer corps’ perceptions of the 
theory of the laws of war and their actual conduct during military campaigns. In 
so doing, it adopts a comparative approach by exploring the application of the 
laws of war by Elizabethan forces in two contrasting theatres of war, namely the 
wars in the Netherlands between 1572 and 1587 and the campaigns in Ireland 
between 1569 and 1584. 
England, since the arrival in 1568 of the duke of Alba with the 25,000 men 
of the Spanish Army of Flanders, year after year edged ever closer to open war, 
which was declared in 1585 against the king Philip II.11 However, the declaration 
of war was not the beginning of offensive military action. English soldiers were 
serving in various degrees and increasing numbers from 1569 to 1585. Estimates 
of English soldiers serving in the Netherlands identifies a token strength of 100 
(c.1568-9), or fewer troops, until Elizabeth dispatched 2,400 unaffiliated 
mercenaries into the conflict in 1572.12 In 1578, troop numbers reached a new 
height, about 4,500 men, but these began to decline until England formally 
entered the conflict on the side of the Dutch, which changed the nature of the 
conflict.13 In 1585 England sent 7,500 soldiers and after the arrival of the earl of 
Leicester muster rolls were raised to 9,000 English soldiers.14 Ireland, on the 
                                         
9 The Holy Bible, conteyning the olde testament and the new: authorised and appointed to be 
read in churches (London: Christopher Barker, 1588), Romans 13.4. 
10 The Holy Bible, conteyning the olde testament and the new, Psalms, 82.4. 
11 R. B. Wernham, ‘Elizabethan war aims and strategy,’ in Elizabethan government and society: 
essays presented to Sir John Neale, eds., S. T. Bindoff, J. Hurstfield, and C. H. Williams 
(London: University of London Athlone Press, 1961), pp. 340-368, 343. 
12 David J. B. Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacobs Wars”: the employment of English and Welsh mercenaries 
in the European wars of religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562-1610’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of London, 2002), pp. 313-314. 
13 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, pp. 321-322, appendix 2, 340. 
14 John S. Nolan, ‘The militarization of the Elizabethan state’, The journal of military history 58 
(1994), pp. 391-420, 418; Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, pp. 328-329. 
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other hand, was the equivalent of a rural backwater. The English army of Ireland 
from 1569 and into the mid-1590s averaged 1,500-2,000 soldiers; these troops 
were not mustered in a singular army, but rather were dispersed throughout 
Ireland in small — policing — garrisons.15 Only when powerful Anglo-Irish lords 
rebelled did English muster rolls reach numbers that mirrored those armies in 
the Dutch conflicts; e.g. during the Desmond rebellion (1579-1584), English 
military strength rose to 8,892 men, but once the crises had abated troop 
strength was reduced to its policing levels.16 The conflicts against Spain, 
particularly in the Netherlands, and Ireland were two of the greatest military 
challenges facing the Elizabethan state. 
 
Historiography 
The conflicts in the Netherlands and Ireland loomed large in the thoughts 
of English contemporaries, but each conflict was viewed in very different ways. 
Those in the Netherlands were of strategic importance, and apart from religious 
ties with the fellow Protestant Dutch, and English fears of an active Catholic 
Inquisition just across the Channel, Spain increasingly appeared to the English 
observer to be preparing an invasion force. Therefore, the Spanish military 
occupation of the Netherlands posed a serious external threat to England’s 
continued existence, so that by 1585 the belligerents were the sovereign states 
of England and Spain, and a state of war existed between the two. Conversely, 
in English political discourse Ireland was seen as a dependant territory, held by 
conquest in subservience to the kingdom of England. Previous English monarchs 
had been content to largely leave the government of Ireland to its domestic 
lords, but Elizabeth had adopted a reformist policy and expanded English state 
control over Ireland. English intrusion into the direct government of Ireland 
provoked resistance. Most notable of these were the Desmond rebellions (the 
Fitzmaurice rebellion, 1569-1573 and the Desmond rebellion, 1579-1584). Each 
side in the contest adopted increasingly belligerent positions. The conflicts in 
Ireland, therefore, were matters of domestic law enforcement and not war, and 
                                         
15 Mark Charles Fissel, English warfare, 1511-1642 (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 224; Paul E.J. 
Hammer, Elizabeth’s wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 72. 
16 Fissel, English warfare, p. 224; Nolan, ‘The militarization of the Elizabethan state’, p. 418. 
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English military actions were one aspect of a difficult policy intended to reform 
all aspects of Irish society. 
 To contemporaries, rebellions and wars were very different types of 
conflicts and were fought accordingly: wars were international conflicts waged 
between sovereign states whereas rebellions were intra-national and were 
manifestly unlawful uprisings of subject peoples against their sovereign prince 
and his government. The laws of war were an international code of conduct, 
and, but did not, therefore, apply in rebellion. In the suppression of rebellions, 
it was domestic law — namely the laws of treason — which legitimated a harsher 
form of conduct. Whereas wars between states were fought to achieve limited 
political ends, campaigns against rebels could amount in effect to a war of 
extermination. 
In themselves the laws of war, as a subject of historical enquiry, have 
most often been the preserve of legal historians charting the development of 
international law, of which these laws were a sub-category, but their analysis 
has been largely confined to macro scale international diplomatic and political 
issues.17 The laws of war have also been studied in relation to just war theory 
and the history of ideas and as a philosophical subject, but, here, they were 
viewed as a secondary aspect to the morality and ethics of war in general.18 
Early modern military historians have, until comparatively recently, had little 
interest in the sixteenth-century perception and practice of the laws of war as 
an aspect of warfare. 
The general lack of interest in the laws of war has arisen, perhaps, in part 
from a long standing academic concentration on the religious dimension of the 
wars in the sixteenth-century. The historian and lawyer Thomas Walker wrote at 
the very end of the nineteenth-century that ‘[t]he Age of the Reformation was 
an age of war and of wars of particular atrocity. The very religious fervour, 
                                         
17 Douglas M. Johnston, The historical foundations of the world order: the tower and the arena 
(Leiden: Nijhoff, 2008); Wilhelm Grewe, The epochs of international law, tr., M. Beyers 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000); Arthur Nussbaum, A concise history of the law of nations 
(New York: Macmillan, 1947). 
18 James T. Johnson, Ideology, reason and the limitation of war: religious and secular concepts, 
1200-1740 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975); idem, The just war tradition and 
the restraint of war: a moral and historical inquiry (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1984); idem, Ethics and the use of force: just war in historical perspective (Surrey: Ashgate, 
2011). 
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which had in medieval days enlisted united Christendom in crusading warfare, 
worked, when union no longer existed, havoc in international practice.’19 
Perceptions of early modern warfare changed little over the preceding two 
decades. On the eve of the Second World War, the military historian Charles 
Oman reflected upon Elizabethan military conduct, and wrote with regret: ‘[o]n 
the whole, the reign of Elizabeth makes a very depressing chapter in the history 
of the English art of war. [...] Occasionally one feels acute humiliation when 
reading of the conduct of English troops — and officers. ...there were other 
incidents in Ireland and also in the Netherlands of which the memory is 
distressing.’20 A veteran of the Great War, Falls wrote with more pragmatism and 
professional distance, and he recognised throughout his discourse that English 
contemporary observers regarded those conflicts as rebellions and rightly 
reassessed their wider importance.  Writing with more pragmatism and 
professional distance, Falls recognises throughout that English contemporary 
observers regarded the conflicts as rebellions and rightly reassessed their wider 
importance; he and his contemporary historians, however, used the terms 
‘rebellion’ and ‘war’ without adequately defining them in relation to sixteenth-
century legal concepts.21 The first order problem was defining what military 
actions constituted war. 
Implicit in their works was an assumption that all forms of armed conflict 
were essentially ‘war’, a perception perhaps arising from their modern 
experience of nation-state warfare in two successive World Wars. Where 
rebellion was differentiated from war, it was termed ‘civil war’, an uncommon 
term in the sixteenth-century, and one that modern historians have used to 
imply that seventeenth-century nobles fought with a regard to the customary 
rules of war, but this was a change from the noted brutality practiced in Wars of 
the Roses, which indicates that Elizabeth’s wars against rebels were a 
continuation of older precedents.22 
                                         
19 Thomas Alfred Walker, A history of the law of nations: from the earliest times to the peace of 
Westphalia, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1899), p. 188. 
20 Charles Oman, A history of the art of war in the sixteenth century (London: Methuen & Co., 
1937), pp. 388-9. 
21 Cyril Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1950), preface. 
22 Laws of war in the English Civil war: Barbara Donagan, ‘Codes of conduct in the English Civil 
War’, Past and present 118 (1994), pp. 65-95; idem, ‘Atrocity, war crime, and treason in the 
English Civil War’, The American historical review 99 (1994), pp. 1137-1166; idem, ‘The web 
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Much of the ensuing military historiography of Ireland was directed 
towards analysing the process of English colonisation.23 The Elizabethan 
government in 1565 made the cornerstone of their Irish policy ‘to bring all of 
Ireland under English control.’24 English colonial theory developed in Ireland 
(which became the model for the Americas), was achieved via public-private 
partnerships and direct action by the state; English policy was deployed initially 
through privately sponsored enterprises between the government and 
adventurers from the gentry and the younger sons of the aristocracy, not by the 
government’s soldiers stationed in Ireland.25 The process of colonization, in the 
face of ever increasingly hostile Irish opposition, became most brutal, and the 
private enterprises of English elites, like the son of Sir Thomas Smith and Walter 
Devereux, first earl of Essex, resulted in mass killings and atrocities; this has led 
some writers to describe the Tudor conquest of Ireland as a genocide.26 
However, the atrocities and the government policies that encouraged them were 
                                         
of honour: soldiers, Christians, and gentlemen in the English Civil War’, The historical journal 
44 (2001), pp. 365-389; idem, ‘Soldiers’ law’, in War in England, 1642-1649 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 134-156. The chivalric practices of the laws of arms during the 
Wars of the Roses has been understudied, but most historians agree that these rebellions 
were waged with exceeding ferocity: Anthony Goodman, The Wars of the Roses: the soldier’ 
experience (Stroud: Tempus, 2006). 
23 The English colonization of Ireland has an expansive historiography and remains a topic of 
continued debate; what follows are important interpretations: David B. Quinn, The 
Elizabethans and the Irish (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); Nicholas P. Canny, ‘The 
ideology of English colonization: from Ireland to America’, The William and Mary quarterly, 
third series 30 (1973), pp. 575-598; idem, The Elizabethan conquest of Ireland: a pattern 
established, 1565-76 (New York: Barnes and Noble books, 1976). 
Neil Murphy’s recent article traces Elizabethan colonisation strategies not to Ireland which has 
been the predominant narrative but to Henry VIII’s French colonial schemes: ‘Violence, 
colonization and Henry VIII’s conquest of France, 1544-1546’, Past and Present 233 (2016), 
pp. 13-51. 
24 Canny, ‘The ideology of English colonization’, p. 576. 
25 Canny, ‘The ideology of English colonization’, p. 576. 
26 David Edwards, ‘Escalation of violence in sixteenth century Ireland’, Age of atrocity: violence 
and political conflict in early modern Ireland, eds., D. Edwards, P. Lenihan, and C. Tait 
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), pp. 34-78; idem, ‘Tudor Ireland: Anglicization, mass 
killings, and security’, in The Routledge history of genocide, eds., C. Carmichael and R. 
Maguire (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 23-37; Ben Kiernan, ‘The English conquest of 
Ireland, 1565-1603’, Blood and soil: a world history of genocide and extermination from 
Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 169-212; Charles Carlton, 
‘This happy breed of men: Elizabethan warfare, 1558-1603’, in This seat of Mars: war and the 
British Isles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 79-102. Irish resistance, the English 
soldiers’ poverty, and their colonial instincts required the English to continually reassess the 
degree of violence necessary to maintain and extend their control over Ireland: Wayne E. 
Lee, ‘Sir Henry Sidney and the mutiny at Clonmel, 1569’, and ‘The earls of Essex, 1575 and 
1599’, in Barbarians & Brothers: Anglo-American warfare, 1500-1865 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 15-35, 36-62. 
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only broadly analysed, often under the umbrella of martial law.27 The particulars 
of government restraint and atrocity remained largely unexamined. 
As the historical approach known as ‘drum and trumpet’, or campaign 
history, was superseded by the ‘new military history’, debates surrounding the 
so-called military revolution shifted studies away from broad and often 
generalised analysis of armed conflicts towards a greater emphasis on war and 
society.28 Focusing on organisational developments — means of mobilisation, pay, 
supply, morale, and most importantly logistics, ‘new military history’ 
reinvigorated the study of military history, but without contributing much to the 
study of the practice and perceptions of the laws of war. Debates about the so-
called military revolution focused primarily on technological developments and 
the ‘science’ of war, this led to initial surveys of the laws of war. However, 
military actions remained largely separated from their human component and, 
therefore, became somewhat technologically deterministic. 
Geoffrey Parker’s The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: 
the logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars 
exemplified the ‘new military history’ approach.29 In Parker’s analysis of the 
Dutch revolt, also known as the Eighty Years War (1568-1648) and the Dutch war 
of independence, the laws of war or armed conflict were implicitly a by-product 
of war’s technological development.30 The ‘Low Countries’ wars’, Parker states, 
were fought in two phases; the first was c.1578 to 1590 and the second c.1600-
                                         
27 David Edwards, ‘Beyond reform: martial law & the Tudor reconquest of Ireland’, History 
Ireland 5 (1997), pp. 16-21; idem, ‘Ideology and experience: Spenser’s view and martial law 
in Elizabethan Ireland’, in Political ideology in Ireland, 1541-1641, ed., H. Morgan (Dublin: 
Four Courts Press, 1999), pp. 127-57. 
28 The new military history was outlined by Peter Paret, ‘The new military history’, Parameters 
21 (1991), pp. 10-18. 
Here is not the place for a comprehensive historiography of the military revolution, but what 
follows are the principal works on the subject: Clifford J. Rodgers, ed., The military 
revolution debate: readings on the military transformation of early modern Europe (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995); Geoffrey Parker, The military revolution: military innovation and the 
rise of the West, 1500-1800, 1st and 2nd eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 
1996). 
29 Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish road, 1567-1659: the logistics of 
Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries’ wars, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972, 2004). 
30 Professor Parker, however, was keenly aware of the English hand in the rise of the Dutch 
state: ‘Philip II, unlike modern Dutch historians, rated the contribution of English men and 
money to Holland’s resistance very highly.’ See Geoffrey Parker, Spain and the Netherlands, 
1559-1659: ten studies (London: Collins, 1979), p. 35. 
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1648. In the first phase of the war, the soldiers fought primarily ‘guerrilla’ 
actions that emphasised skirmishing and surprise — poor conditions under which 
to wage a just war. However, by the second phase of the conflict the fighting 
‘gave way to a more “baroque” or “classical” style ... as governments re-
asserted their control ... over most other aspects of the war.’31 There is 
something to this analysis, since fighting in Ireland was characterised by 
‘guerrilla’ style warfare, or what might be better termed manoeuvre warfare, 
and in both instances the methods of warfare were at various times horrific.32 
Parker modified his analysis somewhat in his work The Dutch revolt, in 
which the diplomatic and political history of the Dutch conflict was raised above 
the organisational and technological, and this shift goes farther to craft the 
general sense of the war’s place in the intellectual and popular cultural milieu.33 
His approach offers insights into the belligerents’ motivations during the 
conflicts; however, the practices of the laws of war make up little more than a 
footnote. By contrast, in Parker’s The military revolution, a general survey of 
early modern technological development and military practice, he noted the 
developing body of research pertaining to certain aspects of the laws of war, 
although his primary focus was on the regulations pertaining to booty and 
ransom and their effects on operations.34 While booty and ransom were a sub-
category of the laws of war dealing with the aftermath of action, the emphasis 
in this thesis will be primarily on the ‘rules of engagement’ and how the laws of 
war altered actual operations.35 
                                         
31 Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish road, 1567-1659, pp. 10-12, 14. 
32 For a sampling of the research relating to guerrilla warfare in Ireland: G. A. Hayes-McCoy, 
‘Strategy and tactics in Irish warfare, 1593-1601’, Irish historical studies 2 (1947), pp. 255-
279; James Michael Hill, ‘The distinctiveness of Gaelic warfare, 1400-1750’, European history 
quarterly 22 (1992), pp. 323-345; Donal O’Carroll, ‘Change and continuity in weapons and 
tactics, 1594-1691’, in Conquest and resistance: war in seventeenth century Ireland, ed., P. 
Lenihan, vol. 3, history of warfare series (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 211-256, 224; this approach 
was challenged by Edwards, ‘Escalation of violence in sixteenth century Ireland’, pp. 34-78; 
however, recent research challenges the guerrilla warfare thesis in favour of a manoeuvre 
warfare model: James O’Neill, The Nine Years War, 1593-1603: O’Neill, Mountjoy and the 
military revolution (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2017), pp. 209-211. 
33 Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch revolt, revised ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1977, 1988). 
34 Parker, The military revolution, 1st ed. pp. 58-9, supra notes 41-45 to pages 58-9. 
35 Scholars have analysed the Elizabethan regulation of booty and ransom in relationship to Henry 
V’s resumption of the Hundred Years War as presented in Shakespeare’s plays: Theodor 
Meron, Henry’s wars and Shakespeare’s laws: perspectives on the laws of war in the later 
middle ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
Chapter 1. Introduction  25 
 
In Anglophone ‘new military history’, the overall estimation of the 
Elizabethan military corps remained essentially negative. Henry J. Webb’s 
Elizabethan military science recognises the classical influence on martial 
thought and practice while at the same time acknowledging the unique thinking 
in English interpretations.36 Classical Greek and Roman authored texts on war 
that argued for essentially five subjects for the aspiring soldier: recruiting and 
personnel, training, discipline, strategy, and tactics. The subject of discipline, 
of which the laws of war are fundamentally connected, Webb disregarded with a 
single stroke. Had the discipline of classical Roman armies been adopted ‘many 
officers in Elizabeth’s army ... would have been demoted or cashiered, or would 
have suffered cuts in pay.’37 Organisation, administration, training and strategy 
were addressed in C.G. Cruickshank’s Elizabeth’s army; however, these subjects 
were divorced from the laws of war.38 Cruickshank was concerned most with the 
corruptions practiced by captains and the poor state of military doctrine. 
Historians specialising in sixteenth-century military history were aware of 
just war doctrine and developments in the practice of international law of war 
and its contemporary importance, but they have not closely analysed the 
relationship between legal theories, their constituent conflicts, and actions 
taken in campaigns. The medieval historian Maurice H. Keen recognised the 
importance of the laws of arms in relation to military practice in The laws of 
war in the late middle ages.39 The Elizabethan period was bracketed by the 
publication of Barbara Donagan’s ‘Codes of conduct in the English Civil War’, 
while Parker himself produced an excellent general survey of the laws of war 
practiced in the early modern period.40 This reappraisal of the place of the laws 
                                         
The regulation of booty was directly addressed in F. Redlich, De praeda militari: looting and 
booty, 1500-1800 (Weisbaden, 1956: Vierteljahrshrift für Sozial — und Wirtschaftsgeschicte, 
Beiheft XXXIX), and Philippe Contamine, ‘The growth of state control. Practices of war, 1300-
1800: ransom and booty’ in War and competition between states, ed. P. Contamine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 164-194. 
36 Henry J. Webb, Elizabethan military science: the books and practices (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1966). 
37 Webb, Elizabethan military science, p. 46. Theoretical works on the laws of war did not even 
merit a place in his bibliography unless they were written by military men. 
38 Charles G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth’s army, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
39 Maurice H. Keen, The laws of war in the late middle ages (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1965, 
1993). 
40 Barbara Donagan, ‘Codes of conduct in the English civil war’, Past and present 118 (1988), pp. 
65-95, and ‘Soldiers’ law’, in War in England, 1642-1649, pp. 134-156. Geoffrey Parker, ‘Early 
modern Europe’, in The laws of war: constraints on warfare in the Western world, eds., M. 
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of war in early modern conflict has not resulted in specific and thorough 
analyses of the laws of war by the armies of individual states in the sixteenth-
century, although more has been written on the nature of chivalric culture more 
broadly and on the professionalization of the officer corps.41 
One reason for the lack of nationally specific studies of the laws of war 
may have been the assumption that since armies of the period, as the muster 
records prove, were assembled from the peoples of many different national 
identities (a number of Elizabethan soldiers had, for example, served in Philip 
II’s tercios). The practice of the laws of war had a relatively universal, or 
standardised, interpretation. The rank and file soldier had no voice, and was 
compelled, by force when necessary, to obey the commands of the officers 
appointed over them. Officers, particularly the theatre commanders, were 
political appointees, and they commanded their army fully aware of the political 
expectations incumbent on their office. They created their own command 
culture, wherein implicitly, or occasionally explicitly, subaltern officers were 
directed towards a particular standard interpretation of the laws of war. In the 
Spanish army, the laws of war meant different things at different times to 
different commanders. 42 
Changes in the Spanish Army of Flanders’s high command do not 
necessarily indicate that the Elizabethan officer corps also had their own 
                                         
Howard, G.J. Andreopoulos, and M.R. Shulman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 
40-58, and expanded and reprinted as ‘The etiquette of atrocity: the laws of war in early 
modern Europe’, in Success is never final: empire, war, and faith in early modern Europe 
(New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 143-168. 
41 Chivalry as a complimentary subject or component of the laws of war was admirably dealt with 
in David J.B. Trim, ed., The chivalric ethos and the development of military professionalism, 
vol. 11, history of warfare series (Leiden: Brill, 2003) 
Chivalry, as an English cultural phenomenon, has been addressed directly in several studies, but 
these older works tend to view chivalry as something archaic with little bearing on actual war 
and its importance linked to its vestigial and literary power: Arthur B. Ferguson, The Indian 
summer of English chivalry: studies in the decline and transformation of chivalric idealism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1960); The chivalric tradition in renaissance England 
(Washington D.C.: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1986); Richard C. McCoy, The rites of 
knighthood: the literature and politics of Elizabethan chivalry (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1989). Roger B. Manning has identified what he believes to be important 
correlations between military conduct and chivalric ideas; however, these views will be 
shown below to be erroneous. 
42 The laws of war and the different interpretations by successive made by Spanish captain 
generals of the Army of Flanders was addressed in Fernando Gonzalez de Leon, ‘Soldados 
platicos and caballeros: the social dimensions of ethics in early modern Spanish army’, in 
Chivalric ethos and the development of military professionalism, history of warfare series, 11 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), pp. 235-268. 
Chapter 1. Introduction  27 
 
changing interpretations of the laws of war. In Parker’s grand theory of a 
military revolution, he viewed the English as slow to adopt the principles 
identified with the revolution — ‘a new use of firepower, a new type of 
fortifications, and an increase in army size.’43 However, this analysis has been 
qualified, and the Elizabethans have been recognized as having their own views 
the effective waging of warfare that differed from those on the continent.44 Such 
strong notions on military doctrine might suggest that they also had a distinctive 
attitude to the laws of war. Whereas the mass of continental armies were 
largely conscripted commoners, a surprising proportion of Elizabeth’s ‘common 
soldiers’, as Trim has pointed out, were not common men but elites. Elites 
remained a minority in Elizabeth’s army, but many more gentlemen did serve in 
the ranks than previously was recognised.45 
Anglo-centric historiography has begun to adjust to these new English 
historical paradigms — novel approaches to English warfare, expanded 
knowledge of English army composition, and cultural knowledge of English 
warfare. By approaching the conflicts in the Netherlands and Ireland from a 
comparative perspective that focuses on the perception and practice of the laws 
of war, this thesis will go further to explain contemporary attitudes and actions 
in these two terrible conflicts. Furthermore, the approach offers new insights 
into developing areas of research, including the two major areas of debate 
                                         
43 Parker, The military revolution, 1st ed., p. 43. 
44 The most recent historiography of the Elizabethan military establishment in relation to the 
military revolution was addressed in David R. Lawrence, ‘Reappraising the Elizabethan and 
early Stuart soldier: recent historiography on the early modern English military culture’, 
History Compass 9 (2011), pp. 16-33, 17-20. Additional important research has been carried 
out by Fissel, English warfare, 1511-1642, and David Eltis, ‘English military development’, in 
The military revolution in sixteenth-century Europe (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1995), pp. 
99-135. Dutch tactical developments, made near the end of the sixteenth-century, were 
partly the result of English contributions; see Olaf van Nimwegen, The Dutch army and the 
military revolutions, 155-1688, tr. A. May, warfare in history series (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2010), pp. pp. 87 fn. 4, 106-7 fn. 50; throughout the Eighty Years War and more so 
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Marco van der Hoven, ed. Exercise of arms: warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648, history of 
warfare series, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. ix-x. 
Roger B. Manning argues for a uniquely British view of war that was actually in opposition to the 
technical principles of the military revolution resulting of their views on honour and chivalry; 
however, the argument in these works are not necessarily correct: Roger B. Manning, 
Swordsmen: the martial ethos in the three kingdoms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
idem, ‘Prince Maurice’s school of war: British swordsmen and the Dutch’, War & society 25 
(2006), pp. 1-19; idem, ‘Styles of command in seventeenth century English armies’, Journal 
of military history 71 (2007), pp. 671-99. 
45 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”, p. 46. 
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identified in David Lawrence’s survey of recent Elizabethan and Stuart military 
historiography. The first is the ongoing debate concerned with identifying the 
‘motivations and mentalities’ of the Elizabethan soldiery, and the second is the 
less contentious subject ‘[t]he performance of the common soldier’.46 
 David J.B. Trim has argued for the primacy of religion, particularly the 
rise of a Calvinist internationalism, as the key to understanding the motivations 
of a majority of the officers, gentlemen volunteers, and their followings during 
the French and Dutch wars of religion.47 Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
some English officers served in both the continental wars and in operations in 
Ireland, religion fails to fully explain the motivations and mentalities of captains 
in the Irish theatre: Rory Rapple has suggested that the pursuit of personal 
advancement and the acquisition of new lands surpassed religion as the essential 
motivational factors in Elizabeth’s wars upon the Irish rebels.48 Mark A. 
Hutchinson argues for a reassessment of the importance and place of 
Protestantism in the military government of Ireland, stressing that the failure of 
the Elizabethan state to reform religious practice in Ireland led officials to use 
state-sponsored violence.49 
Several other historians argue that it was the pursuit of personal honour 
and glory that drove Elizabethan soldiers, and Trim himself acknowledges the 
significant role that honour played in shaping the soldiers’ mentality. War 
offered the nobility an opportunity to enlarge their reputation through 
honourable conduct since they were expected to be above the pursuit of 
monetary rewards: ‘the proper “endeavour” of a gentleman is to seek honour; 
only the vulgar “labour to become rich”.’50 For late-sixteenth and early-
                                         
46 Lawrence, ‘Reappraising the Elizabethan and early Stuart soldier, pp. 16-33, 20-24. 
Lawrence’s article is a historiographical survey of works that followed the publication of the 
influential work by Fissel, English Warfare, 1511-1642, which provides an interesting overview 
of Elizabethan soldiers’ motivations and mentalities. 
47 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacobs Wars’; ‘Calvinist internationalism and the English officer corps, 1562-
1642’, History Compass 4 (2006), pp. 1024-48. 
48 Rory Rapple, Martial power and Elizabethan political culture: military men in England and 
Ireland, 1558-1594, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
49 Mark A. Hutchinson, Calvinism, reform and the absolutist state in Elizabethan Ireland 
(London: Routledge, 2015); ‘Reformed Protestantism and the government of Ireland, c. 1565-
1580: the lord deputyships of Henry Sidney and Arthur Grey’, The Sidney Journal 29 (2011), 
pp. 71-104. 
50 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, p. 86; for a broader survey, see also the various works in 
David J. B. Trim, ed., The chivalric ethos and the development of military professionalism 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003); Roger B. Manning, Swordsmen: the martial ethos in the three kingdoms 
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seventeenth-century English ‘gallants and swordsmen’ serving in continental 
wars, Roger B. Manning has concluded that their ‘sense of honour was highly 
individual and personal concept ... [and] had nothing to do with Christian 
morality’.51 Elizabethan honour, Manning argues was an impediment to the 
military professionalism commonly associated with the so-called military 
revolution because the English gallants and officers adhered to an older 
anachronistic code of honour and conduct that placed an emphasis upon 
individual displays of honour such as ‘duelling, challenges to individual combats 
on the battlefield, and other histrionics’; however, such actions were not 
necessarily unique to English officers. For example, the Spanish commander, Don 
Juan del Águila, while ensconced in Kinsale and surrounded by English besiegers, 
challenged the English commander Charles Blount, earl of Mountjoy, to a duel; 
Águila’s challenge proposed ‘that the question betweene England and Spaine 
should be tried by combat betweene them two’.52 These displays of honour in 
military actions were a reassertion ‘that social hierarchies remained more 
important than military hierarchies in positions of military command’.53 Paul 
Robinson, however, has argued for a more nuanced role of honour within 
Elizabethan armies.54 ‘The famous warriors of the age’, he remarked, ‘were at 
the same time highly educated, well versed in military science, and ruthless in 
the pursuit of their enemies; and yet obsessed with winning martial glory, 
enthused with passion for single combat and other displays of courage, and 
merciful and generous to defeated opponents (Irish ones excepted).’55 Robinson 
here implies that honour had little or no place in the Elizabethan conflict in 
Ireland, but Brendan Kane’s research shows that honour was an essential 
                                         
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 56, c.f. William Segar, Honor, military and civil 
(London: Robert Baker, 1602), preface; Samuel P. Harrington, The soldier and the state: the 
theory and politics of civil military relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1957), p. 20. 
51 Manning, Swordsmen, p. 79. 
52 Fynes Moryson, An itinerary: containing his ten yeers travel through the twelve dominions of 
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Scotland & Ireland, 4 vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1908), iii, p. 57. 
53 Roger B. Manning, ‘Styles of command in seventeenth-century English armies’, pp. 671-99, 
672. 
54 Paul Robinson, ‘Elizabethan England’, in Military honour and the conduct of war: from ancient 
Greece to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 83-104. 
55 Robinson, ‘Elizabethan England’, p. 104. 
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element in Anglo-Irish relations throughout Elizabeth’s reign.56 For Kane, the 
Irish conflicts were part of an ‘internal “British” struggle in which the proper 
relationship between members of a nascent inter-realm aristocracy, and 
between provincial aristocrats and the state, were being worked out.’57 Rapple 
too identifies moments where Elizabethan soldiers and their conceptions of 
honour in the Irish conflicts led to public displays of mercy to the defeated.58 As 
this thesis will argue, the various motivations and mentalities of Elizabethan 
combatants were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and were in many cases 
complimentary. 
Religion and honour, in these works, are all studied largely in isolation as 
different aspects of the wider military culture in England and leaves questions 
about how these notions were manifested in action largely unanswered. 
Accordingly, this thesis will focus on the laws of war and customary conduct of 
the Elizabethan military. These offer an under-explored area of insight into the 
mentalities of their commanders because these protocols share connections with 
both religious ideas and military concepts of honour, and they either described 
or proscribed certain responses in military actions. Geoffrey Parker observed a 
potential hurdle to such an inquiry by noting that ‘[e]xplicit discussions of the 
customs of war by leading practitioners are exceedingly rare.’59 Nevertheless, 
just as Mark Charles Fissel observes that ‘a nation’s conduct of the art of war 
can be understood by analysing the actions of groups of men’, so this method 
can also provide a point of comparative analysis for observing the how the laws 
of war and armed conflict affected military conduct. 
The thesis has two principal foci: the perceptions of the Elizabethan 
officer corps – those men Sir Walter Ralegh called ‘men of war’ – and their 
actions while on campaign.60  It was the duty of the nobility to bear either the 
sword of justice or of war; this duty might sometimes be expressed in allegorical 
                                         
56 Brendan Kane, The politics and culture of honour in Britain and Ireland, 1541-1641 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); aspects of honour are also acknowledged as 
important in Rapple, Martial power and Elizabethan political culture, chapter 6. 
57 Kane, The politics and culture of honour in Britain and Ireland, p. 94. 
58 Rapple, Martial power and Elizabethan political culture, pp. 219-224. 
59 Parker, ‘The etiquette of atrocity, pp. 143-168, 340, supra note 37. 
60 Walter Ralegh, ‘A discourse touching a marriage between Prince Henry of England, and a 
daughter of Savoy’, in The Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, eds., Oldys and Birch, 8 vols (Oxford: 
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image of the body politic in which ‘the prince and commonwealth ioyned 
together make a perfect man consisting of head, body and members’.61 The idea 
was expanded by the veteran soldier William Blandy to explain war and 
rebellion. In The castle, or a picture of policy shewing forth most lively, the 
force, body and parts of a commonwealth (1581), he noted that ‘[t]he two 
limmes that chiefly and aboue other, strengthē[n] the body of Princely maiestie, 
is the Iusticer and souldiar. [...] The one executeth the will of his Soueraigne 
upon the offender at home, and in the Citty, theother wreaketh the indignation 
of the Prince in the field, upon the body of his enemy.’62  By contrast, the rank 
and file soldiers’ freedom of action was regulated by a combination of cultural 
and sociological tradition that made members of the noble estates natural 
leaders over the common man, as well as by army ordinances which prohibited 
the soldier, on pain of death or loss of limb, from committing to any action 
beyond his immediate task without direct orders from an appropriate officer. 
The Elizabethan officer corps were responsible for seeing that the laws of war 
were followed and that those who violated them during military operations 
should be held to account. 
 
Method 
Using as its starting point the contemporary discourse in England relating 
to the laws of war and the customs that operated in land warfare, this study 
compares the discourse with the actions of soldiers while on campaign in both 
the Dutch and Irish theatres. Therefore, this thesis necessarily excludes for its 
discussion the naval conflict between Elizabeth and Philip. Military operations on 
the seas encountered some issues that closely paralleled debates on land 
warfare; such as ‘privateering’ versus ‘piracy’ or ‘mercenary’ and service with 
an army royal, and the treatment of prisoners. However, the sources and 
scholarship on the law of land warfare and naval warfare are both large and 
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distinct, a conflation of the two traditions would only serve to obscure, rather 
than clarify, the subjects analysed in this thesis.63 
The approach was inspired by John A. Lynn’s Battle: a history of combat 
and culture, in which Lynn directly challenged the body of historiography 
relating to technological determinism, as well as the cultural assertion of a 
distinctly Western way of war. Instead, he focused on a society’s cultural 
perception of war, which he referred to as the ‘discourse on war’ and its 
interaction with what he terms the ‘reality of war’.64 Lynn’s analysis uses a 
model for cultural history that identifies the existence of a ‘feedback loop’ 
within a particular society. The feedback loop notes that the ‘discourse of war’ 
could alter the ‘reality of war’ to create ‘perfected realities’, but equally, so 
could the ‘reality of war’ affect the ‘discourse on war’ and fosters new 
discourses.65 His approach is not without its critics, yet the comparative 
approached used in Battle has much to offer. Restraint, and the absence of it, 
reside at the discursive nexus of important cultural notions about how 
Elizabethans viewed the roles of both religion and honour in war and armed 
conflicts. Lynn implicitly acknowledges the importance of ideas concerning 
restraint and its absence in the chapters that chronologically bracket the 
Elizabethan age, and thus highlights the need for in future study of the 
intervening period. Lynn gives close attention to the discourse of chivalry and its 
relationship to the practice of war in the middle ages, and considered how the 
laws of war and honour during the Enlightenment influenced their conduct of 
war. Lynn’s attention upon the role of restraint, or its absence, introduces an 
interesting framework for understanding how the perceptions of honour and 
                                         
63 For a short overview of contemporary sources related to both the law of the sea and the laws 
of land warfare during the reign of Elizabeth I see K.R. Simmonds, ‘Some English precursors of 
Hugo Grotius’, Transactions of the Grotius Society 43 (1957), pp. 143-57. 
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religious belief interacted and imposed upon the ‘reality of war’ and armed 
conflict. This thesis seeks to understand how English soldiers perceived the 
conflicts through their application or neglect of conventions in the conflicts that 
they fought in. 
With its subject and approaches identified, the thesis takes a comparative 
approach to the problem. It follows Elizabethan officers on campaign, examines 
elements of the laws of war and compares them against their actions. The 
Elizabethan discourse on the laws of war, and relative individual commentaries 
on armed conflict provide the historian with a broad cultural framework that 
specifically relate to the practical execution of military operations.66 This 
discourse on the laws of war shared close connections with both religion and 
honour. I argue that they were a fundamental lens through which English officers 
understood the conflicts that they fought in, which is shown directly from 
reports from the field. 
 
Structure 
The argument begins at chapter 2 with a comparative analysis of the 
diverse types of armed conflict that Elizabethan soldiers at times found 
themselves fighting. It delineates the types of conflict recognised or rejected by 
the English state into one of three typologies: war as a competitive judicial 
conflict between sovereign states; holy war or crusade, which in its forms as 
authorized by the Roman pontiff was a doctrine to which Protestant theology 
was opposed and whose legitimacy the English refused to acknowledge; and 
thirdly, rebellion, which was perceived not as war but a matter of domestic law 
enforcement that used military force to suppress what were in essence criminal 
actions. Each category of armed conflict had its own place in the Elizabethan 
mind, which in turn altered how they fought in each type of conflict and implied 
certain relative standards of conduct. 
Following the delineation of conflicts into their various cultural and legal 
distinctions (war, holy war, and rebellion), chapter 3, the first of two parts, 
addresses how English perceptions of themselves and their enemies influenced 
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military actions in the Netherlands in the 1570s and early 1580s. It begins with 
an examination of the unofficial and hence illegal early interventions by 
Elizabeth against the Spanish subject-state of the Netherlands, and the 
reception of the successive waves of English ‘volunteer’ companies by varying 
Spanish governors. Given the potential for Spanish atrocities, this theatre of war 
provides new insights into the English conceptions of war and the moderating 
influence that English perceptions of laws of war had on combat. 
Chapter 4 continues the study of war between sovereign states by 
examining the next stages of English intervention, reassessing the military 
campaigns and command of the earl of Leicester with an emphasis the earl’s use 
of the laws of war. Elizabeth’s dispatch of the earl of Leicester and an English 
army to the Netherlands late in 1585 was a turning point in the Anglo-Dutch 
alliance. The English intervention in the Netherlands was preceded by a formal 
defensive treaty signed at Nonsuch (1585) which established a state of open war 
between England and Spain. However, it is important to note that although a 
state of open war theoretically existed neither Elizabeth I nor Philip II executed 
full scale military operations against one another. Elizabeth instead issued 
proclamations with specific and limited goals, which was a shift away from the 
practices of her predecessors use of heralds.67 Whereas the legal status of 
English soldiers in earlier expeditions was in doubt, Elizabeth’s declaration war 
made this clear, and the laws of war featured prominently in many of Leicester’s 
actions. Indeed, it can be argued that, the progression of Dutch rebellions into a 
regular war in the Netherlands was in part the result of the lawful intervention 
of the English military forces. 
Following the two-part examination of the laws of war in both covert wars 
and declared wars with Spain. Chapter 5 turns away from ‘foreign’ wars and 
looks at the Elizabethans’ perceptions of, and practices against, the wide-spread 
rebellions in Ireland. English military operations in Ireland between 1569 and 
1584 witnessed a period of remarkable military violence by both the English 
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the lowe countries (London: Christopher Barker, 1585); idem, A declaration of the causes 
moving the queens maiestie of England, to prepare and send a navy to the seas, for the 
defence of her realms against the king of Spaines forces (London: Christopher Barker, 1596); 
idem, A declaration of the iust causes moouing the queenes maiestie to send a nauie, and 
armie to the seas, and towards Spaine (London: Christopher Barker, 1597). 
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state and local elites. Like her father Henry VIII, Elizabeth regarded England as 
an imperial power and claimed dominion over Ireland. Accordingly, when various 
Irish factions took-up arms against the English state, they were regarded as 
taking up arms against their monarch and thus effectively committed treason. 
Elizabeth’s government used military force to quell repeated Irish insurrections, 
but as these did not meet the legal requirements of war, the laws of war were in 
theory not applicable in such conflicts, thereby legitimizing more extreme forms 
of conduct. Nevertheless, certain customs associated with war and its laws were 
in fact observed in certain circumstances by English commanders in operations 
against the Irish, and these are explored in turn. 
The complex dynamic between the English military establishment and 
their various antagonists, both domestic and foreign, are brought together in the 
conclusion, which reflects on the ways in which an English military culture used 
state sanctioned violence in armed conflicts. It argues that the way in which it 
did so provides important insights into the preconceptions of Elizabethan soldiers 
regarding their own position within a conflict, and the place of their opponents 
within their world view. 
 
Sources 
In the latter half of the sixteenth-century, England witnessed a marked 
increase in the production of texts discussing military affairs. Thomas Arnold 
observed that ‘the moment infantry tactics became a problem for educated 
military men… they naturally went about the problem in the manner of 
intellectuals; they talked, they corresponded, they wrote and they published.’68 
Elizabethan soldiers, particularly the officer corps, as well as military minded 
elites, and government officials concerned with military operations, embraced 
this intellectual development in military affairs.69 The fruits of the English 
                                         
68 David R. Lawrence, ‘“Caesar to this present day of king James”: military books and military 
culture, 1572-1603’, in The Complete soldier: military books in early Stuart England, 1603-
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‘intellectualisation of warfare’ has provided this thesis with a varied body of 
sources from which to draw upon.70 
The sources utilised in this thesis include both published and unpublished 
contemporary sources. This thesis relies heavily upon the law of war theories 
published by Alberico Gentili and Matthew Sutcliffe, but it also touches upon the 
lesser known legal opinions espoused by English theologians and government 
officials. Theory was compared with the record of actual combat operations that 
were documented in soldiers’ personal accounts, diaries, journals, and official 
correspondence, as well as with contemporary opinions on the art and science of 
warfare. The records of the Privy Council, the secretariats of leading officials, 
diplomatic reports, and broad sheet news reports provide additional information 
and indirect insights into both English policy and practices connected with the 
laws of war. All these sources, many of which have been edited into collections, 
reprints, and monograph publications, were drawn together creating a mosaic of 
Elizabethan martial practices during this period of intensifying military activity. 
Elizabeth’s growing military commitments reinvigorated the domestic 
study of the laws of war, but as with other military advancements, the English 
jurists were preceded by those on the continent. The son of a mother from the 
Low Countries and a Spanish father, Balthazar de Ayala was educated a Leuven 
University, and on the grounds of his affiliation with the Netherlands, he applied 
for and received the post of auditor-general of the Spanish Army of Flanders. 
Ayala’s experiences in this post inspired him to record his views on the laws of 
war in his De iure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari, libri III (1582), which 
he dedicated to Alexander Farnese, then prince of Parma and captain-general of 
the Army of Flanders.71 This treatise is important in the historiography of the 
laws of war because as Peter Haggenmacher has argued, Ayala’s discourse broke 
with late medieval interpretations of just war and introduced a view of the laws 
of war commensurate with regular warfare, that is conventional warfare, and 
divorced it from quasi-religious causes.72 Regular war was given an English 
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advocate, albeit one with an Italian accent, with the arrival of the Italian 
religious refugee Alberico Gentili who made his home in England. 
Upon his arrival, Gentili quickly built a relationship with the earl of 
Leicester, then chancellor of the University of Oxford, and earned some 
preferment at that university. Doubtless owing to his ability, Gentili steadily 
advanced in position and renown. In the aftermath of the Throckmorton Plot 
(1584) to assassinate Queen Elizabeth and replace her with Mary, queen of 
Scots, Gentili and Johannis Hotman, two continental trained international legal 
jurists then residing in England, were consulted when evidence was discovered 
that implicated the Spanish ambassador, Bernardo de Mendoza in the plot.73 
Some members of the Privy Council were inclined to levy a harsh punishment 
upon Mendoza; they argued ‘in vaine he putteth himselfe under the safeguard of 
nations, which violateth the law of nations’.74 However, both Gentili and 
Hotman argued against such an action; they argued that international law 
shielded ambassadors from criminal prosecution.75 The Privy Council was 
ultimately convinced by Gentili and Hotman’s arguments, and they decided not 
to seek Mendoza’s criminal prosecution. Instead Mendoza was asked to leave 
England, which he did.76 During the Oxford graduation ceremonies later in 1584, 
Gentili lectured on the rights and duties of ambassadors to an audience that 
included both the earl of Leicester and Sir Philip Sidney. 
In the intervening years, Gentili developed deeper ties with the earl of 
Essex, and following the death of Essex’s stepfather in 1589, the earl of 
                                         
73 Sources relating to the Throckmorton plot: CSP Spain (1580-1586), pp. 513-15; Thomas Birch, 
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Leicester, Essex rose in prominence to dominate the martial faction within the 
Elizabethan regime.77 Essex, like Leicester, placed great stock in scholarly 
acumen and would make critical use of scholars within his secretariat.78 These 
men assisted the earl in developing his policies and ensured that they were 
rooted in rigorous renaissance learning, which Essex would later use to justify 
and advance his pro-war and anti-Spanish agenda. Perhaps, when planning 
foreign campaigns, Essex and Gentili met to discuss the campaign, and its 
attendant legal and political implications. There is little evidence for this, but 
such a practice coincides with Essex’s public advice and avowed practices: ‘in 
everye new studye, seeke out some expert men to confer withall’ because ‘I 
profited more by some expert man in half a day’s conference, than by myself in 
a month’s study.’79 Certainly Gentili was the preeminent authority on the 
international law of war and would have been the expert to whom Essex would 
turn to for legal advice. 
The seeds for Gentili’s law of war omnibus De iure belli libri tres were a 
series of academic lectures, which he notably presented at the University of 
Oxford in 1588-1589 which were subsequently published.80 Written in the shadow 
of the Spanish armada, these lectures would have captured the zeitgeist and 
thus public attention. It seems highly likely, just as following the Throckmorton 
Plot, that a generation of Oxford students and interested persons, especially 
those in or considering military or civil service careers, would have attended or 
sought out the published commentaries. The first of these commentaries focused 
on jus ad bellum and addressed issues related to the just causes of war which 
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introduced innovations regarding preventative wars and divorced war from 
quasi-religious causes.81 Gentili asked his friend John Bennett (1552/3-1627), an 
Oxford MA and proctor (1585), to prepare questions that would test his theories 
under cross examination.82 The lectures, however, were not wholly the product 
of isolated academic erudition. In the second series of commentaries, Gentili 
focused on jus in bello, legitimate actions in warfare, which appear to have 
been a collaborative production between Gentili, the primary author, and 
Thomas Smith, a future Privy Council secretary but then the earl of Essex’s 
secretary and a leading Latinist. This suggests that they were intended to have a 
more practical orientation with Smith standing-in as Essex’s proxy and providing 
insights that Essex acquired on campaign which would address the actual 
conditions of war that officers might encounter.83 The final series of 
commentaries addressed issues of post bellum and presented various approaches 
and policies used to conclude wars. Gentili’s De iure belli libri tres would echo 
through the ages and influenced both future English and continental 
commentators on the laws of war.84 
Gentili’s influence was recognisable in another key contemporary English 
source on the laws of war: Matthew Sutcliffe’s The practice, proceedings, and 
lawes of armes (1593).85 Sutcliffe repeated similar arguments that were first 
begun by Gentili; for example the necessity and legality of preventative wars. 
Although Sutcliffe employed the older, more martial, and chivalric term ‘laws of 
arms’ rather than the more legal term ‘law of war’ or ‘de jure belli’, his 
discourse was thoroughly contemporary and unique in its perspective from that 
by Gentili. Despite Sutcliffe’s substantial legal training, his treatise presents the 
laws of war from a less academic and a more soldierly orientation which 
reflected the influence of his own military service on his interpretation of the 
laws of war. At the time of his book’s publication, Sutcliffe claimed rather 
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significant military service: ‘I have, as neere as I could, described the right 
course & true discipline of armes... all which I haue wonne not onely by long 
obseruation, but also by dangerous experience both in France, Italy, Flanders 
and Portugall.’ It is known for certain that Sutcliffe served Leicester in the Low 
Countries as adjutant-general (c. 1587-88), and he joined Essex’s expedition to 
Ireland (1599) in the position of judge marshal of the army.86 As adjutant–
general and judge marshal, Sutcliffe would have been principally responsible for 
maintaining discipline in the camps and within the army in general; he would 
also been the legal expert with whom commanders such as Leicester and Essex 
conferred when questions related to a specific legal point arose during military 
operations. 
It is worth noting that although both Gentili and Sutcliffe’s works were 
not published until the later 1580s and 1590s, they nevertheless reflected the 
major thrust of contemporary English legal opinions on the laws of war; 
however, this legal aspect of their works needs to be prefaced with an 
understanding of their underlying political context.87 Gentili and Sutcliffe did not 
produce their treaties out of an unbiased desire to objectively describe the 
international legal structures of their time. Gentili most clearly was a client of 
the earl of Essex and therefore would have been influenced by the earl’s 
politics. Sutcliffe had less clear connections to Essex prior to 1599, but certainly 
the two were acquainted with one another. Therefore, these works were written 
to either purposefully to further the pro-war and anti-Spanish politics of the earl 
of Essex or shared Essex’s views. 
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Irish knights and royal displeasure in 1599’, in Elizabeth I and Ireland, eds., B. Kane and V. 
McGowan-Doyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 184-208, 191 fn. 26. 
87 Historians of international law have relatively recently begun to highlight the influence of 
politics on the jurisprudence of international law; Randal Lesaffer notes that this trend ‘has 
been advanced in the Anglo-American world by the Cambridge School of the History of 
political thought – in particular Richard Tuck’s work – and by Martti Koskenniemi’s Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations (2001)’, and by Tetsuya Toyoda, Theory and politics of the law of 
nations. Randall Lesaffer, ‘General editors preface’, in Tetsuya Toyoda, Theory and politics 
of the law of nations: political bias in international law discourse of seven German court 
councillors in the seventeenth-centuries, legal history series, vol. 5, studies in the history of 
international law discourse, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. ix-x, x. 
Chapter 1. Introduction  41 
 
Essex was politically concerned with the continuation and the expansion 
of the war against Spain which increasingly brought his faction into opposition 
with the less aggressive policies advanced by Lord Burghley and his faction. 
When the earl took over the leadership of the war party in Elizabethan politics, 
he used his position to shape the debate over war and peace with Spain.88 
Essex’s arguments reached a fevered pitch in 1598. Camden recounts a 
boisterous Privy Council debate where Burghley argued for the ‘benefits of 
peace… knowing the chance of warre to be uncertaine, the charges infinite, the 
treasure of England exhausted … and Spaniards treasure Vnexhausted’, and at 
the closing of his argument, he declared ‘no good could come to England by this 
warre’. Essex vociferously challenged this line of pacifist thinking: ‘I have 
already related, maintained stiffely, that no peace could be made with the 
Spaniards but such as would be dishonourable and treacherous’! Essex’s remarks 
caused Burghley to exclaim that Essex ‘breathed nothing but warre, slaughter, 
and bloud’, and punctuating his point with a raised psalter, which he directed at 
the earl: ‘men of bloud shall not live out halfe their dayes.’89 From the conflict’s 
earliest years, the Elizabethan regime asserted that its actions were a justifiable 
defence against Philip and wider Spanish tyranny, and it suppressed arguments 
that the kingdom acted in defence of rebels. 
Essex’s politics were most clearly manifested in a semi-private letter 
which he circulated in 1598: To Maister Anthony Bacon: an apologie of the earle 
of Essex against those which falsly and maliciously taxe him to be onely 
hinderer of the peace and quiet of his country.90 During that same year, Gentili 
published his final version of his commentaries on the laws of war in Hanau: De 
iure belli libri tres (1598). It furnished Essex’s Apoligie with requisite legal 
justifications for continuing the war against Spain and was directly quoted by the 
earl.91 Furthermore, as Alexandra Gajda observed, ‘Gentili’s work added 
                                         
88 Alexandra Gajda, ‘Debating war and peace in late Elizabethan England’, The historical journal 
52 (2009), pp. 851-878. 
89 William Camden, Annals or, the history of the most renowned and victorious Princess 
Elizabeth, 3rd ed. (London: Benjamin Fisher, 1635), pp. 492-3. 
90 Devereux, Apologie. For the history of Essex’s Apologie see Hugh Gazzard, ‘“Idle papers”: an 
apology of the earl of Essex’, in Essex: the cultural impact of an Elizabethan courtier, eds. A. 
Connolly and L. Hopkins (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), pp. 239-266. 
91 Gajda, ‘Debating war and peace in late Elizabethan England’, p. 868. 
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substantial intellectual ballast to Essex’s argument that the power of Spain must 
be checked before peace could be restored to Christendom.’92 
 The Essexian polemic in De iure belli libri tres was measured.93 Gentili 
states his political positions in a number of chapters, but chapter 16 ‘On 
defending the subjects of another sovereign’ stands out.94 In this chapter Gentili 
highlights the legality and honour connected with the English intervention on 
behalf of the Dutch. Throughout De iure belli libri tres, Gentili clearly saw Philip 
II’s Spain as a threat to the international order because of its expansionist and 
tyrannical actions. As long as there were advantages in war, ‘[t]he king [Philip II] 
himself replied not long ago that he would not cease from warfare’.95 
Additionally, Gentili was critical of Spanish military conduct, and his position 
was neatly summarised in his analysis of the rights and obligations ‘[o]f those 
that surrender to the enemy’.96 Here, he referenced the duke of Alba’s absolute 
policy: ‘that those who had been assailed with artillery did not deserve 
pardon.’97 The duke’s view, Gentili thought, did not leave enough room for 
discretion on the part of commanders, which he argued was essential to the 
correct application of the laws of war. 
 If Gentili’s interpretation of the laws of war was measured, then 
Sutcliffe’s was pure belligerence. There can be no doubt that Sutcliffe fully 
agreed with Essex’s views on Spain. Writing in 1593, Sutcliffe warned against any 
peace with Spain using the same language employed by Essex in 1598: 
the king of Spain hath thought it lawful under colour of treatie of 
peace, without any defiance to cut our throtes, if he could. It may 
be, he taketh the Popes excommunication against the Prince and 
                                         
92 Ibid., p. 868. 
93 In my reading of the sources, I think that Gentili preserved a high degree of emotional 
detachment and his conclusions were measured and well founded; however, Gajda asserts 
that Gentili was passionately hostile to Spain: Gajda, ‘Debating war and peace in late 
Elizabethan England’, p. 868. 
94 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, pp. 77-78. Gentili’s contribution to the Essexian polemic was also justified in 
his discussions of offensive and defensive wars which ‘impressed the necessity of actions 
against tyrants whose ambitions threatened Christendom.’ Gajda, ‘Debating war and peace in 
late Elizabethan England’, p. 868. 
95 Devereux, Apologie, pp. 16-19. 
96 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, pp. 216-230, especially 217-218. 
97 Ibid., p. 218. 
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people of this land for a sufficient denuntiation, or warrant to 
inuade us without other circumstance.98 
Aware of the arguments in favour of peace, many of which were the same as 
those spoken by Burghley in 1598. Sutcliffe rejected these as being ‘built on 
false grounds’.99 Sutcliffe argued ‘[w]e can not haue peace the Spaniard hauing 
begun warres, and threatning the destruction of our state: the question is, 
whether is better for vs to stay until he come vpon vs, or to begin with him and 
seeke him in his owne country: I say this is best’.100 
 Therefore, and not surprisingly, the theoretical basis upon which Gentili 
and Sutcliffe based their discourses on the laws of war were skewed in favour of 
the English. These authors contrasted the English practice of the laws of war, 
which was noble, with those used by Spain which had been cruel and twisted to 
serve tyranny. There was an explicit argument and bias in these texts that 
characterised English actions as ‘restrained, proportionate, legitimised by reason 
and law, and unthreatening to foreign powers’; whereas, the actions of Spain’s 
soldiers were construed ambitious and tyrannical. To make matters worse some 
Italian and Spanish writers held that Spain had been elected to unite 
Christendom against the infidel and heretic.101 The shortcomings of theoretical 
treaties can be corrected for somewhat by considering how soldiers in the field 
viewed the actions of the enemy. For if an enemy can see justice in the actions 
of his foe then it must have more merit than self-aggrandising appellations; 
however, in this case, Spanish atrocities could just as easily be read as nothing 
more than the expected actions from such a tyrannical foe. 
If, as Parker notes, ‘explicit discussions of the customs of war by leading 
military practitioners’ are rare, soldiers’ records of campaigns nevertheless 
contain their own explicit but subtle discourse on the customs and laws of 
war.102 What follows is an argument founded upon extensively upon printed news 
                                         
98 Sutcliffe, The practice, proceedings, and lawes of armes, p. 11, see also his dedication to 
Essex, sig. A2r-v. 
99 Ibid., p. 97. 
100 Ibid. 
101 K.W. Swart, ‘The Black Legend during the Eight Years War’, in Some political mythologies, 
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reports, journals, diaries, and memoirs from soldiers on campaign.103 Many of 
these were written by eyewitnesses or participants in events, and many of their 
descriptions of events part of official reports. Each author wrote with his own 
agenda but the same is generally true for all correspondence which in the early 
modern period which was ‘commonly drafted and revised in order to fashion a 
carefully constructed persona’.104 To provide an additional counterpoint to a 
wholly English narrative, I have made use of several continental sources which 
presents events from the Spanish and their allies’ perspective. 
In both the Dutch and Irish theatres, certain participants contributed 
either personally in writing or were interviewed by their contemporaries. Some 
of these recollections were used to develop historical chronicles. These have 
been readily used when their precedence can be traced. For example, Stowe’s 
Annales or Generall Chronicle of England (1615) was supplemented with eye-
witness reports from Leicester’s campaign. This was achieved through Stowe’s 
correspondence with Henry Archer, whom Stowe refers to as his ‘good friend and 
neare kinsman’. Archer was positioned close to Leicester since he served as one 
of his personal guards which provided him an opportunity to closely observe the 
earl’s actions.105 Another such source is John Hooker, whose close connections 
with the Carew family would supplement his Irish Chronicle; a contribution to 
Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 
Just as Sutcliffe was both a theologian and a soldier, so too did the laws 
of war have complex and dynamic sources to drawn from. I have made use of 
several religious tracts and sermons which illuminate English attitudes towards 
                                         
103 For example, official correspondence was lean during the deployment of English mercenaries 
to the Dutch wars (1572-1574) but certain soldiers wrote some detailed campaign journals: 
Walter Morgan, The expedition in Holland, 1572-1574, ed., D. Caldecott-Baird (London: 
Seeley Service and Company, 1976); Roger Williams, A brief discourse of warre, and The 
Actions of the Lowe Countries, in The Works of Sir Roger Williams, ed., J.X. Evans (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972). Where the author was not a direct participant in event, he 
interviewed the participants: Churchyard’s translation of Emmanuel van Meteren, A true 
discourse historical, of the succeeding governors in the Netherlands, eds., T. Churchyard and 
R. Robinson (London: Matthew Lownes, 1602), as a historian Churchyard has some short 
comings but his account of Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s government of Munster 1569-1570 is 
uncommonly accurate in its details, compare for example T. Churchyard, A general rehearsal 
of warres, called Churchyard’s Choice (London: Edward White, 1579) with Gilbert’s official 
correspondence in Campaign Journals of the Elizabethan Irish wars, ed., D. Edwards (Dublin: 
Irish Manuscripts Commission, 2014), pp. 12-21. 
104 James Daybell, ed., ‘Introduction’, in Early Modern Women’s letter-writing, 1450-1700 
(Bassingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 8, c.f. Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, p. 45. 
105 Leycester correspondence, p. 478. 
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the laws of war in England; for example, Stephen Gosson’s The trumpet of warre 
(1598). Gosson approved of Gentili’s legal theories on the laws of war, and he 
present many of the same arguments in a popular sermon, which was given at St 
Paul’s Cross no less.106 Sermons, unlike university disputations or handbooks on 
military affairs, were a means of addressing a wider audience and educating 
them in the salient points of state policy and its legitimacy. St Pauls Cross was a 
significant venue which several historians have noted was ‘a semi-official 
medium of communication’; one went so far as to describe St Paul’s Cross as the 
broadcasting house of Elizabethan London’.107 St Paul’s, furthermore, ‘had an 
unrivalled reputation as a venue for “newsworthy” sermons and prestigious 
preachers; in 1598, Stephen Gosson claimed that comments he made in a Paul’s 
Cross sermon were repeated to him “fortie miles hence”’.108 Surely some of the 
soldiers bound for the wars would have sought out such events. 
For the study of English military activities on the continent, and 
principally in the Netherlands, the thesis makes extensive use of collections of 
the official correspondence related to the wars. The Calendars of State Papers 
held at The National Archives, Kew, the Historical Manuscripts Commission, and 
the Camden Society have been invaluable, and these have been augmented by 
corresponding collections such as Relations politiques des Pay-Bas.109 English 
campaigns in Ireland too produced an ever-increasing volume of correspondence, 
                                         
106 Gosson, The trumpet of warre. See also: John R. Hale, ‘Incitement to violence? English 
divines on the theme of war, 1578-1631’, in Renaissance war studies (London: Hambledon 
Press, 1983), pp. 487-517; Hale’s conclusions are challenged in Ben Lowe, ‘Religious wars and 
the “Common Peace”: Anglican anti-war sentiment in Elizabethan England’, Albion 28 (1996), 
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107 Mary Morrissey, Politics and the Paul’s Cross sermons, 1558-1642 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), p. 4; H. Gareth Owen, ‘Paul’s Cross: the broadcasting house of Elizabethan 
London’, History today 9 (1961), pp. 836-42. 
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of war, sig. G5r. 
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year of rule, and Elizabeth’s regnal year began on 17 November. Each new year of the 
Christian era begins with the feast of the Annunciation on 25 March. The Julian calendar year 
begins on the 1st of January, and the first day of the new year, in this thesis, was assumed to 
begin on 1 January. The Gregorian calendar (new style) was adopted in 1582, first among the 
Catholic states and principalities but it slowly spread across continental Europe. The thesis 
uses the Julian date which attended most English correspondence, and where it is not 
applicable it is noted. 
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which has been accessed as well through the Calendars of State Papers, and the 
Calendar of the Carew manuscripts preserved at Lambeth palace. Additional 
details and insights were gained from the works published by the Irish and 
Historical Manuscripts Commission; their various reports, and Calendar of Irish 
Patent Rolls were used. Indigenous Irish sources such as the Annals of the Four 
Masters, the Annals of Loch Ce, and Philip O’Sullivan Bear’s Catholic history of 
Ireland help to afford a necessary corrective to accounts written from a 
predominantly English perspective. 
 
Definitions 
It is necessary here to clarify and define certain aspects of the term 
‘nobility’ employed in this study. In some Anglophone historiography, a 
convention has developed whereby the term ‘noble’ is used to signify exclusively 
those that Thomas Smith described, in his De Republica Anglorum (1583), as the 
nobilitas major: those persons holding hereditary title of baron and above. The 
nobilitas minor or the gentry were those persons with the title of knight, 
esquire, or gentleman.110 English contemporaries, however, were freer with 
their use of the term ‘nobility’, and its cognates, which could encompass all 
those of ‘gentle blood’, albeit with the knowledge and understanding of its 
various distinctions.111 This thesis uses the term ‘noble’ in its contemporary 
context to signify one of gentle birth, and the nobilitas major are distinguished 
where necessary by the term ‘aristocracy’. 
The term ‘state’ is taken to refer to the formal governmental structures 
and offices, whereas ‘regime’ is used to invoke the combined unofficial 
machinery of government and the formal state mechanisms, identifies and 
references direct power and personal relationships in the implementation of 
state policy. For example, Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury (1563-1612), replaced 
his father in the office of Lord Treasurer, one of the state’s highest offices, but 
his position in the regime reached its pinnacle only after the fall of the earl of 
                                         
110 Thomas Smith, De republica Anglorum, ed., L. Alston (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1906), chapters 17-19. 
111 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, pp. 47-51: my use of terms differs from Trim’s position but 
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Essex, who was executed in 1601, which left his influence on the machinery of 
government virtually unchallenged. 
All these disparate elements – nobility, state, and regime – imposed upon 
military operations. The law of arms which had developed from the medieval 
code of chivalry was a pan-European code of military conduct and was 
universally recognised by the nobility, who in times of war broadly adhered to its 
principles. Enforcement of standards of conduct according to these laws and 
customs was maintained through a combination of social pressure and secular 
courts. The foreign interests of the English state drove forward the legal 
discourse upon the laws of war. International laws of war, however, were not 
proscriptive but rather followed the development of conventions; therefore, the 
discourses were descriptive of prevailing norms of conduct already established. 
Prevailing norms have been identified as useful methods of law enforcement.112 
The thesis therefore uses precise Elizabethan legal definitions for war, since 
these encapsulate important perceptions and indicators of conduct. War had a 
specific application and that is in the armed conflict between sovereign states. 
Where the thesis discusses armed conflicts that were outside the conception of 
war, and, although they may have many of the characteristics of war, but were 
not considered as such by contemporaries, I have cited the contemporary terms 
for such types of actions; these include holy war, crusade, rebellion, riot, 
brigandage and piracy. 
I have imposed the artificial distinction ‘armed conflict’ upon the 
discussions below out of necessity. Like the term ‘nobility’ which could be used 
to either discuss all those of gentle birth or the aristocracy, but with full 
knowledge of its distinctions, so was term ‘war’ employed very generally at 
times by contemporaries referencing any intense type of armed conflict. 
However, to use war in this manner would give rise to several confused 
                                         
112 Jeffrey Rosen, ‘The social police: following the law because you’d be too embarrassed not 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  48 
 
preconceptions in the minds of readers and false expectations regarding conduct 
concerning the various types of conflicts being waged. 
Specificity is necessary because in the minds of Elizabethan commanders’ 
war and its laws of war only applied in one mode of conflict; this was in just 
war. The theory of just wars had within it a continuum of restraints. It is an 
artefact of modern legal historiography to differentiate between the lawful 
initiation of war, also known as jus ad bellum, and lawful actions in war or jus in 
bello.113 Just wars were either wholly just or wholly unjust; jus ad bellum was 
not separable in theory from jus in bello. Military actions against rebels were 
free from such distinctions of just conduct imposed by the laws of war, since 
these conflicts were matters of domestic law enforcement; nevertheless, the 
customs of war were so much a part of noble identity and military convention 
that officers in their actions against rebels applied on occasion some of the 
ritual aspects associated with war. 
 In this manner ‘[t]he sword and the law’ was a complex dialogue on the 
nature of authority and the regulation of violence within Elizabethan England 
and against its armed antagonists. To rightly possess a sword in the execution of 
one’s duty to the state was to be endowed with certain authority derived 
directly from the crown, but the sword also carried a reminder to those 
entrusted to bear it. The monarch was the source of their power and authority, 
and it was the nobility’s duty to bear the sword against the prince’s enemies and 
rebels. 
 
                                         
113 Robert Kolb, ‘Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello’, International Review of 
the Red Cross 37 (1997), pp. 553-562. 
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Chapter 2. 
The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed 
conflict 
 
[H]ow shall the voices of suppliants be heard amid the heat of battle? 114 
-Alberico Gentili 
 
Gentili here poses the essential question at the heart of the laws of armed 
conflict. Amidst the violent actions of warfare, the clatter of swords and pikes, 
the blasts of muskets and cannon, how did the Elizabethans choose to abate 
violence or unleash it in their wars between states, for religion, or in rebellions? 
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise English military conduct within 
these disparate legal environments. 
The Elizabethans recognised as legitimate two different legal spheres 
wherein military action could be rightly applied; these were international 
conflicts between states which were generally recognised as war, and a state’s 
use of military force against a domestic insurgency. In post Reformation and 
Protestant England, a third category, holy war, was — in the form endorsed by 
the Catholic Church — thoroughly rejected. In each type of military conflict 
there were specific laws that governed and imposed on the conduct of military 
operations and helped to shape the attitudes of English commanders and 
soldiers, as well as the expectations of opposing belligerents. 
 
Just and Regular War 
On the evening of 21 June 1596, Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, ordered 
his drummer to ‘sound throughout the town’, and advertise to the Spanish 
defenders of Cadiz’s castle ‘that all that would yield, should repair to the Town-
House’ before morning, otherwise ‘they should looke for no mercy, but should 
every one be put to the sword’.115 Essex’s ultimatum to the inhabitants of Cadiz 
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1703), p. 187; see also William Monson, The naval tracts of Sir William Monson, ed., M. 
50 
Chapter 2. The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict 
 
was a striking reminder of the brutal potential of late sixteenth-century warfare. 
According to what legal principles was Essex’s ultimatum made, and how could 
violence by individuals be restrained, when ‘[i]t is proper for a warrior when 
engaged with an enemy to lay aside all pity and clemency and show no 
mercy’?116 Essex’s call for surrender, an action drawn from classical antiquity, 
was in effect a summons and made in the belief that his cause and war were 
just, and that the Spanish were his lawful enemies. 
 ‘What causes make wars just or unjust,’ asked Matthew Sutcliffe, ‘and 
what are the effects of lawful wars’?117 It was thanks to Essex’s personal interest 
in just such questions and in the laws of war that we have a cogent Elizabethan 
doctrine dealing with such matters. It was probably through his patronage that 
two important English discourses saw the printer’s press: Sutcliffe’s The 
Practice, Proceedings, and the laws of arms (1596) and Alberico Gentili’s 
Commentaries, which were brought together edited and expanded into De Iure 
Belli Libri Tres (1612), all of which bear dedications to the earl of Essex.118 Essex 
would thus have been well counselled in legal theory, which unanimously agreed 
that ‘wars are just and lawful, which are made by the sovereign’.119 
All other conflicts were not specifically war, which ‘is a just and public 
contest of arms’ between sovereign states and sovereign states alone.120 This 
was an idea that Essex strongly believed in, and prompted him to make an 
allegorical comparison between Elizabeth’s war with Spain and the joust: ‘you 
two [king Philip II and Queen Elizabeth I] are like 2 mightie Champions entred 
into the lists to fight for the two great general quarrels of Christendome, 
Religion and Libertie…. Hee aspiring to an vniuersall monarchy, your Ma[jesty] 
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releeuing all the oppressed’.121 In Essex’s allegory, the joust, like war, was event 
that was more than just a violent contest played out according to rules accepted 
by the participants, but it was also a spectacle to be observed by an audience. 
In the case of England’s war against Spain, all of Europe was Essex’s audience. 
Lawful wars were to be publicly announced and moderately prosecuted until 
justice was satisfied and an assured peace obtained.122 The ‘effects of lawful 
wars’ were numerous, but most importantly, they sought to limit the 
destructiveness of war: ‘we should not be too cruel and harsh towards an 
enemy’, lest just war become a ‘war of extermination’.123 
Combatants in just war were equals engaged in a form of judicial duel in 
which force of arms would decide the justice of one case over another. Yet what 
manner of law could be binding upon sovereigns’, ‘since they acknowledge no 
judge or superior’, that might limit the destruction attending war?124 
Commentators sough a practical tool to manage international relations, and to 
do this they appealed to the law of nations and natural law. The law of nations 
‘is that which is in use among all the nations of men’, wrote Gentili. This did not 
‘mean that all nations actually came together at a given time, and thus the law 
of nations was established’, but rather the notion was an appeal to human 
reason.125 ‘Reason teaches’ all humanity, regardless of their nation. 
Such laws are not written, but inborn; we have not learned, 
received, and read them, but we have wrested, drawn, and forged 
them out of nature herself. We have not received them through 
instruction, but have acquired them at birth; we have gained them, 
not by training but by instinct.126 
Therefore, human reason, understood as the law of nature and a synonym for 
the law of nations, was combined with defined practices and customs to provide 
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soldiers and officers with a comprehensible and easily transmissible body of case 
law of acceptable actions in war.127 
The defined practices and customs of war will be dealt with in subsequent 
chapters. Here the focus is on the use of reason to restrain violence in an 
activity characterised by death and destruction. The doctrine of just and regular 
warfare in the sixteenth-century fostered restraint through its appeal to reason 
by creating an image of the enemy that emphasised his equality with other 
combatants. An anthropologist of war has noted that: ‘[m]ost soldiers are able 
to kill and be killed more easily in warfare if they possess an image of the enemy 
sufficiently evil to inspire hatred and repugnance.’128 However, a consistent 
thread running throughout Elizabethan discourses was the assertion that a 
‘hostis [“enemy”] is a person with whom war is waged and who is the equal of 
his opponent.’129 Belligerents, in this sense, were peers and brothers in arms 
even if they fought under opposing banners. It is their equality that made the 
performance of restraint easier, and gave war a competitive, ritualistic, 
character. 
If in fact war ought to moderately prosecuted, how then could Essex make 
such an apparently merciless declaration, and why is the expedition important 
to the study of the laws of war? Cadiz came to epitomise Elizabethan ideas about 
just war justly executed. Sir George Carew, a known murderer and the bane of 
Irish rebels, was in awe of his commanders’ actions: ‘I did never in my life see 
any governors command with more judgment and wisdom, not execute their 
designs with more valour than they have done in this action’.130 Essex’s chaplain 
preached at St Pauls Cathedral on the honour and valour exhibited in bringing 
                                         
127 Coleman Phillipson, ‘Albericus Gentilis’, in Great Jurists of the World, eds., J. Macdonell and 
E. Mason, the continental legal history series, 11 vols. (Boston: Brown and Company, 1914), i, 
pp. 109-143,130. 
128 J. Glenn Gray, The warriors: reflections on men in battle (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1959, 1970), p. 133. 
129 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 12; Sutcliffe, Practice, proceedings, and lawes of armes, pp. 11-12 
(implied, furthermore Sutcliffe argued this perception was pan European); Gosson, Trumpet 
of war, ff. 36 (wrong intentions of the soldier), 37 (magnanimity in victory). 
130 HMC Salibury, vi, p. 229. 
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about this ‘happy victory’ to ringing applause.131 It was common for members of 
the expedition to refer with professional pride to the mercy and clemency shown 
to the defeated. The Spanish too, it was asserted, from the king to his council 
and even the wider populace, all recognised and praised Essex, and the English 
soldiers, for their restraint at Cadiz.132 
The study of the laws of war, the appeals to them by suppliants, and their 
practice by soldiers at Cadiz does not begin with the Essex’s final warning to the 
castle but with the fury of the initial English attack, which also helps to highlight 
when and how restraint manifested itself in military operations. The success, or 
failure, of such operations depends upon immediate and sustained violence 
against an enemy, a condition that has little room for restraint: ‘[w]hatever you 
do in the heat of battle admits of excuse, when reason lies prostrate and the 
hands, as though intoxicated, do not obey the mind’.133 Yet equally, as Gentili 
notes, ‘when the danger is finally averted, the ardour of mind quieted, and the 
thoughts restored to peace, then to rage and act without consideration is the 
sign of a base mind.’134 This basic principle of the law of war was one that the 
English officers and men adhered to in the assault upon Cadiz. Jurists and 
soldiers referenced unrestrained combat by the term ‘fury’. Gentili made a few 
direct references to the term ‘fury’, and drawing upon jurisprudence stated: 
‘fury, as Baldus called it … is nothing else than violence.’135 An official report 
stated that Cadiz had been captured with ‘sudden fury’ but that afterwards its 
surrender was formalised, formally signalling that ‘the fury [was] now passed’.136 
As the English army swiftly advanced on the town from their beachhead, 
some one and a half miles distant from Cadiz, Essex sent the master of camp, Sir 
John Wingfield, to encounter a mixed force of 300 Spanish horse and foot. The 
Spaniards charged the body of English pike, but the English ‘stoode them 
                                         
131 [Lambeth Palace Library] Bacon MSS. 658, fol. 173, c.f. Walter Bourchier Devereux, Lives and 
letters of the Devereux, earls of Essex, in the reigns of Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I, 
1540-1646, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1853), i, p. 380. 
132 Birch, Memoirs of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, p. 125. 
133 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 211. 
134 Ibid., p. 211. 
135 Ibid., p. 378, see also Gentili’s definition at p. 76: ‘for fury, that is, war, is without 
moderation.’ 
136 CSPD (1595-1597), p. 272; Hakluyt, The principal navigations, iv, p. 253. 
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bravely’, and Wingfield himself wounded their captain Don Nuno de Villa Vicenza 
el Vejo.137 Some of the Spanish soldiers attempted to recover their fallen 
captain, but Wingfield captured him and made him his prisoner (figure 7.).138 
The military commentator and veteran practitioner of the art of war, 
Robert Barrett pointed out the ugly brutality of combat in war that the average 
soldier would be most accustomed to: 
[W]hen men come to the shock, or push of the Pike, they sarrie [i.e. 
press] close together, and the first three, five, or seven rankes do 
beare the chiefe brunt; and entred so farrre, men buckle Pell-Mell, 
close together, by which time commonlie the one side reculeth [i.e. 
recoils] ... and a battell [formation] once reculing doth not lightlie 
hold long, so that ere the Centre of the Battaill be touched one side 
                                         
137 Stephen and Elizabeth Usherwood, The counter-armada, 1596: the journal of the ‘Mary 
Rose’, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 143 (from the journal of Sir George Carew, 
appendix I); Corbett, ‘Relation of the voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, p. 75. 
138 Fig. 7. Corbett, ‘Relation of the voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, pp. 75, 86, reprint of Baptisa Boazio, 
An Exact map of the town of Cadiz made by the commandment of the lords generals (London, 
1596), between pp. 68-9. 
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Figure 7. The battle, or skirmish, at Cadiz (1596). The action was fought between the English 
and Spanish soldiers just after the English landing outside the town of Cadiz. 
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must fall to disaray; men once disordered, they commonly fall to 
rout, the rout is pursued with slaughter and ruine.139 
Restraint was not entirely desirable among the soldiery. Officers wanted the 
mass of their armies to act with detachment and bloody efficiency. Therefore, it 
was the practice in Elizabethan armies to have officers direct the taking of 
prisoners.140 Soldiers fighting in battle were ordered where and when to preserve 
life, and it was a mark of their discipline that they held back the killing blow or 
that fatal shot. 
It was also the practice among Elizabethan armies for officers to single 
out their opposites for single combat, which gave company officers and their 
guard increased opportunities to take enemy officers prisoner. Once Captain 
Vicenza was captured the remaining soldiers ‘retrayted in route to the port of 
the towne pressing to gett in to the same in such haste as they left many of 
there horses behynd’.141 The English army pursued them at a fast march. 
Cadiz was taken in a direct assault — another furious and intense type of 
combat — which used slightly differed tactics from pitched battles, yet was 
governed by the same essential rules of restraint. As the army approached the 
town, Essex ordered Sir Matthew Morgan to take men from Essex’s personal 
guard and breach the gate, while Edward Wingfield led other soldiers into the 
town ‘by a rocke at the ende of the wall’. 142 Others mounted the wall, engaging 
in hand-to-hand combat with the Spanish defenders, and Sir Francis Vere’s 
company advanced and supported Morgan’s mission to ‘brake open the gate’.143 
In under half an hour, ‘such was their fury’ that the English ensign few from atop 
                                         
139 Robert Barrett, The theorike and practike of modern warres (London: William Ponsonby, 
1598), p. 4. The pursuit of a rout was not a massacre but battle’s typical conclusion; 
regardless of whether or not it was achieved during a pitched battle, skirmish, ambush or 
assaults in a siege. For an informative discussion of the normal horrors in early modern 
warfare see: John Childs, ‘The laws of war in seventeenth-century Europe and their 
application during the Jacobite war in Ireland, 1688-91’, in Age of atrocity: violence and 
political conflict in early modern Ireland, eds., D. Edwards, P. Lenihan, and C. Tait (Dublin: 
Four Courts Press, 2007), pp. 283-300, 299. 
140 Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, Lawes and ordinances militarie (Leiden: Andries Vershout, 
1586), p. 5. 
141 Usherwood, The counter armada, p. 143. 
142 Paul E.J. Hammer, ‘New light on the Cadiz expedition of 1596’, Historical research 70 (1997), 
pp. 182-202, 195. 
143 Francis Vere, The commentaries of Sir Francis Vere (London: William Dillingham, 1672), p. 39. 
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the walls.144 Once inside Cadiz, the English companies engaged in fierce street-
to-street fighting with Spanish troops, while the inhabitants threw stones from 
their flat-topped roofs, more often wounding rather than killing soldiers.145 
Groups of Spanish pikemen occupying advantageous positions met the English 
soldiers at push of pike, and they sustained considerable casualties, including 
John Wingfield, shot in the head by a musketeer firing from the castle.146 
‘[S]ome fewe of them [English soldiers] that entred ran presentlie to the market 
place with great furie’ (figure 8.),147 while Vere and his company pursued a 
                                         
144 Vere, Commentaries, p. 39; Hakluyt, The principal navigations, iv, p. 253. 
145 Corbett, ‘Relation of the voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, p. 75; Hakluyt, The principal navigations, iv, 
p. 225; CSPD (1595-1597), pp. 269-70 (Captain Sir Arthur Savage recounts his sundry wounds 
from hurled stones). 
146 The term ‘casualty’ can be confused with ‘killed in action’ (KIA); however, ‘casualties’ 
include both wounded, killed as a result of wounds, and KIAs. The English army sustained few 
KIAs in the assault of Cadiz. 
147 Hammer, ‘New light on the Cadiz expedition of 1596’, p. 195. 
Fig. 8. Corbett, ‘Relation of the voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, pp. 75, 86, reprint of Baptisa Boazio, An 
Exact map of the town of Cadiz made by the commandment of the Lords Generals (London, 
1596), between pp. 68-9. 
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Figure 8. DD: the point where the English seized the gate and breached Cadiz’s wall. SS: two 
Spanish cannons set to defend the town gate that fired upon the assault troops. P: the 
Cathedral of Cadiz. O: Cadiz’s castle. N: the market place. 
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group of retreating Spaniards into the Franciscan abbey and Fort St Philip which 
were surrounded (figure 9.).148 Other English troops trapped a group of Spaniards 
in the king’s munitions house, so that Spanish resistance was confined to several 
fortified positions within the town: ‘by this time night began to grow on, and a 
kind of peace or intermission was obtained’.149 
English accounts of the assault on Cadiz stress the ‘fury’ of their assault, 
a form of action in which soldiers were prohibited, or at least discouraged from 
taking prisoners. English officers did not expect nor desired the common soldiery 
to show mercy to the enemy during the fury of an assault, and they might even 
be punished for so doing. Officers were expected to conduct themselves with 
slightly more discipline, and to show more restraint in particular to their fellow 
officers, but this too was a marginal difference because the objective remained 
paramount. A few prisoners were taken by Vere. ‘I got there three prisoners’, 
recounted Vere, ‘worth ten thousand ducats, one of which was a churchman and 
                                         
148 Fig. 9. Corbett, ‘Relation of the voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, pp. 75, 86, reprint of Baptisa Boazio, 
An Exact map of the town of Cadiz made by the commandment of the Lords Generals 
(London, 1596), between pp. 68-9. 
149 Hakluyt, The principal navigations, iv, p. 252. 
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Figure 9. R: the Abbey of St Francis. K: Fort St. Philip. 
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president of the contraction of the Indies.150 The other two were ancient knights 
called Don Pedro de Herera, and Don Gieronymo de Auallos.’151 However, it is 
not clear when or how these prisoners were taken, if they were captured during 
the assault then Vere’s actions were rare incidents during a disciplined attack 
that emphasised speed and violence of action.152 
Nevertheless, the ‘peace’ spoken of by Hakluyt changed the relationship 
between the attackers and the defenders: ‘[n]ecessity leads us to slay an enemy 
who shows fight; just as violence is shown by way of retaliation to one who 
resists, so the vanquished or the captive is entitled to mercy.’153 The idea of 
mercy to the defeated was an oft repeated idea, and one that prompted Essex, 
as well as other leaders of the army, to give the Spanish an opportunity to end 
the violence, and he sent out his drummer to promulgate the grim ultimatum to 
the castle. 
On the evening of the 21 June, Vere negotiated the surrender of the 
Franciscan Abbey and Fort St. Philip, and the munitions house also surrendered. 
The next morning, the Spanish displayed a ‘flag of truce’ from the castle’s walls. 
Spanish suppliants came before General Essex and the Lord Admiral, Charles 
Howard, 2nd baron Howard of Effingham, and, as Birch would have it, ‘happy 
were those, who could first kneel down to kiss their feet.’154Don Antiono Grion y 
Zuniga, chief magistrate of Cadiz, negotiated a ransom for the inhabitants of 
Cadiz and agreed to pay 120,000 ducats and provide fifty hostages as security.155 
                                         
150 Vere noted that one of his prisoners was the ‘president of the contraction of the Indies’. The 
contraction or rather La Casa de Contractión – the House of Trade – acted as a private trading 
house between the Crown and the Indies (the Americas). 
See also: Clarence Henry Haring, ‘The Casa de Contratación’, Trade and Navigation between 
Spain and the Indies in the time of the Hapsburgs, Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 19 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), pp. 21-45; Donald J. Mabry, Colonial Latin 
America (Coral Springs: Llumina Press, 2002), pp. 89-92; 
151 Vere, Commentaries, p. 42. 
152 ‘If in encounters and battels where he shall happen to be, the enemies happe to be 
ouercome, let him set all his care and diligence in the execution of, the victory with his 
weapon, and not in the spoile’. Barrett, The theorike and practike of modern warres, p. 11. 
153 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, pp. 210-11. Compare the lawyer’s view with that of the veteran captain: ‘in 
the expugnation of any fort, city or towne. He shall pursue the victorie euen yntill the enemy 
be wholie yeelded ... wherein he shall deporte himselfe neithercruell nor couetous ... in such 
cases shall he shew himselfe fauourable and mercifull to the humble vanquished’. Barrett, 
The theorike and practike of modern warres..., p. 11. 
154 Birch, Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth, ii, p. 54. 
155 Corbett, ‘Relation of the voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, p.78. 
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Having secured their surrender, Essex at once issued a proclamation to his army 
that ‘the fury now past, all men should surcease from all maner of blood and 
cruell dealing, and that there should no kind of violence or hard usage be 
offered to any, either man, woman or child, upon pain of death’.156 Women 
were granted an extraordinary privilege ‘to go away with all their apparel and 
jewels’.157 The proclamation was strictly enforced: two soldiers ‘attempting to 
take a woman’s necklace’ were executed.158 The surrender was finalised by 
Essex, when he provided the inhabitants of Cadiz with safe conduct out of the 
warzone. 
The English recognised that in combat soldiers were expected to kill the 
enemy; however, Essex’s restraint was especially praiseworthy because it was 
uncommon. The army’s practice of restraint at Cadiz was calculated to send a 
political signal to Cadiz, Spain, and Europe; unlike the ‘cruel’ Spanish, the 
English carefully attended to notions of civilised restraint. Or as the poet 
Thomas Newton put it: ‘[l]et us therefore in legal scales,/ all circumstances 
weigh,/ [w]hy, when, where, how & under whom we dinting [s]word assay.’159 
The Elizabethan perception of just war understood that success depended upon 
violence, and the laws of war acknowledge the problem of limiting violent 
conflict through the law of nature based on human reason. 
 
 
                                         
156 Hakluyt, The principal navigations, iv, p. 253. 
157 Birch, Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth, ii, p. 47. 
158 HMC Salisbury, vi, p. 226. 
159 Thomas Newton’s poem follows Iue’s dedication and was an English addition to a French 
discourse on war. Raimond de Beccarie de Pavie, Instructions for the warres amply, 
learnedly, and politiquely, discoursing the method of militarie discipline, tr., P. Iue (London: 
Thomas Man and Tobie Cooke, 1589), p. A3 (the poem bears the heading: ‘To all Gentlemen 
souldiers, and others, the Readers of this Booke’); the French original was published 
anonymously and perhaps Paul Iue wrongly attributes the authorship: see Charles Stephenson, 
‘Servant to the king for his fortifications’: Paul Ive and the practice of fortification 
(Yorkshire: D.P. & G. Military Publishers, 2008), p. 41, n. 11. 
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Holy War 
At Cadiz in 1596, the earl of Essex’s army had marched under the banner 
of St. George. Earlier, before a surprise attack upon the Dutch town of Axel in 
July of 1586, Sir Philip Sidney extorted his men to bravery by declaring that their 
cause was ‘God’s cause’, and their enemies were ‘men of false religion, enemies 
of God and his Church’ (figure 10.).160 Or as Dr Trim’s research has indicated: 
‘[t]he wars being fought against the Catholic states of Europe were seen by 
many in Elizabethan England and Wales as being in some sense a holy war.’161 
Symbols and words that, taken at their face value, indicated England’s wars 
were as much a holy wars as they were a just wars, which raises the question. 
How far did the Elizabethan regime’s religious policy shape their soldiers’ 
perceptions of holy war and influence the state’s military operations? 
Many Englishmen, both Protestants and Catholics, saw the conflicts of 
their age, to a certain extent, as religious wars; however, Protestant Englishmen 
had notably different conceptions of how holy wars should be executed. Catholic 
orthodoxy maintained a theory of war that permitted not only limited and 
secular just wars between states, but also, it sanctioned nominally unrestrained 
holy wars in defence of the Church. Holy war, in this construction, can be 
defined as an armed conflict fought for religious ideals which is authorised 
                                         
160 Fig. 10. The Due Repulse bearing the cross of St George (fig. 10.), and Essex’s ensigns bore 
the same flag throughout the assault on Cadiz (fig. 7 and fig. 8). Corbett, ‘Relation of the 
voyage to Cadiz, 1596’, p. 68. 
161 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, p. 35. 
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Figure 10. Essex’s flag ship, Due Repulse, bore the cross of St George as its signifier. 
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either by divine authority or upon the authority of some religious leader, and 
when the authorising authority was the pope the holy war became a crusade.162 
Advocating for the Catholic doctrine of crusade was the English religious 
exile, and stalwart opponent of the Elizabethan regime, Cardinal William Allen. 
‘Ther is no war in the world so iust or honorable,’ wrote Allen, ‘as that which is 
waged for [the Catholic] Religion’.163 This passage indicates that defence of the 
Catholic religion was the most justifiable cause for war. Unlike a Gentilian just 
war, which in its execution was a form of judicial arbitration, adjudicated 
through force of arms, between two equals, and limited by law. Allen’s holy war 
doctrine acknowledged only one side, those defending the Catholic Church, to 
be lawful. In this type of conflict, the opposing side, those fighting for heresies 
or false religion, were wholly illegitimate combatants, and thus, there was no 
allowance made for the customary protections due to enemies during holy wars. 
Holy war required the severest prosecution: ‘for that no crime in the world 
deserueth more sharpe and zealous pursuit of extreme reue[n]ge, (whether it be 
in superiours or subjects) then reuolting from the Faith to strange religions.’164 
All limitations were thus to be set aside in the belief that only in total victory 
was the ‘spiritual commonwealth’ preserved.165 
Allen’s doctrine of holy war could legitimately empower either princes or 
their subjects, at the pope’s command, and thus in the eyes of God, to lawfully 
take up the crusade and wage wars against the Catholic Church’s enemies, no 
matter whom they were. The temporal authorities – the magistrate - Allen 
asserted were the servants of the faith and subordinated to the pope’s spiritual 
supremacy in religious matters: ‘the te[m]poral power consisteth most safelie & 
longest, when it hath good correspondence and subordination to the spiritual’.166 
In Allen’s formulation of holy war, the state, or states, aligned with the Catholic 
Church were, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of transnational canon law 
                                         
162 Frederick H. Russell, The just war in the middle ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), p. 2. 
163 William Allen, A trve sincere and modest defence of English Catholiqves that svffer for their 
faith both at home and abroade: against a false, seditious and slanderous libel intitled; the 
execvtion of iustice in England (Rouen: Fr. Parson’s press, 1584), p. 103. 
164 Ibid., p. 103. 
165 Ibid., p. 98. 
166 Ibid., p. 123-4. 
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and the pope’s supreme spiritual authority when they engaged in holy wars. 
Where states failed to adhere to the church’s spiritual governance, the church 
could liberate subjects from all fealty, oaths, and allegiance and empower 
subjects to overthrow their heretical princes and magistrates through papally 
ordained holy war.167 Aware that it is oxymoronic, in this sense holy war was 
sanctified and lawful rebellion. Pope Pius V exercised this authority, when he 
issued the papal bull Regnans in Excelsis (1569/70) which deposed Elizabeth and 
released her subjects from loyalty and obedience to her regime.168 Allen clearly 
could not conceive of any circumstances outside the Catholic Church where 
another church possessed the legitimacy to engage in holy wars.169 The 
Protestant English state, however, had formally rejected the authority of the 
Catholic Church and papal supremacy. As a heretical state, Elizabethan England 
was the prime target of Allen’s doctrine of holy war, which made this doctrine 
of holy war the tool of the enemy. 
The Elizabethan Protestant religious settlement established the monarch 
of England as the absolute and supreme temporal and spiritual authority within 
England and its dominions. This declaration had its limits but was elegantly 
summarised in the articles of the Elizabethan religious settlement; Article 37, 
‘of Civil Magistrates’, which established the state’s superior authority, through 
the institution of the monarchy, over the church and war: 
The Queenes Maiestie hath the cheefe power in this Realme of 
England, and other her dominions, vnto whom the cheefe 
gouerment of all estates of this Realme, whether they be 
Ecclesiasticall or Ciuile, in all causes doth apparteyne, and is not, 
ought to be subiect to any forraigne iursdiction. […] The Byshop of 
Rome [i.e. the pope] hath no iurisdiction in this Realme of 
Englande. […] It is lawfull for Christian men, at the commaundment 
of the Magistrate, to were weapons, and serue in the warres.170 
                                         
167 Although Ayala’s focus is upon the laws of war in just warfare, he accepted the pope’s 
authority to relieve subjects from their oath of obedience to their sovereign: ‘For kings who 
abuse their position the Pope has various modes of restraint and of compelling them to deal 
justly, for he is God’s regent on earth and has received from Him both swords, the spiritual 
and the temporal, for the peace and preservation of the Christian commonwealth. […] Where 
the interests of the Christian commonwealth require it, the Pope can not only restrain, he 
can depose [kings]’. Ayala, DIOBDM, ii, p. 19. 
168 Allen, A trve sincere and modest defence of English Catholiqves, pp. 113-4. 
169 Ibid., p. 104. 
170 Church of England, Articles, whereupon it was agreed by the archbishoppes and bishoppes of 
both prouinces, and the whole cleargie, in the conuocation holden at London in the yere of 
our God 1562 according to the computation of the Churche of Englande for auoiding of the 
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Therefore, when Sir Thomas Smith penned his discourse on the composition of 
the English government, and described monarchical power as absolute in matters 
of ‘war and peace’, he was describing the monarch’s sole discretionary authority 
to declare war, but he also implied a preference for secular just and regular 
war.171 The Elizabethans had scant regard for the Catholic Church’s holy war 
doctrine. Not surprising, since from their perspective, this was the warfare of 
the antichrist. 
Writing during the reign of king James VI and I, the Elizabethan soldier Sir 
Walter Ralegh penned a critical essay attacking the Catholic theory of holy war. 
He claimed that holy war and the crusade were unnatural and beneath human 
nature.172 The pope’s ‘croisada’, Ralegh noted, claimed to be ‘free from worldly 
ambition, just, and honourable’, and made ‘holy and meritorious’ by ‘pardon of 
sins, release from purgatory, and the promise of life to come’; however, in 
reality, it served only vain papal ambitions: ‘to oppress kings by their people, 
and the people by their king’.173 Furthermore, the Catholic practice of crusade – 
‘that religion ought to be enforced upon men by the sword’ – Ralegh concluded 
was an unchristian doctrine imported from ‘Mahomet the false prophet’.174 A 
significant number of Elizabethans believed as Ralegh did that the corruption of 
papacy, and its unlawful assumption of temporal authority, which it had never 
rightly possessed, was the core cause of the major conflicts of the latter half of 
the sixteenth-century: the pope granted indulgences to Philip II that released 
him from his oaths to preserve the liberties of the Dutch, which resulted in a 
vicious civil war in the Netherlands. In France, the papacy urged its kings to 
prosecute Protestants with oppressive civil wars, and in England, Pope Pius V 
had inspired a war ‘both upon us and among us’.175 
                                         
diuersities of opinions, and for the stablishyng of consent touching true religion (London: 
Richarde Iugge and Iohn Cawood, 1571), pp. 23-4. 
171 Smith, De republica Anglorum, p. 58. 
172 Johnson, Ideology, reason, and the limitation of war, p. 96, fn. 14; Walter Ralegh, ‘A 
discourse of the original and fundamental cause of natural, necessary, and unnatural war’, in 
Works of Sir Walter Ralegh, eds., Oldys and Birch, 8 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1829), viii, pp. 253-297, 264, 266. 
173 Ralegh, ‘A discourse of the original and fundamental cause of natural, necessary, and 
unnatural war’, pp. 264, 276. 
174 Ibid., p. 264. 
175 Ibid., pp. 276-7. 
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Elizabeth I, as well as many Elizabethans, particularly within the regime’s 
leadership, rejected holy war in the sense of a papal crusade, even if those 
same men also saw their own wars in some sense as Protestant holy wars. In a 
letter to a French secretary, Walsingham claimed Queen Elizabeth constrained 
her religious policies, to include war, by two important principles: 
The one, that conscience are not to be forced, but to be won and 
reduced by the force of truth, with the aid of time and the use of 
all good means of instruction and persuasion. 
The other, that the causes of conscience, when they exceed their 
bound and grow to be a matter of faction, lose their nature; and 
that sovereign princes ought distinctly to punish the practice, 
though coloured with the pretence of conscience and religion.176 
Here, speaking in the name of the queen, Walsingham asserted the regime was 
unwilling to use the sword to enforce religious conformity except when belief 
threatened the sovereign state. The courtier Sir Christopher Hatton agreed, and 
asserted ‘that in matters of Religion neither Fire nor Sword was to be used.’177 A 
victim of religious persecution himself, and whose theory on the laws of war was 
supported by Elizabeth’s leading men of war, Gentili argued for a secular 
doctrine of war wherein extra ordinary ‘force in connexion with religion is 
unjust.’178 He took further pains to stress: ‘since the laws of religion do not exist 
between man to man’, unlike human reason, ‘therefore no man’s rights are 
violated by difference in religion, nor is it lawful to make war because of 
religion.’179 The papal crusade and Catholic holy war was predicated upon 
ecclesiastical supremacy over the temporal state; however, the Elizabethan 
church had been subordinated to the state, and ‘Anglicans were adamant that 
war could not be justified without the sanction of a magistrate, even by 
appealing to scripture.’180 
                                         
176 Francis Bacon, The works of Francis Bacon, eds., J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D.D. Heath, 7 
vols. (London: Longman, 1879), I, pp. 97-101. 
177 Camden, Annals, 4th ed., p. 458. 
178 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 38. 
179 Ibid., p. 41. 
180 Richard L. Greaves, Society and religion in Elizabethan England (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1981), p. 538. Sermons and homilies were a key method of indoctrination that 
firmly instilled the concept of temporal supremacy among the English citizenry; for example, 
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Influential members within the Elizabethan regime accepted that the 
term ‘war’ had a specific political and legal meaning. War was a temporal 
matter, and thus lawful wars were limited to armed conflicts between states 
and had to be fought under the public, not ecclesiastical, authority. This view of 
public authority was accepted by many devout Englishmen: ‘he which strikes 
with the sword, whose condition is priuate may feel the stroke of the sword. To 
take vengeance in a cause of justice, is appertaining properly vnto the publique 
magistrate, and so much doe those testimonies of holy scripture.’181 If the 
temporal authority was required to legally wage wars then what did Camden 
mean when he wrote ‘between Religion and the Common-wealth there can be no 
separation.’182 
Elizabeth’s public approach to religion, her middle way - via media – 
created a state-church that emphasised national loyalty through the outward 
obedience to the institution of the Church of England. The Banner of St George, 
a red-cross upon a white field, had been appropriated by the English state and 
crafted into a national symbol, so much so that it could be referred to by 
foreigners as the ‘English cross of St George’, and armies royal carried it into 
battle, and it flew from forts and ships.183 Sidney might declare that England’s 
enemies in the Netherlands were also God’s enemies, but these apparent 
appeals to holy war were made with the caveat that God’s cause was England’s 
cause, and his soldiers ‘should not ... feare death or perill’ because they served 
‘their Prince’ and fought for the ‘honour of their Countrey’.184 Dr Johnson aptly 
summarised religion’s role within the early modern English state: ‘religion was a 
matter of state; with Protestant England set against Catholic Spain, 
overthrowing the religion meant overthrowing the state itself, and in the end 
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the two really cannot be separated.’185 This attitude crystallised in Sir Philip 
Sidney’s maxim which held that religion and politics must never be separated.186 
Thus, the Anglican theory of holy war took a significant turn away from 
Allen’s doctrine of papal crusade. The theoretical justifications for Catholic holy 
war had no legitimacy in Protestant England. The English emphasis on the 
temporal authority in matters of war necessitated a re-evaluation of the causes 
and actions in holy war. Invited to preach at St Paul’s Cross in 1598, ‘an open air 
pulpit in the precincts of St Paul’s Cathedral’ and ‘among the most influential of 
all public venues in early modern England’, the clergyman Stephen Gosson’s 
sermon The trumpet of war thoroughly rejected Catholic arguments in favour of 
holy war, which attacked the Spanish justifications for war against England.187 
Gosson contended that holy war, in its lawful manifestation, was simply another 
lawful cause for just and regular war. 
[War] may be iust and necessarie two ways, the one is in defence of 
the innocent, the other is in reuenge of iniuries. […] Princes are 
commanded to set open their gates, that the king of glorie may 
come in. Therefore if either Turke, or Pope, or Idolatorous Prince 
force the law of Mohomet or Idolatrie upon their people, when they 
are desirous to embrace the Gospel, the Gospel may then bee 
brought in by armes: but if the Turke or Pope, or Idolatorous Prince 
beguile their people, and their people willingly entertained a false 
religion, there is no violence offered … where no violence is 
offered, defence [i.e. just war] can take no place.’188 
The prince alone retained the authority to declare war; priests did not ‘manage 
arms’, argued Gosson, but cared for the soldiers’ spiritual health.189 Gosson 
presents a theory of holy war that was essentially just war with a religious 
cause. This was expressed clearly by Gosson by his preservation of traditional jus 
in bello limitations on violence. In battle, only the stratagems (sleights, shifts, 
wasting, spoiling, undermining, battery, and blows) commonly associated with 
                                         
185 Johnson, Ideology, reason, and the limitation of war, p. 101. 
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regular warfare were lawful; however, once victory was secured, Gosson 
reminded his audience, ‘it is against humanitie to kill more than needs’.190 
Soldiers were prohibited from the punitive slaughter of innocents during battles, 
sieges, and pillage.191 Through this position – permitting religious causes for just 
war while preserving customary restraints – Gosson crafted a rhetorical position 
which severely criticised Spanish military conduct, and lauded previous English 
military adventures.192 Several earlier continental military manuals imported and 
translated for an English audience further influenced and bolstered English 
conceptions of licit holy war.193 
Years before England chose to commit its blood and treasure in the 
defence of the Netherlands, it provided modest, in comparison, military support 
in the defence of the French Protestant Huguenots.194 Despite the number of 
atrocities that befell them, the Huguenots drew moral strength from a belief 
that their conflicts were indeed Protestant holy wars, but their view of holy war 
did not sanction unrestrained warfare in a manner commensurate with Catholic 
religious theories.195 Out of the French military captains known to the English 
population and soldiery few were as well respected for their chivalry and martial 
prowess as François de La Noue (1531-1591).196 The politicke and militarie 
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discourses of the lord de La Noue (1587) addressed issues of restraint during the 
French and Dutch wars of religion; wars that also employed significant numbers 
of English soldiers, which in turn provided at least one vector for French 
Protestant ideas about holy war to enter the English political-military 
consciousness.197 
La Noue, a veteran officer, was unconcerned with arguments justifying 
wars, rather he asked tough questions regarding appropriate military conduct in 
religious and civil wars.198 ‘If wee speake of words’, justifying the wars, wrote 
La Noue: 
wee heare nothing but Gods honor, the Kings seruice, Catholick 
religion, the Gospell, our Countrie. All which goodly titles doe 
binde the ministers of armes to endeuor that their works may 
concure with their words. But when afterward wee see the most 
part take a contrary course….199 
Jus in bello, thought La Noue, applied in all conflicts; lawful and restrained 
conduct was required in regular, civil, and religious wars.200 La Noue questioned 
these causes of war and their attendant violence: 
What violent causes are those that stirre you vp? If Gods glorie, 
then consider that he taketh no pleasure in sacrifices of mans 
blood: but detesteth them and loueth mercie and truth. If your 
Princes seruice, you must thinke ye doe them small seruice in 
slaying on an other, for soe doe you diminish and plucke away the 
chiefe senowes of his Realme. If Religion moueth you, it seemeth 
ye knowe not the nature thereof: for sith it is all charitie, the same 
should induce you to meekenesse. If your Countrie, behold your 
fields are almost all desert, your villages burnt, your cities sacked, 
your riches in straungers hands, and your glorie vtterly lost. Seek 
then no more excuses to lengthen your calamities.201 
Just actions in wars, argued La Noue, was the best proof of the basic lawfulness 
of a war: ‘[w]ho wil beleeue that your cause is iust, when your behauiors are so 
                                         
197 François de La Noue, The politicke and militarie discourses of the Lord de La Noue whereunto 
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uniust?’202 La Noue was not the only Protestant to personally feel the sting of 
religious strife and to craft a theory of just religious war. 
The French Protestant theologian François de Saillans advanced similar 
ideas about war, in his treatise Discourses of warre and single combat (1591), 
which added to the growing body just war theory that acknowledged religious 
causes. His work shared important similarities with Gosson’s Trumpet of warre 
(1598) and La Noue’s The politicke and militarie discourses of the lord de La 
Noue (1587). 203 Saillan’s translator, John Eliot, was motivated to undertake his 
work because the Discourses addressed ‘many matters vndiscussed by anie that 
have written of the same subiect’, and he believed Robert Devereuex, earl of 
Essex, and the ‘Martialist[s] of our own countrie’, could learn from it.204 Saillans 
agreed that just war could have religious causes, but because it was just war, 
traditional jus in bello restraints remained in effect.205 The prince and military 
leaders, thought Saillans, were responsible for the actions of their armies and 
soldiers, and it was their duty to see that discipline and faith, sufficiently 
impressed on the soldiers, protected non-combatants and showed mercy to 
defeated enemy soldiers; the notion ‘that the lawes cease, & are of no force in 
warre’, wrote Saillans, ‘is not of God but of the Deuill.’206 Therefore, a cogent 
body of military treatises advanced a clear Protestant doctrine of holy war, 
which asserted just wars could be lawfully waged for religious causes, but these 
wars were truly just wars, and, thus, were limited by traditional ideas regarding 
jus in bello. 
Religion motivated both Catholics and Protestants states to fight their 
wars, but there was a perhaps a third group that influenced English thought. In 
an interesting paper prepared for the eyes of Lord Burghley, the Puritan 
gentleman George Carleton divided up the population of England into three 
                                         
202 Ibid., p. 225. 
203 Johnson, Ideology, reason, and the limitation of war, pp. 108-9. François de Saillans wrote 
his Discourses under the pseudonym Bertrand de Loque. Bertrand de Loque, Discourses of 
Warre and single combat, tr., J. Eliot (London: John Wolfe, 1591); this work was dedicated to 
Robert Devereux, 2nd earl of Essex. For further information about Saillans and a summary of 
his theory of war: see Beatrice Heuser, The strategy makers: thoughts on war and society 
from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), pp. 50-62. 
204 Loque, Discourses of Warre and single combat, sig. A2v. 
205 Ibid., f. 1-4, 17-21. 
206 Ibid., f. 22. 
70 
Chapter 2. The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict 
 
religious groups: ‘[t]he papist, the atheist, and the protestant’ Notably Carleton 
observed that the first two – the papist and the atheist – were to be ‘favoured 
because they are many’.207 Atheists would hardly be motivated by religious war 
arguments. The veteran of the Dutch wars and later the dean of Exeter, 
Matthew Sutcliffe summed up the general attitude of soldiers, as he knew them, 
writing ‘the name of religion I know, will seem strange to most of our lusty 
young soldiers, that in swearing and blaspheming place their greatest bravery, 
and account it a shame for a soldier to be religious.’208 The popular Puritan 
preacher Lancelot Andrewes acknowledged the general disregard of soldiers for 
preachers, while preaching to the earl of Essex on the forbearance of sin prior to 
his expedition to Ireland (1599); he asked his audience ‘what good do these 
churchmen [in war]?’209 Certainly for many soldiers religion played an important 
role in motivating them to take action, but for others, perhaps a plurality, 
loyalty to the state, adherence to a martial code of honour, superseded their 
religious affiliation.210 Regardless of their faith or personal code, every soldier 
had to trust that the men to his left and right would fight for every other man in 
the formation if they were to have any chance of survival and national loyalty 
became the tie that bound many soldiers to one another. 
The Catholic educated Christopher Blount was the loyal servant of the 
earl of Essex, and he spent much of his life under arms and fighting for the 
Elizabethan state.211 William Blandy lost his BA from Oxford ‘for Popery’, but 
remained the close friend of the ardent Calvinist Geoffrey Gates with whom he 
trailed the pike in the Dutch wars.212 To explain this Blandy wrote in his The 
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castle, or picture of policy (1581) that the best soldiers fought for ‘the glory of 
Christ, the honour of our Prince, the cause of our country, the defence of our 
name and honesty ... all other[s] that ... respect not the true sovereign good, 
they are rather to be accounted men puffed up with vaine desire’.213 ‘The 
reality of crusading for Englishmen’, particularly in the sense advocated by the 
Catholic Church, to which we should add church ordained holy war more 
generally, stated Tyerman, ‘had withered and died amidst the shifting spiritual, 
social, and political winds of the sixteenth century.’214 Other soldiers would 
assert religion formed a spiritual bond that complemented the temporal bonds 
that existed between the subject and their sovereign prince: ‘nothing ties man 
to due obedience & faithful more than the band of religion’, but was this truly 
the bond religion? Or, however, this seems to be simply the language of the age, 
and the manifestation of a national ideology as suggested by Johnson.215 
Although Elizabeth I repeatedly offered aid to foreign Protestants, she did 
not want to openly embrace the idea of religious war, as the more puritan of her 
subjects hoped and lobbied for. This was not surprising since prominent 
members of the regime considered both Roman Catholicism and radical 
puritanism as equally flawed interpretations of the Gospel. Robert Cecil well 
expressed these sentiments in a letter to the Archbishop of York in 1604: ‘[I] 
having held it for certain rule … that the Papist were carried on the left hand 
with superstitious blindness, [and] the Puritans … were transported on the right 
with unadvised zeal’.216 The more radical puritans interpreted holy war in a 
                                         
The Castle, or picture of policy, p. 13r. Geoffrey Gates advanced a very similar argument in 
his The defence of militarie profession (London: Henry Middleton, 1579); but what make 
these two works interesting is less their arguments which became very contemporary in 
Elizabethan martial discourse, but the religious inclinations of the two men; Gates was a 
Calvinist and Blandy a quasi-Catholic. The practice of religion is usually kept to theological 
doctrines, but a holistic study of religion within the Elizabethan military would benefit from 
future research: for example, the relationships between soldiers like Gates and Blandy, Essex 
and Blount suggest, and perhaps even Charles Blount, baron of Mountjoy and earl of 
Devonshire and the Spanish Master of Camp Don Juan del Águila. 
213 Blandy, The Castle, or picture of policy, p. 13r. 
214 Tyerman, England and the crusades, 1095-1588, p. 370. 
215 Henry Knyvett, The defense of the realm, 1596, ed. C. Hughes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1906), p. 55. 
216 Edmund Lodge, ed., Illustrations of British history, biography, and manners, in the reigns of 
Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, and James I, exhibited in a series of original papers, 
selected form the manuscripts of the noble families of Howard Talbot and Cecil, 2nd edition, 
3 vols. (London: John Chidley, 1838), iii, p. 126; see also Leo F. Solt, Church and state in 
early modern England, 1509-1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 81. 
72 
Chapter 2. The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict 
 
manner which more closely resembled the Catholic Church’s doctrine. This view 
would have diminished monarchical temporal supremacy, which the queen 
jealously guarded against any diminishment; see for an example, Elizabeth’s 
rage at Leicester’s assumption of the United Provinces’ sovereignty.217 Elizabeth 
would not permit the church, any church, to encroach upon the monarchy’s 
supremacy.218 She was supported by important church leaders in this. Archbishop 
Whitgift believed that any loss in royal supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs would 
result in the concomitant loss of royal supremacy in civil affairs.219 The queen 
obviously agreed and favoured a clear subordination of religion to politics which 
naturally extended to war. 
By rejecting holy war doctrine, adopting a secular view of war, and 
promoting a national Church, the Elizabethan regime developed an ideological 
space within the Elizabethan military, which permitted Anglicans, quasi-
Catholics, atheists, and puritans to serve the state in its wars so long as they 
showed outward submission to the Church of England. This position was 
supported by leading military men such as the earl of Leicester and the earl of 
Essex. Both commanders permitted, with mixed results, a variety of beliefs in 
their armies, so long as that did not conflict with the tenets dictated by the 
Church of England, which suggests that, at least within the Elizabethan military, 
religion was viewed as less important than patriotism.220 
                                         
217 Solt, Church and state in early modern England, 1509-1640, p. 82: ‘The Presbyterian radicals, 
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The state, claimed Burghley, prosecuted enemies of the state not because 
of their religious beliefs, but because they were criminals: rebels, traitors, and 
propagators of sedition.221 Additionally, Burghley drew attention to the laws, 
which directed these actions; these he pointed out were not ‘new lawes’, but 
were ‘the auncient temporall lawes of the realme, and namely by the lawes of 
Parliament made in King Edward the thirds time’.222 Laws, he claimed that had 
long been held in force, and arising in an age when ‘Popes were suffered to haue 
their authoritie Ecclesiastical in this realme as they had in many other 
countries.’223 The Elizabethan regime, ‘her maiestie and all her gouernours and 
magistrates of Justice’, were duty bound, by oath and divine law, to take action 
and preserve domestic peace within the realm: ‘for auoiding of the floods of 
blood, which Ciuill warres are seene to runne and flowe ... by the sword as by 
lawe’.224 Burghley’s treatise was crafted as much for a continental audience as it 
was for English audiences.225 It rejected claims made by Catholic critics that the 
regime was persecuting Catholics for their faith, rather the regime was 
maintaining domestic law and order. Cardinal Allen’s A trve sincere and modest 
defence of English Catholiqves (1584) attempted to refute Burghley’s 
pronouncements in The Execution of iustice in England (1583). With Allen 
arguing for papal sanctioned rebellion and Burghley asserting the state’s right to 
preserve domestic peace through the rule of law. 
The theologian Thomas Bilson penned The trve difference between 
Christian subiection and vnchristian rebellion (1585), a further and final 
statement on Elizabethan rule of law policy and a direct refutation of Catholic 
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criticisms and spiritual authority to check temporal powers.226 Bilson countered 
the theoretical aspects of Allen’s critique.227 He argued that princes, by virtue of 
scripture and divine law, bear the sword alone which makes them the supreme 
authority within the realm; this authority was absolute and answerable only to 
God. The sword, wrote Bilson, was the instrument of public authority that kept 
the peace and punished its violators. Therefore, the sovereign prince was 
responsible for declaring wars and preserving domestic peace, and no other 
person has authority or right to refute the prince’s declarations. Those subjects 
that resist the ‘Princely regiment with the sworde’ were, as Lord Burghley 
noted, no more than traitors: criminals, and subject to punishment under the 
laws of the realm and their monarch.228 By separating politics from religion, the 
Elizabethan regime was left, where force of arms was required, to use either the 
doctrine of just war against its foreign enemies and ‘war upon the rebel’ if the 
state was to preserve the rule of law and execute justice in the kingdom. 
Englishmen might employ religious rhetoric and symbols indicative of holy 
war in defence of their wars with the Catholic states of Europe, but it was 
because many considered their struggles as part of a wider cosmic war between 
good (Protestantism) and evil (Catholicism).229 ‘These wars are holy’, wrote the 
prominent Puritan John Stubbs in 1586 to Lord Willoughby, while the latter was 
employed in the Dutch wars.230 Similarly Lancelot Andrewes preached in a 
sermon before the queen that ‘to go forth to war, against our enemies, any 
enemies, whether foreign foes or rebellious subjects ... hath ever been counted 
most just and lawful.’ War ‘at this time against these enemies’, Andrewes 
preached, ‘is a war sanctified’ because England’s wars were God’s wars — 
                                         
226 Lake, Bad Queen Bess?, pp. 178-206; idem, ‘The “political thought” of the “monarchical 
republic of Elizabeth I”, discovered and atomized,’ Journal of British studies 54 (2015), pp. 
257-287. 
227 Lake, Bad Queen Bess?, p. 194. 
228 Bilson, The trve difference between Christion svbiection and vnchristian rebellion, pp. 238, 
238-240. 
229 Trim, ‘Fighting Jacob’s wars’, pp. 34-5; Peter Lake, ‘The significance of the Elizabethan 
identification of the pope as antichrist’, Journal of ecclesiastical history 31 (1980), pp. 162-
170; Carol Z. Wiener, ‘The beleaguered isle. A study of Elizabethan and Jacobean anti-
Catholicism’, Past and Present 51 (1971), pp. 27-62; Malcom R. Thorp, ‘Catholic conspiracy in 
early modern Elizabethan foreign policy’, Sixteenth Century Journal 15 (1984), pp. 431-448. 
230 Lloyd Berry, ed., John Stubbs’s “Gapping Gulf” with letters and other relevant documents 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1968), p. 131. 
75 
Chapter 2. The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict 
 
‘praeliari praelia Domini’; however, the holy aspect of these wars was not their 
essential divinity, but the product of the divine-like union of state, church, and 
the faithful.231 At their foundation, the Elizabethan wars were just wars with the 
state publishing secular causes, as well as, popular religious justifications, but as 
just wars, these wars were limited by traditional customs of restraint. 
England’s wars, as just wars, therefore, required the Elizabethan soldier 
to act with more honour and obedience to the laws of war than the popular 
perceptions of their enemies would suggest. The pope, often dubbed the 
antichrist, and his chief demon, the king of Spain, were dubious characters at 
best. Sutcliffe agreed with Ralegh that much of the ugliness exhibited in the 
current crop of wars was the result of papal interference: ‘the king of Spain has 
thought it lawful under colour of treaty of peace, without any defiance to cut 
our throats, if he could. It may be he takes the Pope’s excommunication against 
the Prince and people of this land for a sufficient denunciation’.232 Philip II, 
thought Sutcliffe, was motivated by doctrinal elements found in holy war, and 
his fears increased upon reading the work of Alexander Farnese’s adjutant-
general, Balthazar de Ayala: ‘[it is] no marvel,’ he warned, ‘if they [the Spanish] 
observe no solemnities in wars against [the English]’, because the English were 
heretics and ‘faith and promise is not to be performed unto heretics.’233 
Sutcliffe’s polemic, however, was likely written as a means to the earl of Essex’s 
ends. During the 1590s, Essex perceived Spain as England’s greatest threat, and 
he wanted to create a popular image of Spain as a state poised to strike down 
Elizabeth and her kingdom. Upon a closer reading of Ayala, his interpretation of 
holy war appears closer to the perceptions shared by many Elizabethans, while 
admittedly Ayala’s views are obscure, since this was not his focus. He appears to 
interpret holy war through the doctrine of just war. Popes might choose to 
declare holy war but such actions should be done in coordination with faithful 
princes, whose duty it was to plan and execute wars.234 The Elizabethan 
regime’s claim that all international wars were in fact just wars, and military 
force against rebels and other dissidents simply the execution of justice in 
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England conflicted with and contradicted key theological elements associated 
with the Catholic Church’s doctrine of holy war. 
Despite these conflicting perceptions of law, the Catholic Church 
employed a spectrum of force to combat English heresy; it could empower the 
secular lords to take military action themselves; ecclesiastics could lead and 
direct operations against the regime, and in the most extreme cases, the pope 
could authorise a crusade. The papacy would use variations of each its attempts 
to overthrow Elizabeth.235 In late 1569 the northern earls of Northumberland and 
Westmorland called their followers to muster under arms and reinstate Catholic 
practices.236 Pope Pius V attempted to empower the English nobility to lawfully 
depose Elizabeth, the ‘pretended queen’ and heretic, with the publication of 
the papal bull Regnans in Excelsis on 25 February 1570, which excommunicated 
Elizabeth and freed her subjects from all obligations and allegiance.237 It is 
difficult, however, to determine the extent to which the bull itself functionally 
motivated the northern earls to rebel against the Elizabethan regime, since by 
the time copies had arrived in England, the rebellion had been effectively 
suppressed. Nevertheless, its arrival in England served to confirm the belief of 
Elizabeth’s government that the rebellion was due to pope’s disruptive 
influence.238 
It is still harder to gauge the impact of Regnans in Excelsis on the 
contemporaneous rising in Ireland of James Fitzmaurice, although religion was 
undoubtedly an essential cause for his actions against the Elizabethan regime in 
Ireland (1569-1573). Like the northern English earls, Fitzmaurice acted 
precipitously before coordinating his rebellion with the pope or Catholic states. 
Nevertheless, believing that the best source of foreign aid was to be gained from 
Spain, he had dispatched the titular archbishop of Cashel, Maurice Fitzgibbon, 
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who met with influential ministers and courtiers but failed to gain support from 
Philip.239 
The foreign support that the Northern and Fitzmaurice rebellions required 
never manifested, and both rebellions arose before the excommunication of 
Queen Elizabeth could fully mature and unify resistance. It further failed to 
unite continental Catholic opposition to Elizabeth. Indeed, the two most 
powerful Catholic leaders, Philip II and the Holy Roman Emperor Maximillian II, 
even endeavoured to have it recalled. At its worst, Regnans in Excelsis served to 
unite most Englishmen, including patriotic Catholics, against a common enemy: 
the papacy. The papacy and the Catholic Church would remain Elizabethan 
England’s principle antagonist until the armada crisis of 1588, when Philip II and 
the threat of Spanish tyranny supplanted the papacy as the greatest threat to 
the realm.240 Pope Pius’s call for a church sanctioned overthrow of the 
Elizabethan regime collapsed in the face of the state’s integrated and forceful 
response. 
Pope Pius V died in 1572 and his successor, Pope Gregory XIII, remained 
focused upon returning England to the Catholic Church. English Catholic 
clergymen, once exiles, were directed by the papacy to return and preserve 
Catholicism within England. Their war was not to be waged with arms, but the 
ideals of a spiritual war. The seminary at Douai sent a hundred missionaries into 
England from 1574 to 1580.241 A more significant mission effort began in 1580 by 
the Society of Jesus.242 At this time Regnans in Excelsis imposed more 
complications than benefits, and Gregory sought to ameliorate some of its 
authority by adding an addendum, which he gave to the early Jesuit missionaries 
Campion and Persons: ‘the bull always binds Elizabeth and the heretics, but, 
while things remain as they are, in no way binds the Catholics, except when 
                                         
239 Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish wars, p. 139 (Fitzmaurice to Archbishop Fitzgibbon) c.f. Archives de 
Simancas, MSS L.8336, f. 27. 
240 Julian Lock, ‘“How many tercios has the pope?”: the Spanish war and the sublimation of 
Elizabethan anti-popery’, History 81 (1996), pp. 197-214. 
241 Meyer, England and the Catholic Church under Elizabeth, p. 134. 
242 Ibid., p. 130 (before his death Ignatius Loyola had included England within the Jesuit’s 
mission). 
78 
Chapter 2. The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict 
 
public execution of the said bull shall become possible.’243 These missionaries 
fought clandestinely to preserve their religion, and their actions in England 
provided the papacy with intelligence from inside the enemy’s camp, which 
assisted in the planning of numerous plots and schemes against Elizabeth’s 
heretical regime.244 If, however, the cause of Catholic religion was being fought 
in England with ideas and subterfuge, Pope Gregory countenanced a second 
attempt to liberate Ireland through force of arms. 
Fitzmaurice’s rebellion had ended with his submission to Sir John Perrot in 
1573. Although Fitzmaurice submitted, he was never truly reconciled with the 
Elizabethan regime, and in 1575 Fitzmaurice illegally left Ireland in search for 
support from continental Catholics that would allow him to liberate Ireland from 
heretical dominion. Making his way to Rome in 1577, he found unlikely support in 
the form of the well-connected and mercurial soldier of fortune Sir Thomas 
Stukeley who introduced the Irish crusader to the papal court. Pope Gregory saw 
potential in Fitzmaurice and commissioned him to act in ‘in defence of the true 
religion’. Fitzmaurice’s crusade was reinforced with 600 former brigands that 
were pressed into papal service.245 Pope Gregory also financed several ships to 
transport the expedition, and in February 1577, Stukeley and Fitzmaurice set out 
from Porto Ercole. Before sailing to Ireland, the expedition halted in Lisbon, 
where delays drew Stukeley, and more than half the pressed men, into king 
Sebastian’s ill-fated crusade to conquer Morocco. Both men died fighting at the 
battle of Alcazar in 1578. Hobbled by the loss of Stukeley and the soldiers, 
Fitzmaurice struggled to resuscitate his floundering expedition, and once again 
aid came forth from the Church. The Papal nuncio to Spain, Bishop Philip Sega, 
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succeeded in persuading Philip to release the English Jesuit Dr Nicholas Sanders 
as an accredited papal agent, so in 1578 Sanders joined the crusade.246 
Dr Sanders passionately preached among the soldiers on the virtues of 
holy war. Fitzmaurice’s expedition took on a sanctified air, and together Dr 
Sanders and Fitzmaurice made their papal commission and holy cause central to 
the coming rebellion. The two of them used this rhetoric to compensate for the 
expedition’s deficiencies in manpower through the power of religious 
ideology.247 Fitzmaurice took the remaining troops and departed Lisbon; the 
expeditionary force made landfall in Ireland on the Dingle peninsula in July 
1579. At once, he dispatched circular letters to prominent Irish elites; wherein, 
he declared his papal authority to wage ‘holy war’, called all Catholics to take 
up arms and expel the heretics, and furthermore, the letter announced special 
indulgences that granted absolution for sins committed during the war with 
heretics.248 He hoped that his papal commission would legitimise his cause and 
the ensuing conflict, but the Elizabethan regime did not recognise either the 
papal commission nor Irish crusaders as legitimate. The Elizabethans found the 
idea of elevating Irish rebels to the status of lawful enemies repugnant. 
 
Rebellion 
The arrival of Fitzmaurice in Ireland initially caused great fear amongst 
the members and allies of the Elizabethan regime. Observers could not confuse 
the pretext for Fitzmaurice’s invasion, since when he and the troops 
disembarked, they were preceded by ‘[t]wo friars bearing ensigns, and a bishop 
with a crozier staff and his mitre.’249 ‘I care not for soldiers at all’, Fitzmaurice 
was reported to have said, because ‘I know the minds of the noblemen in 
Ireland.’250 Some 2-300 strong, the papal troops began fortifying their position 
on the Dingle peninsula on 23 July, and the soldiers reportedly had burned, 
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sacked, and taken prisoners from the neighbouring communities.251 By 3 August 
reports were delivered to Elizabeth and her Privy Council that Sir John of 
Desmond, the militant brother of the earl of Desmond, had received a bull from 
the pope to ‘maintain his rebellion and [an order of] excommunication for all 
that support the Queen.’252 A messenger from James Eustace, viscount of 
Baltinglas, met with the earl of Desmond in 1580 to ally with him and declare 
that ‘he should make good war.’253 Another army was being assembled under the 
pope’s banner under the commanded of John of Desmond. John of Desmond led 
his papal army on a mission that drew the Englishmen’s attention away from the 
crusade’s toe-hold on the Dingle peninsula, an expeditionary fort which was 
known by a variety of names — Castello del Oro, Dún an Óir, Smerwick fort, or 
simply the Spaniards’ fort.254 Edward White to confided in Walsingham that 
‘[t]he fire [of rebellion is] like to be in every corner of the realm.’255 
Armed with the papal firebrand and ready to burn the heretics out of 
Ireland, Fitzmaurice travelled north into Connaught to call the faithful into 
action. Traveling with a handful of men, Fitzmaurice and his troop were 
discovered and killed by Irish agents allied with the crown on 20 August. The 
nature of the conflict, however, for the papal force never fell into question. The 
earl of Desmond took over the leadership and maintained the church’s holy 
war.256 Despite the many papal letters authorising holy war, the English refused 
to see the rising of Irish Catholics as anything other than a mere rebellion. 
Furthermore, the English leadership never considered the rebels’ fort at 
Smerwick to be a serious threat. Even one year later, Lord Justice Pelham after 
viewing the fort said that he ‘found it a vain toy’.257 It remained strategically 
insignificant until 18 October 1580, after Captain Bingham of the vessel 
                                         
251 CSPI (1574-1585), pp. 173-4 
252 CSPI (1574-1585), p. 178. 
253 Cal. Carew (1574-1588), p. 309; CSPI (1574-1585), p. 237: 26 July 1580, Captain Zouche wrote 
to Walsingham that ‘Baltinglas’s rebellion the more dangerous because he coloureth it with 
religion.’ 
254 Thomas Johnson Westropp, ‘Promontory forts and allied structures in Northern county Kerry, 
part III’, The journal of the royal society of antiquaries of Ireland 40 (1910), pp. 179-213, 
181, 193. 
255 CSPI (1574-1585), p. 179. 
256 HCCI, iii, p. 1272-5. 
257 Cal. Carew (1575-1588), pp. 267-8. 
81 
Chapter 2. The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict 
 
Swiftsure confirmed the arrival of 3-400 fresh foreign troops, which perhaps 
came to relieve the garrison. The newly arrived Lord Deputy Grey had received 
the sword of office on 7 September along with a mandate from the queen ‘to see 
a good and a short end of’ the rebels in Ireland.258 
Queen Elizabeth’s instructions for Grey showed that the queen was well 
informed. She commanded Grey to differentiate between the Irish loyalists and 
the rebels. Regarding the loyalists, Elizabeth wanted action taken to counter the 
public perception that she sought to ‘roote them out [her Irish subjects] with an 
intention to place there our subjects borne in this realme [of England]’, and to 
make known, her ‘affection to them’. Those, however, that have ‘intelligence 
with forraine princes, as lately certayne of them have had, they shall give us 
just cause to the contrarie’, and for their treasons, they must be punished.259 It 
was becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the situation on the Dingle 
peninsula, and in early October 1580, the earl of Ormond skirmished with the 
papal forces, an engagement which left the constable of Castle Maine dead from 
a gunshot wound. On 7 November Lord Deputy Grey encamped his forces before 
the Smerwick fort. From it flew four ensigns with the pope’s banner set in the 
centre.260 The planting of the pope’s banner directly challenged Elizabeth’s 
monarchy and an overt act of rebellion. 
Tudor political theory and secular laws identified rebellion as the most 
grievous offense against the body politic, but furthermore, it was damnable 
offense and sin against God. The Church of England’s official homilies were an 
essential propaganda tool. These were used to indoctrinate the masses in the 
basic pillars of Tudor society and firmly instilled the concept of temporal 
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supremacy.261 The Homily on Obedience, the locus classicus for Elizabethan 
attitudes towards rebellion, for example, stated: 
[h]ere let us al learne of Saynet Paule the chosen vessel of God, 
that all persons hauing soules (he excepteth none, nor exempteth 
none, neyther Priest, Apostle, nor Prophete, sayeth Saynt 
Chrisostome) do owe of bounden duetye, and euen in conscience, 
obedience, submission, and subiection to the highe powers, whiche 
as they be gods liefetenauntes, Gods presidents, Gods officers, 
Gods commissioners, Gods iudges, ordeyned of God himselfe, of 
whom onely they haue al their power, and al theyr aucthoryte And 
the same S. Paule threatneth no lesse payne, then euerlausting 
da[m]nacion, to al disobedient perso[n]s to all resisters agynst this 
general & common auethoritie, forasmuche as they resist not man 
but god: not mans deuise and inuention, but gods wisedo[m]e gods 
order, power and aucthorytye.’262 
Therefore, none were above, nor could challenge, the sovereign’s authority, and 
those that did were damned by divine law. However, in the aftermath of the 
Northern Rebellion, Elizabeth commissioned addition measures to reinforce royal 
authority and further instil loyalty among her subjects.263 
Among these measures, the queen commissioned the production of the 
Homilie against disobedience and wilful rebellion (1570), which in 1572 was 
included in the second book of official sermons and made a regular feature of 
Elizabethan religious practices.264 Its incorporation into regular church services 
ensured that many future and serving military men would have been exposed to 
the essential tenets of the Elizabethan laws of armed combat. The third part of 
the sermon expounds upon the general categories of war, and it notes ‘warres 
have always the sinnes and mischeefes of men vpon one side or the other ioyned 
with them … but of all warres, ciuil warre is the worst, and farre more 
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abominable yet is rebellion … being unworthy of the name of any warre’.265 
Terrible actions were required to prosecute any military campaigns, and it was 
regrettable in regular war. Yet, it was more criminal when the source of these 
‘mischiefs’ were your own countrymen. The sermon also sanctioned and 
conditioned soldiers to take brutal actions in the suppression of rebellion. It 
taught that rebels should be rewarded with ‘shamefull deaths, their heads & 
carkases set upon poles, or hanged in chaynes, eaten with Kites and Crowes, 
iudged unworthy the honour of burial’.266 Rebels were subject to physical 
brutalisation; just as their souls, it was taught, ‘the deuyll harreth into hell’.267 
The displaying of the papal banner atop the fort at Smerwick was, in the 
teachings of the homily, an unlawful symbol of war, and it warned ‘[l]et no good 
discrete subiect therefore folowe the flagge or banner displayed to rebellion’.268 
Doubtless, these homilies helped to frame Lord Deputy Grey’s mind while 
his soldiers besieged the Irish rebels and foreign papists in 1580.269 Over the 8th 
and the 9th November, the English pioneers advanced their trenches against the 
fort, skirmishers fought against one another, while English cannons plied the fort 
with fire. One English volley destroyed a timber building, and the defenders of 
Castello de Oro raised a white flag to signal their desire for a parley. 
By rejecting the Catholic theory of holy war, the Elizabethan state 
permitted the application of military force in only two legal contexts: 
internationally in just, or regular, wars and against domestic rebellion, riots, 
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and large scale civil disturbances. While Elizabethan armies were intended to 
operate primarily in international conflicts, military forces could also be lawfully 
deployed in law enforcement operations. In De Republica Anglorum (1583), 
Smith acknowledged the lawful powers of the monarch of England in such cases, 
and he wrote that martial law was used ‘within the Realme before any open 
warre in sodden insurrections and rebellions’.270 Contemporaries believed the 
English state was under attack from both internal agents aligned with the 
Catholic Church as well as external foreign enemies, and it was necessary to give 
the state the necessary means to meet out justice to either of these enemies. 
The Northern Rebellion (1569) provided the Elizabethan state with the 
political energy necessary to legislatively redefine treason.271 No longer could 
religious non-conformity be viewed as simply a matter of conscience. Adherence 
to the old religion became a precursor to treason and rebellion, and the 
resultant political legal framing in the early to mid-1580s influenced the 
application of the laws of armed conflict. Catholic Church calls for holy wars of 
liberation from Elizabethan heresy were transformed into the baseless cries of 
rebels. The crusading zeal of rebels such as Fitzmaurice, in 1569 and 1579, 
represented the militarised Catholic faith and religious politics that Burghley’s 
Execution of justice in England sought to disallow.272 The Catholic crusade in 
England devolved from war into a matter for domestic law enforcement. 
English systems of law enforcement had very limited capacity and were 
unfit to address the type of threat posed by any sizable group of armed men 
bent on violence. Instead, the state relied upon the quasi-legal system known as 
martial law and its soldiers to execute justice. Martial law differed from other 
legal instruments. Smith noted how the applications of martial law differed from 
regular law. He described it as ‘without processe of lawe or forme of 
judgment’.273 The crown defined it through its procedures, and it utilised 
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information rather than grand or petty juries.274 By the authority of martial law, 
its agents had the right to ‘put to death, or to other bodilie punishment, whom 
he shall thinke so to deserve’.275 Martial law, stated Smith, was a monarchical 
power; however, its application was, most often, in practice devolved to 
military officers of significant rank and position by issue of specific commissions, 
or when and wherever the royal banner was displayed before royal army, hence 
its association with military camps.276 
Elizabeth granted commissions of martial law as a supplementary power 
for the suppression of rebellion. The regime also believed, it was a necessary 
tool for the enforcement of the centralised state’s policies in colonies and 
restive areas. This made it particularly applicable in Ireland.277 However, it is 
important to note the particular differences here in these two applications; 
firstly, that a commission authorising martial law was not explicitly necessary for 
military operations against armed rebels, since the it was the crown’s armies, 
the army royal, that was brought against them; secondly, commissions of martial 
law supplemented, what can only be described as, intensified law enforcement 
activities prior to combat operations. In direct actions against armed rebels, 
conventional legal doctrine already advocated total war, or what Gentili 
described as a war of elimination.278 
With rebellion, politically and legally interpreted as a crime, rebels were, 
therefore, illegal combatants with no more rights under the laws of war than 
criminals because ‘a subject does not by rebellion free himself from subjection 
to the law’.279 Rebels were those combatants that had rejected God’s will and 
their sovereign prince’s authority; however, there were certain non-traditional 
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combatants, for example, that retained the rights of lawful combatants as 
described in the laws of war. They were those who did not possess obvious 
sovereign authority, such as those that had ‘proved false to friendship, to a 
treaty, or even to voluntary dependence, retain the rights of war’.280 Ireland was 
declared the dominion of the English state, and therefore subject to the 
sovereignty of the English monarchy because an enemy must have a state, 
senate, treasury, united population, and ‘some basis for a treaty of peace’.281 
The term ‘enemy’, Gentili wrote, had a specific legal meaning, just as the term 
‘war’ had, and it implied equality of combatant status. It is ‘sometimes 
extended to those who are not equal’, he noted, ‘namely, to pirates, proscribed 
persons, and rebels; nevertheless, it cannot confer the rights due to enemies, 
properly so called, and privileges of regular warfare.’282 
In operations against rebels, commissioners of martial law and captains 
possessed broad powers. At one end of the spectrum, martial law could be 
executed with the most extreme violence and brutality that spared none, and at 
the other rebels might be extended the rights associated with regular warfare. 
Clearly, explicit commissions of martial law were more often associated with 
preserving law and order; whereas, the martial law of the army royal was 
intended to restore order lost to rebellion. The right to summarily judge rebels 
under martial law, however, became more doubtful if the suspected rebels were 
not openly bearing the weapons of war or in riotous assemblies. Hence, Lord 
Deputy Grey had to first answer some fundamental questions concerning the 
combatant status of these foreign soldiers brought forward under the flag of 
parley but whose fort flew the papal standard. 
The papal delegation met with Grey and first ‘offred to yield vpp the 
ffortes, So as they might be licensed to dep[ar]te w[ith] Bag and Baggadge’.283 
Grey quickly halted this line of debate from their colonel. Grey had to first know 
by what right this army had invaded England’s domains. Despite flying the papal 
                                         
280 Ibid., p. 24. 
281 Ibid., p. 24. 
282 Ibid., p. 25. 
283 Hennessy, Sir Walter Ralegh in Ireland, pp. 207-211, 209 (Official Report of Proceedings at 
Smerwick). 
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banner, these foreigners might possess a lawful commission to wage just war, so 
he demanded these foreigners ‘shew by what commission they had came thither 
into another Princes domynions to warre, [and] whether [their commission 
came] from the Pope or the Kinge of Spayne, or any other’ sovereign prince.284 
To this, ‘[t]hey said they had not,’ and acknowledged that the army had no 
commission to wage war against England! One of the Spanish captains present, 
perhaps foreseeing the danger this portended, purportedly added that ‘Iohn 
Martines de Ricaldi Gouenour for the King [of Spain] at Bilbo had willed him to 
levie a band & repair with yt to St Androes & there to bee directed by this their 
Coronell here’.285 Another of their officers, Camp-master Bartoni then noted 
‘that they were all sent by the Pope for the defence of the Catholica fede’ as 
‘onely adventurers that had came to seek fortune abroade, and serve in warres 
amongest the Irishe.’286 
This last comment was particularly galling to the devoutly Protestant Lord 
Deputy, but he was equally affronted by their ignorance of the contemporary 
laws of war. To one thoroughly inoculated against Catholic theories of holy war, 
the Lord Deputy could see these foreigners as nothing more than another 
example of the popes usurping authority. Furthermore, the crude bearing of his 
opposites announced their pretence.287 These proceedings and this so-called 
papal army, Grey doubtlessly determined, was a farce, so he angrily denounced 
them and their stated purpose: 
The Irishe them selves, as the Earle and John of Desmonde with the 
rest, were no lawfull enemyes, but Rebells and traytors; therefore 
they that came to succor them no better than rogues and 
                                         
284 TNA, SP 63/78/29, Lord Grey to Queen Elizabeth, 12 Nov. 1580, p. 5; Edmund Spenser, A View 
of the Present State of Ireland, in The Complete Works of Edmund Spenser, ed., A.B. 
Grosart, 10 vols. (Manchester: Hazell, Watson, and Viney, 1882-4), ix, p. 167 
285 Ibid.; TNA, SP 63/78/29, p. 5. 
286 Ibid.; Spenser, A View of the Present State of Ireland, p. 167. 
287 The papal captains at Smerwick, and Colonel Giuseppe were of dubious quality and military 
education. In a letter to the Nuncio in France, 5 April 158: Colonel Giuseppe ‘left here as a 
commissary and paymaster to [Thomas] Stukeley’. A written reprimand was sent to the 
colonel, while he was being held in England awaiting ransom, declaring ‘[w]ithout an order 
from his Holiness you decide to embark on an enterprise disproportioned to your qualities.’ 
When consideration was being given to his ransom, it was said that ‘he is a man of such 
condition that if 200 scudi were paid for his ransom (instead of 4,000), it could not be said 
that little was paid!’ O’Rahilly, The Massacre at Smerwick (1580), p. 10. 
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runnagates, specially cominge with no licence, nor commission 
from their owne Kinge.288 
Accordingly, in answer to the foreign captains’ proposed exchange of Castello 
del Oro for license to repair to Spain with their honour intact, he proclaimed 
‘that they could not justly pleade either custome of war, or law of Nations, for 
that they were not any lawfull enemyes. Rather they had but one choice to 
make: ‘render me the fort, & yield theyr selues to my will lyfe or death’, or 
‘returne & I would fall to my business’, namely the immediate storming of the 
fort.289 The papal fort was untenable, so the coronel submitted to the mercy of 
the Lord Deputy. 
Disgusted by the illegitimacy of these foreign fighters and rebels, and 
obliged to Queen Elizabeth to make a short end of the rebellion, Grey took 
extreme measures. The next morning during the formal surrender of the fort, he 
sent in ‘certeyn bandes, who straight fell to execution. There were 600 slayne’ 
and ‘all the Irishmen and women hanged’.290 For this triumph, Queen Elizabeth 
personally praised her Lord Deputy: 
The mightie hand of the Amightiest power hathe showed manifest 
the force of his strength in the weakenes of feeblest sexe and 
mynds this yere to make men ashamed ever hereafter to disdaine 
vs, in w[hich] Action I joye that you have bin chose the instrument 
of his glory….291  
                                         
288 Spenser, A View of the Present State of Ireland, p. 167. 
289 Ibid.; TNA, SP 63/78/29, p. 5. 
290 TNA, SP 63/78/29, pp. 5-6; Hennessy, Sir Walter Ralegh in Ireland, pp. 207-211. 
For analyses critical of Grey’s actions at Smerwick, see: Walker, A History of the law of Nations, 
pp. 262; Brian C. Lockey, Law and Empire in English Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); O’Rahilly, The Massacre at Smerwick (1580); Vincent P 
Carey, ‘Atrocity and history: Grey, Spenser and the slaughter at Smerwick (1580)’, in Age of 
atrocity: violence and political conflict in early modern Ireland, eds., D. Edwards, P. 
Lenihan, and C. Tait (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), pp. 79-94. 
For analyses defending his actions see: Mary Hickson, ‘Lord Grey of Wilton at Smerwick in 1580’, 
The antiquary 25 & 26 (1892), pp. 259-265, 19-20; Geoffrey Butler, and Simon Maccoby, The 
Development of International Law, reprint (New Jersey: Lawbook Exchange, 1928/2003), p. 
123; Catherine G. Canino, ‘Reconstructing Lord Grey’s reputation: a new view of the view’, 
The sixteenth century journal 29 (1998), pp. 3-18. 
Archaeology of the siege and slaughter of the papal troops: Damian Shiels, ‘Dún an Óir 1580: the 
potential for intact siege archaeology’, Kerry archaeology and historical society journal, 
second series, 7 (2007), pp. 59-69; René R Gapert, ‘The Teampall Bán human skeletal remains 
and the importance of forensic anthropology’, in Past Kingdoms: recent archaeological 
research, survey & excavation in county Kerry, ed., M. Connolly (Tralee: The heritage 
council/Kerry county council, 2005), pp. 74-77. 
291 Hennessy, Sir Walter Ralegh in Ireland, pp. 212-214, 212. 
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Grey’s slaughter of the papal garrison fit within the bounds of sixteenth-
century counterinsurgent and law of war doctrine, even if it was an 
exceedingly harsh response (figure 11.).292 
 
 
                                         
292 Fig. 11. A.M., The true report of the prosperous successe which God gave vnto our English 
souldiers (London: Edward White, 1581); the image was originally printed in R. Faques, 
Hereafter ensue the trewe encounter or batalye lately don betene Englande and Scotlande 
(London, 1513?) and was originally created to represent the battle of Flodden (1513). 
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Figure 11. An older repurposed woodcut intended to represent Lord Deputy Grey in Parley with 
Colonel Giuseppe and members of the papal expeditionary force; the background shows 
artistic rendering of the fighting preceding the surrender. 
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Chapter 3. 
‘Underhand’ Warfare between States: the conduct of 
English volunteers in the Dutch Rebellion 
 
‘These people here [in England] are so zealous in all that touches this 
question [rebellion in the Netherlands] that I am assured that if they do 
not openly send forces to the states they will soon find some new means 
of helping Orange underhand.’293 
Antonio de Guaras to Gabreil de Zayas, 17 December 1575. 
 
The Eighty Years War (1568-1648), also known as the Dutch War of 
Independence, was the formative crisis that gave birth to a Dutch state free from 
the Spanish monarchy – the United Provinces. It was during the conflict’s first 
forty-one years (1568-1609) which concluded with the Twelve Years Truce (1609) 
that produced the nascent Dutch state and precipitated the rise of the United 
Provinces. As the conflict progressed, belligerents fighting for the rebellious 
provinces eventually transcended the initial ius ad bellum determinations of the 
Holy Office and king Philip II of Spain; these belligerents were found to be at first 
rebels and unlawful combatants, while the conflict progressed over the years, the 
belligerents became implicitly recognised as lawful combatants. How did the 
perceptions of the conflict transform from Captain-General of the Army of 
Flanders, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo’s, the duke of Alba, crushing civil and 
military campaign against despised Dutch rebels into the regular war waged by a 
future successor to the post, Ambrogio Spinola, marquis of the Balbases (1569-
1630), which respected the rights of the Dutch soldiers? The contrast between the 
two phases of the conflict cannot be clearer than in contemporary representations 
of the same two captain-generals of the Spanish Army of Flanders (figures 12. and 
13.).294 
                                         
293 CSP Spain (1568-1579), pp. 514-5. Antonio de Guaras was a Spanish merchant/banker, 
resident in London, and Spanish agent. Gabriel de Zayas was one of the two Spanish 
secretaries of state at this time. 
294 Fig. 12. I have chosen the Anonymous engraving (1650) over the earlier engraving in Guillaume 
Baudart, Les Gverres de Nassav (Amsterdam: Michel Colin, 1616) for its clarity, and that it 
retains the motto, attributed to the original statue: ‘[t]o the duke of Alva ... who extirpated 
sedition, reduced rebellion, restored religion, secured justice and established peace’; 
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translation Geoffrey Parker, The Dutch revolt (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 111. 
‘Monument to the Duke of Alva of 1571’ c.f. Daniel R Horst, ‘The duke of Alba: the ideal 
enemy’, Arte Nuevo: revista de Estudios Auros 1 (2014), pp. 130-154, 144. 
Fig. 13. Diego Rodriguez de Silva y Velázquez, ‘The Surrender of Breda’, Museo Nacional del 
Prado: online gallery <https://www.museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/online-gallery/on-
line-gallery/obra/the-surrender-of-breda-or-the-lances/?no_cache=1> [accessed on 31 March 
2015], inv. no. PO1172; for more detailed digital images and the source used in this work, 
see: Velázquez, ‘The surrender of Breda (1634-5)’, Web gallery of art 
<http://www.wga.hu/html_m/v/velazque/04/> [accessed on 31 March 2015]. 
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Figure 12. Anonymous copy after Philip Galle’s engraving of Jacques 
Jonghelinck’s sculpture, Monument to the duke of Alva of 1571, c. 1650. 
Engraving, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, inv. no. RP-P-OB-79.156. 
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In the Monument to the duke of Alva, the ‘Iron Duke’ stands like a colossus 
atop the broken and twisted bodies of rebels. By contrast, in Velázquez’s The 
Surrender of Breda, painted in 1634-1635, a magnanimous Spinola receives the 
submission of the States’ captain, Justin of Nassau, as a comrade in arms, albeit 
an enemy. It may be said that the conflict’s change in orientation and particularly 
the difference between Alba and Spinola was not so surprising, since in the final 
years of the first half of the Eighty Years War Spain and the emergent republic 
had increasingly regularised their relations with Spain through agreements such as 
the cuartel general (1599) and the cease-fire establishing the Twelve Years’ Truce 
(1609).295 However, this perhaps understates the stark differences between Alba 
and Spinola’s conflicts and the processes which led to the establishment of more 
regular warfare. 
One source contributing to the legitimisation of Dutch belligerents was 
the enduring presence of foreign mercenary armies and foremost among these 
                                         
295 The cuartel general (1599) is discussed below, pp. 169-170. 
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Figure 13. Diego Rodriguez de Silva y Velázquez, The Surrender of Breda (produced 1634-5); 
held by the Museo Nacional del Prado. 
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were ‘volunteers’ from the England. The English soldiers carried, in addition to 
their arms, important political and diplomatic considerations for Spanish agents 
in the Netherlands that went beyond their immediate military threat. At varying 
times, these mercenary armies threatened to overturn the state of rebellion by 
bringing about a sovereign intervention by Elizabeth, and, thus a third-party 
claim to a state’s right to wage a just war beyond the provinces’ contentious 
rights to wage war in their defence. The Elizabethan state provided in sporadic 
bursts increasing numbers of mercenaries, and ultimately declared war in 1585, 
in defence of the States General against Spanish tyranny in the Low Countries.296 
 
‘Underhand’ Wars and Elizabeth’s French intervention 
The English could field essentially two types of military formations in 
foreign conflicts; these were either ‘volunteers’ or an ‘army royal’. The latter 
was associated with direct state intervention and regular war and marched 
under a commission from Queen Elizabeth I. The former was something unique. 
Volunteers, or mercenaries, entered into conflicts without official state 
sanction. They might even be publicly denounced; however, the state covertly 
supported and encouraged them. The English regime had utilised volunteers 
before to intervene in foreign conflicts where open support proved to be 
politically too risky.297 Elizabeth was rightly cautious regarding a head to head 
confrontation with Spain which could draw upon resources that vastly 
outstripped the capacity of the English state; therefore, she preferred indirect 
policies against Spain and other Catholic antagonists. 
Contemporaries lacked the language to adequately define this type of 
armed conflict, but it can be encompassed utilising modern terminology. David 
                                         
296 David J.B. Trim, ‘“If a prince use tyrannie towards his people”: interventions on behalf of 
foreign populations in early modern Europe’, in Humanitarian intervention. A history, eds., 
B. Simms and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 29-66. 
297 The utility of volunteers was identified early in Elizabeth’s reign by then Sir William Cecil, 
secretary of state, in response to pleas for aid from Scottish Protestants - Lords of the 
Congregation – rebelling against Mary of Guise. Cecil wanted to support Scottish Protestants 
but to also provide Elizabeth I with ‘plausible deniability’. To this end, English officers were 
permitted to individually seek employment in the service of Scottish Protestants but without 
the open consent of the state, which for a time successfully kept England removed from 
direct combat operations. Hammer, Elizabeth’s wars, pp. 57-8. Similar strategies were 
employed in France c.1562 and the Netherlands c.1572; see below, and Hammer, Elizabeth’s 
Wars, pp. 63-64 (France), 88-9 (Netherlands). 
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J.B. Trim was the first to describe Elizabethan underhanded warfare as ‘secret 
war’. This was warfare in which the state could plausibly deny official 
involvement and was notably employed during the French wars of religion and 
again during the Dutch revolt. Both secret interventions by the Elizabethan 
regime involved the deploying of English volunteers, or free mercenary 
companies. Volunteer companies and soldiers were consistent with the queen’s 
policies of ‘underhand’ or secret warfare.298 The queen’s policies included covert 
material support for foreign principalities, states, and non-governmental 
religious groups. For example during the Dutch revolt: ‘the English would aid 
William of Orange’s supporters only “underhanded” by “giving money ... 
provisions and military munitions”’.299 Underhanded support, however, at times 
could include supplying co-religionists with foreign fighters; these were often 
motivated to act because of their shared religion, and these volunteers operated 
with varying degrees of covert support from their home state, but without any 
official commissions to wage war. This organisation provided the English state 
with the necessary ‘plausible deniability’ and introduced a novel type of 
warfare: the ‘underhand’ war. 
‘Underhand’ war allowed the Elizabethan regime to support its allies in 
the absences of a declared state of war. Gentili permits sovereigns to lawfully 
declare war in the defence of foreign princes — allies — both religious and 
political, this he calls ‘defence for the sake of honour’.300 Implicit within this 
just cause of war was tacit support for individuals to take up arms in the 
defence of their foreign neighbours: ‘it is lawful for any one to aid a neighbour 
against injury’.301 Individuals were morally bound, thought Gentili, to render 
assistance. ‘[I]n forum of conscience some maintain that a man is bound to the 
defence of his fellow man. Conscience, however, is the impulse of a good man, 
or rather of the best man.’ 302 Afterwards Gentili took the obligations of 
                                         
298 Trim, ‘The “secret war” of Elizabeth I., pp. 189-99. 
299 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacobs Wars”’, p. 123, and c.f. Relations politiques, vi, pp. 535-538. 
300 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, pp. 67-73. 
301 Ibid., p. 73. 
302 Ibid., pp. 70-71. Elizabeth seems to have accepted that personal conscience might compel 
men to serve in foreign wars and that this motivation was more honourable than simple 
profit. In 1576, she wrote a letter to Comendador Requesens, in the Netherlands, asking for 
mercy in the case of Thomas Copley: ‘he is not one of those traitors and rebels who have fled 
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individuals and extend the examples to bind sovereigns to the same action. 
Individual action in the defence of others, in the absence of a declared state of 
war, was illegal and belligerent status became that of the prince with whom 
they served, and when that prince was determined to be a rebel then these 
volunteers were also rebels. Therefore in ‘underhand’ wars, the volunteers’ 
home state was absolved from responsibility for their actions since ‘there is no 
intent [or ability] to control what is held in secret’.303 
Elizabeth deployed both volunteers and an army royal in the first French 
war of religion, and the French conduct towards these two military formations 
was very different. The volunteers were determined by French royalists to be 
illegal combatants, and beyond the protections afforded to lawful soldiers under 
the laws of war; these troops were most often summarily executed, and where 
they were not executed outright, they were sentenced to service as oarsmen in 
the galleys, which was considered by contemporary soldiers as ‘worse than 
death’ and to be ‘more feared than execution’.304 The earl of Warwick 
commanded the army royal, and they were only grudgingly acknowledged as 
lawful and afforded the rights granted to legitimate soldiers. 
In 1562 following the Huguenot capture of Rouen and the royalist siege, 
Elizabeth secretly dispatched between 4 or 5 volunteer companies, in several 
small ships, to aid the city’s defence.305 These volunteer companies were 
publicly disavowed by the Elizabethan regime, and their participation in the 
conflict was attributed to personal motivations; this meant that the volunteers 
                                         
her realm nor did he leave through any villany or crime, but simply on account of his religion, 
and for the liberty of his conscience.’ CSPF (1575-1577), pp. 232. 
303 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 209. 
304 John H. Langbein, ‘The historical origins of the sanction of imprisonment for serious crime’, 
[reprinted in] The Journal of legal studies: the University of Chicago Law School 5 (1976), pp. 
35-60, 41; the first quote is from the renowned European lawyer – whose legal writings were 
published over 30 times – Joost Damhouder, Practique judiciare es causes criminaelles... 
(Antwerp, 1564), and a digital copy was available online at 
<http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k53673k/f4.image.r=.langFR> [accessed on 11 Sept. 
2014], ch. 151, p. 208; the second quote is from Paul Frauenstädt, ‘Zur Geschicte der 
Galeerenstrafe in Deutschland’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 16 
(1896)pp. 518–546, 524 supra note 22, 540-1 and comes from the Holy Roman Emperor, elect, 
Ferdinand I’s patent of 1556 commuting capital offences to service in the galleys, of course if 
a prisoner was physically unfit for that service he should be executed as before. 
305 Frederic J. Baumgartner, Declaring war in early modern Europe (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 50-51; David J.B. Trim, ‘The “foundation-stone of the British army”? 
The Normandy campaign of 1562’, Journal of the society for army historical research 77 
(1999), pp. 71-84; idem, ‘The secret war of Elizabeth I’, pp. 189-99. 
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were shadow warriors, although secretly the servants of the regime. They were 
publicly seen as independent actors, freed from any political ties to a sovereign 
head of state, and thus concealing the participation of the English crown in 
French domestic affairs. 
While taking advantage of a high-tide to pass over the royalist’s barricade 
that obstructed the Seine River and enter Rouen by sea, one ship grounded 
itself, and its soldiers surrendered to royalist troops. The constable of France, 
Anne de Montmorency (1493-1567), the chief authority for enforcing military 
justice within France, heard the case of the surrendered English volunteers and 
then found them guilty of criminally supporting rebels and sentenced them to 
summary execution.306 The tree of execution for those poor souls bore the 
posted advertisement: ‘POUR AVOIR VENUS, CONTRE LA VOLUNTE DE LA ROYNE 
D’ANGLETERRE, AU SERVICE DES HUGUNOTZ’ (figure 14.).307 In his report to 
Cecil, the English ambassador to France, Thomas Smith criticised the affair: 
‘[t]he hanging of the eleven men beside Caudebec shows more rigour than war 
generally permits to strangers taken prisoners.’308 The French were not 
impressed by such protestations, and knew that they were a mere facade to 
conceal the Elizabeth’s hand in French internal affairs. It was made clear to 
Throckmorton, another member of the English embassy, ‘that a company of lewd 
vagabonds of England had come into France ... that eleven had been taken, 
whom she [Catherine de Medici] caused to be hanged; that the rest will be so 
served if taken’.309 The Protestant defenders of Rouen ‘have dismissed the last 
herald, saying they mean to give battle to the Catholics, who are determined to 
try the assault as soon as possible.’310 However, Rouen fell to assault on 26 
                                         
306 Patrick Forbes, A full view of the public transactions in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 2 vols. 
(London: J. Bettenham, 1741), ii, p. 117 
307 Ibid., ii, p. 117: ‘[for having come] against the will of the queen of England, serving the 
Huguenots’; note here that the French proclamation makes public the disavowed status of the 
English companies and affirms their illegitimate, and rebel, status under the laws of war, and 
thus justifies their summary execution. 
Fig. 14. Katie Hornstein, ‘Just violence: Jacques Callot’s Grandes Misères de la Guerre’, Bulletin 
16 (2005), pp. 29-48, 41 (fig. 9), online at <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/b/bulletinic/x-05102-
und-09/1?subview=detail;view=entry> [accessed on 24 March 2016]. The original is held in The 
Paul Leroy Grigant Memorial Collection at the University of Michigan, Museum of Art. 
308 CSPF (1562), p. 375 and Forbes, A full view of the public transactions in the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth, ii, p. 119. 
309 Ibid., p. 404. 
310 CSPV (1558-1580), p. 345. 
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October, ‘commands were given that they should all pass the sword’, and Smith 
recorded in his journal that ‘of th’English they take the French killeth without 
mercie.’311 Therefore volunteers sent into rebellions did so with the knowledge 
that the traditional customs of war would not be extended to them, and their 
belligerent status was equal to that of the indigenous rebels (i.e. brigands and 
pirates). 
The army royal (about 6,000 men), however, intervened under a separate 
set of circumstances than did the volunteers. It had an official sanction under 
the terms of the Treaty of Hampton Court (1562), which was agreed to by the 
agents of Louis I de Bourbon, prince of Condé, and Elizabeth, and this permitted 
the English to lawfully intervene directly on behalf of a prince of France. Despite 
the duke of Guise’s criticisms of the army royal’s commander, the earl of 
Warwick, the men under his command and even himself were extended the 
protections afforded lawful belligerents engaged in just war.312 Thus, when 
English volunteers enter on behalf of the Dutch rebels, they had no reason to 
                                         
311 Forbes, A full view, ii, p. 168; CSPF (1562), p. 407; CSPV (1558-1580), p. 346: ‘war is now 
beginning to be made in a cruel fashion, and that those who are taken are hanged, as was 
done to those English succors who could not enter Rouen quickly enough, and who were all 
put to death.’ 
312 Trim, ‘The “secret war” of Elizabeth I.’, pp. 194-195; and idem, ‘The “Foundation-Stone of 
the British Army”?’, p. 77: Cecil coordinated with agents serving Louis I de Bourbon, prince of 
Condé, and fashioned a treaty to defend the Huguenots who were led by Condé, a royal 
prince in the line of royal succession. The Treaty of Hampton Court was signed on 20 
September 1562 and outlined the English commitment; a copy of the treaty is printed in 
Forbes, A full view, ii, pp. 35-6. The expedition is also examined in Wallace T. MacCaffrey, 
‘The Newhaven expedition, 1562-1563’, Historical journal 40 (1997), pp. 1-21, 9. 
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Figure 14. Jacques Callot’s ‘The hangman’s tree’, no. 11 from Les Grandes Misères de la 
Guerre (1633); although this image comes from the Thirty Years War, it accurately represents 
the European practices of the sixteenth-century. 
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expect mercy from the soldiers of the Army of Flanders. In the end, however, 
the Protestant volunteers took a measure of martial pride in their unlawful 
status, which can be seen in the black ensign of Henry Champernowne, captain 
of the most celebrated company of English volunteers that served in the French 
wars of religion, which bore a head with the words issuing from it: ‘My death is 
virtuous’.313 
 
The English volunteers and Elizabeth’s ‘underhand’ war against the Duke of 
Alba (1572-1573) 
From the Spanish perspective, the outbreak of armed rebellion in the Low 
Countries, was a matter of domestic law enforcement, not very dissimilar to the 
conclusions reached by the English government regarding Ireland.314 Alba had 
been dispatched to the provinces to bring members of the Protestant motivated, 
and, therefore, heretical rebellion to justice, and if to achieve his mission, he 
needed to apply military force, he was certainly authorised to do so. William I — 
the Silent — prince of Orange (1533-1584), and his allies were rebels; Orange 
himself had been tried in absentia by the ‘Council of Troubles’, and found guilty 
of treason. It did not matter to Philip II that Orange held a position of 
sovereignty in the French principality of Orange. Philip ‘thought the fealty sworn 
for the estates of the [Habsburg] Netherlands overrode any possible claims to 
sovereignty.’315 Moreover, the sovereignty of the small principality of Orange, 
wherein William was an absentee sovereign, was more a medieval artefact than 
any substantive internationally recognised status. The princes of Orange claimed 
to be subject to no king, but the French monarchs routinely confiscated the 
territory of Orange in times of civil war, only returning it on the re-
establishment of peace, which made the principality a de facto subject to the 
sovereign state of France and its monarch.316 Therefore, the principality of 
                                         
313 Ibid., p. 195. 
314 Christopher Duffy, Siege warfare: the fortress in the early modern world, 1494-1660 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 141. English ideas concerning rebellion had their Spanish 
parallels; for example, Luis Valle de la Cerda, Avisos en materia de estado y Guerra para 
oprimir rebeliones (Madrid, 1599), c.f. Parker, ‘The etiquette of atrocity’, p.339, note 30, 
which justified the execution of all rebels. 
315 Professor Geoffrey Parker, personal correspondence, 19 March 2013. 
316 Ruth Putnam, William the Silent prince of Orange and the revolt in the Netherlands (New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1911), pp. 86-87; William of Orange thought very highly of his 
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Orange, if it did have something of the quality called sovereignty, was 
insignificant in an international sense, and any military actions taken by William 
of Orange were done so as a subject and a rebel against Spain, and the initial 
Spanish reaction was to re-establish the rule of law by any means. 
In 1572, several Dutch towns were captured or had sided with Orange’s 
cause, Alba recognised that not all the towns possessed by the rebels were 
equally guilty of rebellion, and he devised a system through which he could 
classify the condition of each into one of six categories, and the appropriate 
military response for each. Towns in the first four categories were essentially 
loyal to Spain, and when these were recaptured, they deserved leniency. If, for 
example, one such town was re-taken by an assault which overthrew the rebels, 
the town should not be sacked by the royalist soldiers. The two remaining 
categories were rebel towns; these were towns that had either surrendered to 
the rebels before a need arose, or refused a royalist garrison in favour of a rebel 
garrison. These were treasonous actions which contemporaries thought 
warranted exemplary punishments.317 
Such exemplary punishments were part of Alba’s strategy of ‘terror’: ‘the 
application of brutal violence against a portion of enemy territory in hope of 
inducing surrender of the rest.’318 Little changed when the conflict was removed 
from sieges to field operations. There was no ambiguity in field operations, the 
Dutch were rebels and were under arms against their monarch, and as such were 
worthy only of execution, and no customary honours needed to be extended to 
them. Despite a strong European culture of pitched field engagements in war, 
Alba routinely avoided them. He preferred to insult Orange by rejecting his 
challenges to bring their armies together in pitched battle, and instead wore the 
rebels out ‘with dilatory manoeuvers, harassing skirmishes, frequent ambushes 
                                         
sovereign status and considered himself an independent prince: see Orange’s remarks to that 
fact to the elector of Saxony in Herbert H. Rowen, The prince of Orange: the Stadtholders in 
the Dutch republic, Cambridge studies in early modern history (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1990), p. 10; furthermore in the first revolt, when it came time to bring armies 
into the field, Orange did so by issuing military commissions in accordance with international 
norms and the manner appropriate to a sovereign prince: see Parker, The Dutch revolt, p. 
108. 
317 Parker, ‘The etiquette of atrocity’, p. 156. 
318 Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Siegecraft and surrender: the law of war and strategy of cities as 
targets’, Virginia journal of international law 39 (1998-1999), pp. 353-423, 365. 
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and sneak attacks under the cover of darkness.’319 Rebel heralds were routinely 
executed, a striking reversal of the strict immunity habitually extended to 
heralds of sovereign states. The customary practice of taking prisoners for 
ransom, or the policy and procedures regarding the taking, keeping, and 
exchanging prisoners of war, had no application against rebels. Alba suppressed 
it further by placing, ‘dead or alive’, bounties upon the heads of rebel leaders. 
In regular warfare, these peoples would have brought the most desirable 
ransoms; therefore, few prisoners were ever taken, and most of these, when 
they were captured, were done so for the purposes of interrogation, and were 
executed afterwards.320 
English participation in 1572-1573 was the continuation of an English 
‘underhand’ war in defence of Protestantism, and the Dutch revolt was simply 
the most recent theatre. How did these English volunteers fit into Alba’s law of 
armed conflict? From 1572-1573, Spanish commanders applied Alba’s 
interpretation of the laws of armed conflict somewhat less strictly against the 
English volunteers, and surprisingly they were a group given a measure of the 
traditional respect afforded lawful combatants. 
The Elizabethan regime had as one of its operational goals the protection 
of Flushing, a town that had recently revolted from Spain in a dramatic fashion. 
In April 1572, they had executed Alba’s agent, Hernando Pacheco, his royalist 
entourage, while also symbolically hanging the duke of Alba’s personal 
escutcheon on the gallows — a grave insult.321 Thomas Morgan’s famous English 
company of 300 pike trailers had arrived to defend the town on 6 June, joining 
with three French and Walloon companies already present and under the 
command of Jerome Tseraerts, the Orangist governor of Flushing. Alba, at this 
time, was engaged in the siege of Mons (June to September 1572), and 
delegated the problem to the royalist governor of Middleburg, de Beauvoir, and 
the Spanish Captain Sancho d’Avila.322  
                                         
319 Gonzalez de Leon, ‘Soldados platicos and caballeros’, pp. 235-268, 241. 
320 Ibid, p. 243. 
321 Williams, ALC, pp. 99-; It is worth noting that execution by hanging was a grievous insult to a 
professional soldier and was the manner of execution applied to criminals, and this was 
confirmed by Pacheco who pleaded with Flushing’s citizens to be executed by the sword. 
322 Edward Grimston, A general historie of the Netherlands (London: Adam Islip, 1627), p. 354. 
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Having prepared positions outside Flushing, the royalists began launching 
sorties in mid-June to retake it, which was met with like skirmishers from the 
Orangist army. Morgan persuaded Tseraerts to allow his company to sally out in 
battle formation. There was a purpose behind Morgan’s action; he wanted to 
meet the royalist army on conventional terms, and not in skirmishes and 
ambuscades. Furthermore, the English captain took physical steps to present his 
company as legitimate combatants. Williams recorded that ‘[t]o make the 
skirmish the more honourable, we sallied with our ensigns.’323 The royalist 
soldiers likewise presented a corps in like battle formation with their ensigns 
displayed, and the two corps came to push-of-pike (figure 15).324 
Ensigns and standards had notable importance in European military 
culture. These played a significant role in the visual articulation of the law of 
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324 Fig. 15. Walter Morgan, The expedition in Holland, p. 130-1. 
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Figure 15. An Anglo-Dutch formation (left) meets at push of pike with a Spanish formation 
(right) with their ensigns displayed, and casualties, the easiest potential prisoners to take, litter 
the ground. 
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arms because it could communicate at a distance with whom the formation was 
allied;325 for an army to unfurl a standard was another means to declarate war, 
while raising a banner above a town or fortress proclaimed its legitimate 
ownership. Firstly, banners proclaimed who was making war against whom; ‘a 
banner or a pennon was a man’s personal emblem; therefore, when it was 
displayed, he had committed on his honour to battle.’326 Secondly, it signalled 
the legal conditions that the unit intended to conduct battle. In medieval 
warfare, a red banner or streamer let it be known that no quarter would be 
given, and a white flag indicated a moment of truce so a parley might be 
conducted. The defenders of Grave in April 1586 raised a black flag to indicate 
to their allies that if they were not relieved soon, they would surrender.327 
Standards also symbolised the unit’s collective honour, so to lose an ensign was 
foremost a disgrace upon the unit’s commander and his soldiers. Hence Williams 
promised, while in command of Bergen op Zoom in 1585, to burn his ensigns 
rather than let them fall into the hands of the enemy. This was intended to 
protect his honour and rob his attackers from the glory of capturing it.328 
We do not know specifically the types or description of Morgan’s ensign; 
however, it was perhaps his family’s own heraldic device since Williams says it 
was ‘Morgans Ancient [standard]’, if so, Morgan would have felt a strong 
personal motivation to see battle given under honourable conditions.329 It can be 
inferred from Williams’s account that Morgan’s company skirmished according to 
the laws and European customs of war. 
Here the English volunteer company made an overt declaration of their 
intention to practice conventional warfare with its attendant code of conduct.330 
                                         
325 Keen, The laws of war in the late Middle Ages, pp. 103-4. 
326 Keen, The laws of war in the late Middle Ages, pp. 107-8. 
327 CSPF (1585-1586), p. 621. 
328 CSPF (1585-1586), pp. xvi, 70. 
329 Williams, ALC, p. 103-104. 
The standards used by volunteer companies differed from companies in English state, and the 
crown; Morgan likely carried his own heraldic device on his banner, Henry Champernowne’s 
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English state, and another symbol of the state were the arms of Queen Elizabeth which were 
also carried by sanctioned companies. 
330 The picture of soldiers at push-of-pike in fig. 14 is an example of an Anglo-Dutch company 
meeting their Spanish opponents and both bearing the standards proudly. Ensigns were an 
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The royalists and the English formation came to push of pike — i.e. close 
quarter’s battle — and within the melee certain members struggled to capture 
the others flag. During one encounter ‘the enemy had holde on Captaine 
Morgan’s’ standard, but it was rescued by ‘George Browne and diuerse other 
gentlemen’.331 The brave action of Brown and his fellows spoiled the royalist 
prize and earned them honours by recovering the company’s colours. The 
royalist formation then withdrew and leaving the English formation unbroken, 
holding the field. With their honour preserved, the English formation received 
word to also withdraw from the fight, which they did, and as custom dictated 
both sides took prisoners of war.332 The skirmish, small and insignificant in the 
context of the wider revolt, but notable because it had been fought and 
conducted according to the prevailing customs of war. By contrast, on 11 June 
the rebel garrison of Flushing had captured some 120 prisoners during a naval 
raid using fly-boats against a nearby Spanish flotilla under the command of the 
duke of Medina Celi, Alba’s lieutenant governor, and resulted in several 
summary executions. It seems likely, however, that this action was an impulse in 
reprisal for the royalists’ earlier hanging English victuallers.333 
July 1572 brought the arrival of Colonel Humphrey Gilbert, an English 
captain all too knowledgeable of the differences between military operations 
against rebels and war. In 1569, he had served in Ireland and as the colonel of 
the army of Munster earned an infamous reputation for his own terror tactics. 
Nevertheless, Gilbert’s ruthless and bloody methods enabled his small force to 
overcome significantly larger rebel groups and fit within Elizabethan 
counterinsurgency doctrine.334 One of his more atrocious tactics involved 
requiring any Irishman seeking a meeting with him, to pass through a lane 
marked out with the severed heads of rebels.335 Apart from his Irish experience, 
                                         
important signal in warfare. Morgan’s Expedition to the Holland? Perhaps move this to fn. 
219. 
331 Williams, ALC, pp. 103-104. 
332 Williams, ALC, p. 104. 
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Gilbert advocated for a military academy to be established in London to increase 
English military professionalism in 1570 and indicates that he had a serious 
interest in military affairs.336 More than other captains in Elizabeth’s 
‘underhand’ war, Gilbert must have been aware of the potential risks that his 
regiment faced, particularly after Elizabeth’s regime had made it openly known 
to Alba that the English companies then in the Low Countries were there without 
the sanction of the crown in an apparent attempt to politically distance the 
English crown from its covert volunteers.337 
Gilbert’s initial aim was to link up with Louis of Nassau’s force, who were 
then actively defending Mons against the duke of Alba and the main corps of the 
Army of Flanders, but it this was beyond him to achieve, and he was diverted to 
the area around Sluis. The campaign there was a blundering affair. The royalist 
captains in Middleburg and around Sluis indicated their displeasure at the arrival 
of these English interlopers into this domestic matter of the Spanish crown. 
Gilbert attempted to capture Sluis, but the governor tricked Gilbert into a 
drawn-out parley, which he used as a ruse to alert his royalist allies and buy 
time for their relief. Following four days of prevarications and delays, Gilbert 
sent his trumpeter to Sluis. The trumpeter was halted outside the gates, and the 
governor warned the him that he would only render the town to the approaching 
royalist column, and if Gilbert remained he would ‘find meanes to hang ... 
[them] all’. Enraged at this deception, Gilbert swore oaths that he ‘would put all 
to the sword, vnless they would yield’, but the gates remained closed. It was 
only after Tseraerts’s pressured him that Gilbert commanded the army to 
withdraw.338 Along his march, Gilbert salved his wounded pride by ambushing a 
royalist supply column, where his soldiers drove of the escort of horse, and 
‘their footmen & conuoy to be executed by vs: which were for the most part’.339 
It remained an open question as to how the royalist commanders would 
treat these English adventurers. When Mons surrendered to Alba, for example, it 
was granted favourable terms; Louis of Nassau’s Orangist army – chiefly 
                                         
336 Humphrey Gilbert, Queene Elizabethes Achademy, ed. F. J. Furnivall, vol. 8, Early English 
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comprised of Huguenots – was permitted to leave with their arms, ensigns, and 
drums, and ‘[t]he Duke most honourably saw the capitulation observed and kept’ 
(figure 16).340 Churchyard’s account of the surrender attributes its good terms to 
an English volunteer, William Morgan. There is perhaps reason to doubt this 
version of events. Morgan was a low-level officer, the captain of a small ensign 
of horse; however, Nassau was sick and bed ridden during the period that the 
defenders of Mons negotiated with Alba, and he was personally unable to attend 
the parley.341 Presumably Nassau selected ‘serteyne soldiours of judgement’, and 
his absence had added benefits since Alba personally hated the man, and it 
would not serve the defenders to antagonise the duke. With many towns in the 
north openly declaring themselves for Orange, Alba was personally motivated to 
conclude his siege as soon as possible. This fact also highlights the extent to 
which commanders in the field could interpret the laws of war to suit the 
situation. The defenders, on the other hand, were well positioned to drag-out 
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Figure 16. Louis [Ludwig] of Nassau’s departure from Mons. Note that the Dutch army was 
escorted by Spanish units. 
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the siege into the fall; therefore, Alba had a significant interest in establishing 
terms for the rapid surrender of Mons and reason to set aside his usual hard-line 
policy. Formally Alba justified the terms granted to Nassau in his official 
correspondence with Phillip; he asserted his need to attended to the rebellion in 
the north, and that Mons had been defended by foreigners – Huguenots – not 
Dutch rebels.342 Perhaps William Morgan’s foreign quality partly earned those 
exceptional terms. 
The capitulation of Mons also paid service to Alba’s interpretation of the 
laws of armed conflict; it had been captured, and a considerable number of its 
citizens remained loyal to Spain.343 Therefore, Alba would not allow it to be 
sacked; he preferred to use a special court to judge and punish collaborators.344 
Alba kept strictly to these interpretations. Hence after taking possession of 
Mons, Alba marched his armies north, and his forces applied exemplary 
punishment to openly rebellious towns. On 1 October, Mechelen (Malines) was 
‘sacked ... to the vttermost’ for three full days, 14 November Zutphen was 
sacked before the terms of its surrender were set, and on 2 December the 
Spanish razed Naarden and slaughtered its inhabitants en masse.345 Certainly 
Alba had few qualms when it came to issuing orders to his soldiers authorising 
mass killings. 
The English volunteers were something of a wild card, while Alba’s ‘furie’ 
bore down without restraint on the rebels, Morgan’s company and Gilbert’s 
regiment assisted Tseraerts from September to October 1572 in two unsuccessful 
attempts to take royalist town of Goes, and finally withdrawing at the approach 
of Mondragon’s bold veteran regiment. Their operations nevertheless reveal 
several instances of note regarding ius in bello. A royalist regiment led by the 
governor of Middleburg had marched to intercept Gilbert’s regiment as it 
marched in route to Goes. Certain numbers of the Spanish royalist troop had 
‘prepared a great number of haulters’, and had orders ‘to hang all the prisoners 
                                         
342 William S. Maltby, Alba: a biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, third duke of Alba 1507-
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they should take.’346 Fortunately for the English, they discovered the enemy and 
overthrew them in an assault. ‘[O]ur men’, recalled Williams, ‘hung a number of 
them with their owne haulters.’347 The English did not attempt to justify hanging 
some of the Spanish soldiers, and the action was little more than a brutal 
example of reciprocity when the status of combatants was in doubt. During the 
second attempt on Goes, the English were commanded by Tseraerts to assault 
the town with scaling ladders. The assault failed, and the Spanish took prisoner 
those that were left wounded as the assaulting force retreated under fire. 
Messengers were exchanged between the two camps, and the Spanish captain, 
Pedro Pacheco, offered to exchange prisoners and agreed upon their ransoms. 
Gilbert believed that his regiment’s recent actions — namely the recent punitive 
hanging of royalist troops — were changing the rebellion into a war; he wrote to 
Burghley to say ‘[t]he Spaniards would be glad to make good wars, for that they 
[the English] have hanged so many of them, and are like to take more of 
them.’348 
Colonel Gilbert left the Dutch conflict in fall of 1572 and taking with him 
the bulk of his regiment, but important numbers of English volunteers continued 
serving the Dutch.349 Two hundred English soldiers, with many perhaps mustering 
in the company of the Scottish Captain Balfort, and Captain Symons’s company 
of shot that passed through the Spanish lines in January 1573, and all 
contributed materially to the defence of Haarlem.350 In December 1572, Alba 
and the Army of Flanders laid siege to the town, and it was a protracted 
operation that took nearly eight months of combined naval and land operations 
for the Spanish to complete. The Dutch rebels, incensed by Alba’s ‘furie’ and 
terror tactics, violated a number of the laws of war; they abused the rights of 
non-combatants, were perfidious, an tortured and mutilated captives.351 
Contrary to conventional military practices, women were mustered in a pioneer 
company and actively participated in combat operations, an act that stood as an 
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insult to early modern ideas of masculinity and honour. Contemporaries believed 
women should not participate in military operations, which the soldiers of the 
Army of Flanders likely saw as an insult because ‘there is no great glory in 
punishing a woman and the victory has no renown’352 When not under arms, 
women were a protected class and considered non-combatants and arming 
women for war overturned established sixteenth-century gender roles. Legal 
doctrines had developed to classify women as ‘innocents’ because they were 
considered too weak to fight; however, ‘in so far as women play the part of men 
they are men and not women’.353 The defenders committed perfidy when they 
used a false parley as a cover so that fresh reinforcements could be secreted 
into the town. A parley was a truce, and a pause in all military activity; this 
prohibited any actions, on either side, that materially improved one’s tactical 
disposition.354 Spanish soldiers and Catholic clergy were tortured in full view of 
Alba’s army.355 The defenders did not render appropriate military honours due to 
fellow soldiers, instead they insulted them. Some of the Dutch serving in the 
garrison, had been previously pardoned by Alba at Mons, and were now violating 
their oaths given there to no longer bear arms against the king of Spain.356 
The cycle of atrocities spiralled out of control. Spanish atrocities were 
met with Dutch atrocities in a chain of terrible reciprocity. The siege of Haarlem 
was a brutal series of assaults, mines and counter-mines, naval battles, and 
failed relief attempts. ‘The soldiers willingly accepted all the toil’, stated 
Spanish Captain Mendoza, ‘as the price of satisfying a personal vendetta, for the 
war had become so cruel that there was no question of either side taking a man 
alive.’357 
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Despite the use of terror tactics on both sides, there were some attempts 
to bring the laws of war to bear at Haarlem. On one occasion, the walls had 
been breached by the Spanish battery, and the defenders attempted to attain 
terms for their surrender. A noble woman was sent to the royalist camp with the 
defenders’ terms. She pleaded with Alba’s son, Don Frederick, for an honourable 
amend ‘to suffer them to depart the towne in ther shertes and white rodes in 
ther handes’.358 Don Frederick rejected the offer claiming that ‘sithe thaye 
helde out so longe, nowe let them end lyke men who loke for no mercye.’ This 
brief opportunity for restraint was stillborn, and Alba, it was rumoured, had left 
standing orders to make no compacts with the rebels: ‘[a]ll the towns of Holland 
dothe offer to yeld upon condicions but the Duke will not, but will have all 
together his owne will grant to nothinge.’359 The royalists resumed fighting as 
Frederick had promised. Prisoners taken by the royalists attempting to relieve 
Haarlem were executed ad terrorem, ‘and all hanged before Harlem’. When 
Spanish soldiers cast the severed head of a Dutch captain into the town, the 
defenders’ returned the heads of seven Spaniards.360 
On 9 July 1573 Orange, desperate to relieve Haarlem, ordered the baron 
of Batenburg, with about 6,000 foot, 600 horse, and a train of wagons bearing 
the necessaries to relieve the town, to break through the royalist’s siege-
lines.361 Both Walter Morgan and Roger Williams criticised the mission on varying 
tactical and strategic grounds, and Colonel Morgan did not commit his English 
regiment to it; however, Orange placed some of his English volunteers, along 
with Scots, Dutch, and Huguenots, into its companies of foot. The royalist force 
gained intelligence of the mission, and prepared an overwhelming counter-
                                         
358 The so-called amende honourable (honourable amend) was a public formalized act of 
contrition and reconciliation designed to restore an injury or honour to a wounded party; it 
was commonly used in late medieval Burgundy reconciling rebellious citizens with princely 
authority: Peter Arnade, ‘Carthage or Jerusalem? Princely violence and the spatial 
transformation of the medieval into the early modern city’, Journal of urban history 39 
(2013), pp. 726-48, 733; idem, Realms of ritual: Burgundian ceremony and civic life in late 
medieval Ghent Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 114-126. Coligny’s military 
ordinances also employed it as a disciplinary tool: Eugène de Caraman Chimay, ‘Gaspard de 
Coligny, admiral de France’, The British quarterly review 61-2 (1875), pp. 163-182, 168-9. 
Leicester sent terms of an honourable amend to a besieged Doesburg in 1586, see chapter 4. 
359 Relations politiques, vi, p. 680. 
360 Relations Politiques, vi, p. 752; Gonzalez de Leon, ‘Soldados platicos and caballeros’, p. 244. 
361 Following Gilbert’s return to England in the winter of 1572, Morgan assumed the regiment’s 
command. Williams, ALC, pp. 129-30; Morgan, The expedition to Holland, 1572-1574, pp. 
133-138; Relations politiques, vi, pp. 791-5. 
110 
Chapter 3. ‘Underhand’ Warfare between States 
 
attack which annihilated the column. Batenburg’s defeat crushed the defenders’ 
morale and lost Orange an allied army. Soldiers of the Army of Flanders took one 
of the prisoners from the column and cut off his ears and nose, and then set him 
free to carry tidings of doom into Haarlem. The Spanish further confirmed its 
downfall by throwing several more severed heads over the walls.362 Four days 
later Haarlem surrendered, but terms of surrender were not established in a 
single universal agreement made by the captain in overall command. The 
military captains that defended Haarlem appeared to have each, on their own 
account, set their own terms of surrender. Spanish accounts state that the town, 
and its indigenous garrison, surrendered on terms of mercy, and accepting 
Spanish promises of mercy that ‘they might hope for better then they deserved. 
...he promised to secure them from plunder, and from all other licentious 
Military violence.’363 However, two foreign captains made their own compacts. 
Balfort, the Scottish captain, wrote Williams, ‘escaped [the] Duke d’Alvaes 
cruelty, [and] promised to kill the Prince of Orange: but being arriued with the 
Prince he confessed his promise, and serued him faithfully long after.’364 
Doubtful though Williams’s testimony might be, it was also recoded in Meteren’s 
account, and Balfort was present at the siege and allowed to depart, apparently 
with his company, and did long continue in Orange’s service.365 Alba’s fury was 
vented on the remnants of Haarlem’s garrison. Spanish records indicate that 
1,735 soldiers were executed.366 This began as an orderly summary process 
(figure 17.), but the royalist soldiers tired of the endless beheadings, and began 
drowning the prisoners in the Spaarne River (figure 18.).367 A number of 
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prisoners that were taken as a result of the surrender of Haarlem were pressed 
into Spanish service and used as pioneers at the siege of Alkmaar.368 
Alba’s terror policy was constrained somewhat, and where it was possible, 
he extended more liberal combatant status to the small number of English 
mercenaries. Alba’s practice conformed to his wider secular vision of Spanish 
European strategy; he consistently advocated for a position of neutrality 
regarding England, and despite the emergence of a trade war between the two 
states (1568-1573). Alba remained opposed to any Spanish intervention on behalf 
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Figure 17. Troops from the Army of Flanders summarily execute soldiers from the Haarlem 
garrison. 
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of English Catholics.369 His position increasingly came into conflict with Philip’s 
monarchical policy in the 1570s because it conflicted with the later’s ‘messianic 
imperialism’, which placed the defence of the true Catholic religion, and its 
adherents, into the king’s hands. As Philip once noted, ‘it appears to me that, 
after my special obligation to maintain my own state in our holy faith, I am 
bound to make every effort to restore and preserve it in England as in former 
times’.370 
Alba consistently warned Philip to avoid taking any actions against 
Elizabeth’s kingdom. He understood that the English secret war in the 
Netherlands (1572-4) was justifiable because of Philip’s entanglement in the 
failed Ridolfi plot (1571); this was a pro-Catholic plot that planned to invade 
England with 6,000 Spanish troops from the Army of Flanders, assassinate 
Elizabeth, and overthrow her protestant regime and establish a Catholic 
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Figure 18. Soldiers from the Army of Flanders drowned the remaining soldiers of the Haarlem 
garrison. 
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government under Mary queen of Scots.371 This suggests that one act of 
subversion might serve to legitimise another, but this question cannot be 
definitely answered at this time. However, Alba convinced Philip to reconcile 
himself with the English queen in 1574, who responded accordingly, so when 50 
vessels carrying troops for the Army of Flanders were driven off course by 
storms, they were given safe harbour and courteous treatment in England, and 
Elizabeth moderated her military support for Orange.372 
English soldiers, individually and in companies, nevertheless remained 
serving Orange through the interim period of 1574 to 1578, despite the waning of 
English state support, both ‘underhand’ and open, for the Orangist cause. There 
was never any attempt to disguise the fact that Englishmen and English 
companies participated the Dutch conflict. However, before 1585 there was no 
open breach between England and Spain, and any English mercenaries in Dutch 
service were according to the international laws of war equal to their rebel pay 
masters. When Antonio de Guarras, Alba’s agent to the Elizabethan court, 
registered a formal complaint, Elizabeth responded in a confident manner: she 
declared that these English mercenaries were ‘traitors and rebels’ that had gone 
‘to those parts secretly’, and she would cheerfully hang any English in the 
service of Orange, just as she had done in France.373 
 
England’s ‘underhand’ attacks on the Comendador (1573-1576) and Don John 
of Austria (1576-1578) 
Philip recalled Alba to Spain in 1573 and replaced the veteran soldier with 
the administrator Don Louis de Requesens. The replacement would not carry the 
military title governor general, Requesens’s title was Comendador Mayor de 
Castilla, or simply the Commendador. He maintained a slightly attenuated 
version of the Duke Alba’s hard-line policy against Dutch rebels, but he also 
                                         
371 Robert Ridolfi was an Italian baker living in England, a secret papal agent, and most likely a 
double agent serving the regime: Parker, The grand strategy of Philip II, pp. 160-4, endnote 
38; Francis Edwards, The marvellous chance: Thomas Howard, fourth duke of Norfolk, and 
the Ridolfi Plot, 1570-1572 (London: Hart-Davis, 1968). 
372 Parker, The grand strategy of Philip II, pp. 164, supra note 49, c.f. TNA, PRO SP 12/105/123, 
Walsingham to Burghley, 6 Oct. 1575. 
373 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s Wars”’, pp. 126-7, Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the revolt in 
the Netherlands (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 30, c.f. Relations politiques, vi, p. 758. 
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inherited some of Alba’s apprehension against exemplary punishment of English 
mercenaries despite blaming Elizabeth and England for the Spanish failures of 
1572-3.374 Suppressing his personal hatred for the Elizabethan regime, and on 
several key occasions, Requesens chose not to execute English prisoners. Instead 
Requesens exchanged captured English mercenaries, perhaps to purchase 
goodwill in England and, therefore, to further larger Spanish strategic and 
political aims. The laws of war and their interpretation was flexible, and allowed 
the dominant party notable latitude to interpret the laws of war in their favour. 
Requesens, therefore, displayed mercy when not bound to do so because it 
benefited himself and the king. 
During the siege of Leiden (1573-1574), Spanish soldiers took 400 English 
prisoners.375 Requesens’s administration in the Low Countries treated these 
English prisoners very differently from Dutch belligerents. On 25 October 1574 in 
a letter to his cavalry commander, General Don Alonso de Vargas, Requesens 
ordered that Dutch captives should be killed and not ransomed.376 By contrast, 
Requesens, perhaps as part of the Anglo Spanish settlement of 1574, ordered the 
‘surrender to the Queen of England the 400 Englishmen that were of late 
captured in Holland’.377 The Elizabethan regime coordinated with Requesens to 
arrange safe-conduct for the prisoners. In the summer of 1575, additional English 
volunteers were captured and taken prisoners at The Hague; these unlawful 
troops were spared at the personal intercession of the future Spanish 
ambassador to England, Don Bernardino de Mendoza.378 The volunteers were 
repatriated concurrently with Mendoza arrival in England which resulted in a 
warm reception. Mendoza was honoured with a seat at her majesty’s own table, 
                                         
374 Matthew C. Waxman, ‘Strategic terror: Philip II and sixteenth-century warfare’, War in 
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Trevelyan (Dordrecht: Springer, 1927), pp. 14-16. 
376 Gonzalez de Leon, ‘Soldados platicos and caballeros’, p. 246, fn. 46. 
377 CSPR (1572-1578), p. 179-8. 
378 Requesens acquiesced to Mendoza’s request against the advice of his aides in order to 
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to England. Gonzalez de Leon, ‘Soldados platicos and caballeros’, p. 246, fn. 46. 
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and the queen commended Mendoza for the return of her subjects by presenting 
him with a gold chain valued at over 1,000 crowns.379 
The political conditions of the revolt underwent meaningful changes 
during the intervening years (1574-1578). The mutinous depredations of the 
Army of Flanders during the Requesens administration thoroughly discredited the 
Spanish regime.380 Requesens died in office on 5 March 1576, and the Spanish 
power-vacuum contributed to a new sense of Dutch unity. On 30 October, 
Orange negotiated an agreement, the Pacification of Ghent, with the Estates to 
end fighting between rebel and obedient provinces. With a peace established 
between the various indigenous factions in the Low Countries, the rebels and 
former royalists united to expel the Spanish army. The crisis required Philip to 
act quickly, and he appointed the veteran commander Don John of Austria to 
replace the deceased Requesens as governor of the Low Countries. 
Shortly after arriving in the Low Countries, Don John concluded a cease 
fire with the States on 27 January 1577, whereby, he recognised their demands 
in the Perpetual Edict, which led to the withdrawal of Spanish troops on 28 
April. Don John, like Requesens, believed England was to blame for the troubles 
in the Netherlands, and he advocated for an invasion: the ‘Enterprise of 
England’.381 Intelligence of the ‘Enterprise of England’ was leaked to Elizabeth, 
which quickly chilled Anglo Spanish relations. On 24 July, Don John with a 
policing force retook the citadel at Namur, and decided he would enforce the 
king’s authority by arms. Following his failed attempt to capture Antwerp on 1 
August, he recalled the tercios. 
Warnings of a Spanish invasion of England necessitated re-forging latent 
alliances, and on 7 January 1578, working on behalf of Elizabeth, Thomas 
Leighton completed an alliance between the States General and England.382 The 
articles of the treaty called for cooperation and the dispatch of 5,000 English 
foot and 1,000 horse to the Netherlands. However, the defeat of the States’ 
                                         
379 CSPR (1572-1578), pp. 177-78, 179-80, 181.  
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army at Gembloux on 31 January 1578 by Don John’s tercios caused Elizabeth to 
hesitate.383 The States desperately needed English military support, but 
Elizabeth, with her more conservative counsellors, decided against an open 
breach with Spain which would have involved dispatching of the earl of Leicester 
at the head of an army royal to fight on behalf of the States.384 Rather Elizabeth 
chose to contest Don John’s administration through proxies, and she purchased 
the services of the staunch Calvinist John of Casimir, lord of the Palatinate and 
military entrepreneur. In the queen’s commission to Casmir, she granted him 
authority to recruit English captains and companies for his expedition.385 Casimir 
recognised the utility of recruiting in England, so that by June 1578 there were 
two English regiments in Dutch service; their captains were John Norreys and 
Henry Cavendish.386 
The English regiments faced their first trial by fire on 1 August 1578, east 
of the town of Mechelen: the battle of Rijmenam. The armies formed up in 
conventional formations massed under respective ensigns in preparation for a 
pitched battle. The Spanish tercios were not this time in fighting trim. Plague 
had ravaged the ranks killing and sickening many men. The English regiments 
were fresh and closed to push of pike leaving 500 men from the Army of Flanders 
dead on the field and routing the Spanish. The engagement also gave the English 
the opportunity to capture ‘[t]wo or three Italians or Spaniards prisoners’.387 
During their retreat, the Army of Flanders poisoned their trail to throw off their 
pursuers. They dumped plague victims, and those succumbing to their battle 
wounds, into ‘wells and ditches’, one observer noted that these were ‘full of 
dead’.388 Biological weapons were generally thought to be unlawful in just wars; 
                                         
383 Gonzalez de Leon, ‘Soldados platicos and caballeros’, p. 246: Don John at achieving victory at 
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however, Don John certainly felt justified and employed these weapons against 
rebels and unlawful combatants.389 Don John successfully led his army to safety. 
In the wake of the allies’ victory, one of the States’ captains dispatched ‘a 
trumpet to Aerschot’ with their prisoner[s?] to negotiate their ransom.390 
 
Governor Parma’s Reconquista and the end of terror tactics (1578-1592) 
Shortly after the States’ victory at Rijmenam, Don John himself fell victim 
to plague and died. Philip promoted Alexander Farnese, the prince (and future 
duke) of Parma (1545-1592), to be his replacement. Parma made significant 
structural changes to the Army of Flanders’s command structure during his long 
tenure (1578-1592). Whereas, Alba preferred officers that had proven 
themselves victorious in battle, and he often promoted common men of tested 
military acumen to positions of command. Parma, on the other hand, favoured 
aristocrats and noble officers. This Spanish administrative change greatly 
moderated violence in the Dutch revolt, and over the course of Parma’s career, 
military memoirists, historians, and commentators began referring to the revolt 
as the war in the Low Countries which signified a shift in public perceptions of 
the conflict. 
The States-General had unified for a brief time against Don John’s 
regime; however, after his death, they splintered once again into ‘obedient’ and 
‘rebellious’ factions. The division fell along religious lines with the Catholic 
provinces allying themselves with Parma’s Spanish administration, and 
Protestants rallying behind Orange. These dispositions were given a 
constitutional structure under the Union of Utrecht and the Union of Arras. Early 
in 1578 representatives from Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Gelderland, 
and Ommeladen met to conclude an alliance, the Union of Utrecht, which gave 
each province the right of self-rule; however, in war the provinces decided to 
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act in perpetuity ‘as if they were a single province’.391 This union had the same 
effect as a declaration of independence and became the foundation stone for 
the United Provinces. The Catholic provinces reacted against this alliance to 
form a union of their own: the Union of Arras. Their alliance included the 
provinces of Hainaut, Artois (on 6 January 1579), and Walloon Flanders (on 6 
April), and by 17 May they were formally reconciled to Spanish rule by the treaty 
of Arras.392 
These divisions introduced a new element into the fighting in 1578-1579, 
combatants now were divided into three politically different camps; first were 
the rebels, the Protestant provinces identified in the Union of Utrecht; second, 
the Spanish Army of Flanders and the Parma regime; and third, the reconciled 
provinces – signatories to the Union of Arras. It was the third group that most 
offended English commanders fighting in Elizabeth’s secret war. English Captains 
saw these new combatants as standing against the cause of Dutch liberty, and 
the volunteers referred to them as ‘malcontents’, or ‘rebels’. This suggests that 
there were connections between the belligerent political rhetoric and the 
practice of the laws of war. A moving speech made by a commander could 
inspire their soldiers to either greater atrocity or more measured actions.393 
Over the 1570s, English captains learned through hard campaigning to 
respect the prowess and discipline of the Army of Flanders which was viewed by 
many Elizabethans as Europe’s leading military power. Returning English 
veterans had witnessed first-hand the nadir of English arms, and it is not 
surprising that after setting down the pike, a few picked up the pen and 
critiqued its decline.394 The background for these feelings has its place in the 
Scottish (1559-1561) and French (1562-1563) military debacles.395 Much of the 
respect for Spanish arms was gained through combat with them. A few intrepid 
Elizabethans took up personal service with the Army of Flanders and returned to 
                                         
391 Limm, The Dutch revolt, 1559-1648, p. 51. 
392 Ibid., p. 52. 
393 There is certainly more room for future analysis on the relationship between rhetoric and the 
laws of war but this falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
394 Gates, The defence of militarie profession (1579) and Blandy, The castle, or picture of policy 
(1581). 
395 Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars, pp. 61 (Scotland), 64 (France). 
119 
Chapter 3. ‘Underhand’ Warfare between States 
 
teach the Spanish method to their comrades. The most famous of these was 
Roger Williams, who served in the regiment of Julian Romero for three years 
(c.1574-1577); it is also worthy to note, within the Army of Flanders, English 
soldiers were considered excellent soldiers.396 Williams’s experiences fuelled 
England’s transition from older tactics and weapons systems towards a modern 
practice.397 Therefore, the cosmopolitan nature of early modern military service 
fostered a degree of professionalism between belligerents. 
Among Orangist army commanders, particularly the English and French, 
there was an effort to preserve the law of war. The Orangists held 
Grobbendonck castle, in the town of Herentals, near Antwerp, under the 
command of a French captain named Normand. Parma had positioned his army 
to capture it, and the great Huguenot Captain la Noue was sent to counter his 
advance. Norreys’s regiment, then attached to la Noue moved to counter the 
siege; however, ‘as soon as the cannon was presented’, Captain Normand 
yielded the castle upon terms of composition. The terms allowed the French 
garrison to depart, but the small corps of Dutch soldiers there were sacrificed to 
Parma and were either ‘hanged or put to the sword.’398 Captain Normand knew 
that his surrender was dubious with allied troops so near, and deserted ‘on 
account of M. la Noue’s indignation at the surrender’. There can be little doubt 
that if la Noue had captured him, he faced death for treason.399 
Over 1578-1579 Parma’s adroit political and diplomatic negotiations with 
the ‘obedient’ provinces began to produce positive gains; however, he was still 
working to construct a coherent military strategy. He worked under the negative 
institutional weight and policies of successive governors. From Alba to Don John 
previous Spanish commanders had preferred ‘terror’ to diplomacy, which led 
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Parma to flirt with the failed policies of his predecessors. During the siege of 
Maastricht in the spring of 1579, he applied an interpretation of the laws of war 
that Alba would have recognised. To the sixteenth-century ‘man of war’ there 
were strong grounds for the use of exemplary punishment regarding the rebel 
town of Maastricht; they had denied entry to royal troops sent to garrison their 
town, and the town’s leaders had declared themselves for the rebels. Thus, 
what followed was a siege every bit as terrible as any waged by the ‘Iron duke’ 
of Alba. The Dutch combatants were judged rebels and the laws of war 
accordingly silenced. 
Maastricht was besieged by Parma’s army, about 20,000 effectives, which 
was only slightly less than the total population of the town which had an 
estimated population of 34,000 — men, women, and children. The ranking 
Orangist official was governor Melchoir von Schwarzenberg; however, military 
command and the chief architect of the town’s defence was Lieutenant 
Sebastian Tappin.400 Maastrict’s small number of defenders (about 4,200 total 
effectives) rapidly took-up an active defence: ‘[s]ince the coming of the enemy 
they have had divers light skirmishes, wherein such prisoners as they take on the 
one side and the other [are] cruelly executed and put to death.’401 Both parties 
continued holding true to the old vendetta, and each knew that no mercy would 
be granted by the other. The divisions further hardened when the citizenry 
expelled their Catholic priests fearing that they would betray them.402 The 
women of Maastricht, as in Haarlem, were mustered for the common defence, 
thus, eliminating their customary protections under the laws of war. All law and 
custom indicated that the entire town’s population were combatants; there 
would be no prisoners, no mercy, only war of elimination. 
Parma planted his siege batteries, ‘20-30 guns’, on the 26 May, reported 
the Elizabethan diplomat William Davison to the secretaries. The Spanish cannon 
hammered the walls into rubble: ‘to-day or to-marrow ... the enemy gives 
assault’.403 The Army of Flanders tested several breaches; these forays were 
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repulsed by the defenders, and captured royalist soldiers were summarily 
executed, and their corpses dumped unceremoniously into the river.404 Parma 
sent-out entreaties calling upon the defenders to surrender, but these were 
rejected. In June soldiers from the Army of Flanders had ‘cruelly put to the 
sword’ the garrison of Dalem; therefore, the defenders Maastricht chose to fight 
rather than face summary execution.405 In one curious account, the defenders 
hung from a remaining section of wall a dead dog with a loaf of bread tied to its 
neck and cried out: ‘when the dog eats the bread they would surrender’!406 This 
obstinate act, as much as anything that the defenders had already done, would 
have assured the town’s utter destruction. After preparing a combined surface 
and subterranean assault, Parma ordered his soldiers to attack along both 
avenues of approach at once on 28 June. The royalist’s attack overwhelmed the 
remaining defenders, and they had no choice but to plead mercy and attempt a 
surrender or face annihilation. An English account of the fall Maastricht survives, 
and was passed on to Walsingham. It stated that the defenders in the last 
moments succeeded in surrendering on terms with Parma, but they were 
betrayed by the Spanish troops, who for their own security, entered their prisons 
and ‘massacred them cruelly for three hours’.407 
The destruction of Maastricht, legally justifiable under the sixteenth-
century customary law against rebels, marked a turning point in the 
development of Parma’s strategy because afterwards he would seek 
reconciliation wherever possible. Parma was recognised as the most successful 
Spanish governor of the Netherlands, and the key to his success was a sincere 
desire to reconcile the rebels with their Spanish overlords.408 His military 
operations immediately reflected this policy shift. For more than a decade, 
Spanish forces had applied virtually unrestrained military might to crush the 
rebellion. The transition would require herculean efforts to reverse, the Army of 
Flanders’s formerly free and bloody hand away from a typical sixteenth-century 
                                         
404 Ibid., p. 488. 
405 Ibid., p. 31. 
406 Ibid., p. 488. 
407 CSPF (1579-1580), p. 6. 
408 Violet Soen, ‘Reconquista and reconciliation in the Dutch revolt: the campaign of Governor-
general Alexander Farnese (1578-1592)’, Journal of early modern history 16 (2012), pp. 1-22. 
122 
Chapter 3. ‘Underhand’ Warfare between States 
 
counterinsurgency strategy into what can best be described as regular war. 
Parma instituted important administrative changes to the Army of Flanders. 
Professional career soldiers were replaced by aristocrats who were less inclined 
to victory at any cost. Furthermore, the old ban prohibiting the ransom of 
captives was lifted, and soldiers were once again permitted to ransom their 
prisoners of war, which enhanced the monetary value placed on the lives of 
rebels. Here was a means for the chronically unpaid Spanish soldiery to earn 
legitimate profits on campaign.409 Storming towns always tended to produce 
massacres; however, Parma largely averted this by offering liberal terms of 
surrender and imposed indemnities to pay his troops rather than permitting 
soldiers to plunder the defeated. These polices imposed increased military 
restraints on all combatants; therefore, in early 1580 when royalist troops 
captured St Amand, the citizens were held as prisoners of war, and among those 
captured and ransomed was the English Colonel Thomas Morgan.410 
Sent to Friesland 6 August 1580, Norreys’s regiment fought on the 
conflict’s periphery with ‘malcontent’ forces led by the count of Rennenburg. 
These soldiers were not the Italians and Spaniards ubiquitous amongst the 
tercios, but those Dutch who had rallied to the royalist cause embodied in the 
Union of Arras. An English veteran of Friesland campaign, Geoffrey Gates, 
described the English soldier’s perception of the ‘Malcontent’ troops: ‘[i]t is a 
people that feareth niether God, not man, cruell, bloudy, and beggarly, 
gathered together of the froth and scomme of many nations: [i]n manner 
barbarous, in opinion Turquishe, hoping [with a hot] and earnest indeuor to 
spoyle and spill all Christian bloud.’ Gates’s fellow campaigner thought that 
‘sufferaunce towards so cursed and peruerse a generation [was] to be maruailed 
at.’411 It would be a simple deduction to think that Norreys, the captain that had 
overseen the massacre of Rathlin Island in Ireland, would be ruthless advocate 
for the destruction of the ‘Malcontents’ in the Netherlands. Yet, Dutch nobles 
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took a more liberal view, and the ‘malcontents’ were judged as lawful 
mercenaries, or soldiers, in the service of legitimate nobles and potentates, and 
despite their distaste for these enemies, the law of war remained applicable.412 
In mid-July Norreys’s English regiment, directed by the count of 
Hohenlohe, approached five ensigns of ‘Malcontents’ that held two forts at 
‘Vpslaught’.413 Hohenlohe dispatched his drummer to deliver the terms of 
surrender; he commanded them to ‘yield up those fortes, without conditions 
(sauing their liues) to the use of the Prince of Orange, & the States’. The 
captains of the ‘malcontent’ forts considered these unfair terms of surrender, 
which did not pay due deference to their lawful combatant status. Hohenlohe’s 
drummer returned with the message ‘affirming their tenure to be planted in ye 
right of ye Popes holynes, & the Countie de Lalyne.’ Here the ‘malcontents’ 
sought to draw attention to those authorities from which they had formal 
commission and that their military service was lawful. Norreys and Hohenlohe 
recognised the legitimacy of their commission, and that their terms of surrender 
had been rejected. 
Norreys, in response, ordered his captains to begin besieging the forts; 
however, before the battery had begun, ‘[t]he Malcontents perciuing themselues 
so wrapt and invironed, by such as they feared would haue no compassion, sent 
forth a Drumme to craue mercye.’ In a council, Hohenlohe convinced an angry 
Norreys to accept their surrender, and to granted favourable terms: the 
‘malcontents’ could depart with ‘their liues saued [but] without armes.’414 The 
engagement and the subsequent surrender set forth the legal standard that 
Norreys would be expected to keep during his operations in Friesland. 
The chief ‘malcontent’ in Friesland was the count of Rennenburg, and he 
had committed his forces to capturing the town of Steenwijk. Rennenburg’s 
army surrounding Steenwijk overmatched Norreys’s collection of English and 
other mercenary troops; the besiegers had between 5-6,000 foot and 1,200 
horse; whereas Norreys had fewer than 2,000 effectives. However, Norreys had 
                                         
412 Richard Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, 3 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 
1885), pp. 301-2; Norreys allowed the soldiers under his command to massacre the garrison of 
Scots and their families. 
413 Hohenlohe in English sources is often referred to as ‘Hollock’. 
414 Blandy, The castle, or picture of policy, p. 23v. 
124 
Chapter 3. ‘Underhand’ Warfare between States 
 
been schooled in the manoeuvre warfare of Ireland and had learned how a 
smaller and more manoeuvrable force could break-up a larger force that relied 
upon conventional military operations. He used his small corps of soldiers to 
disrupt Rennenburg’s supply-lines, devastated his lands, and stealthily 
penetrated the siege lines with fresh supplies for the defenders. Thus, Norreys 
used his deficient numbers to essentially besiege the besiegers and broke the 
siege in late February 1581. Nevertheless, despite the employment of 
unconventional tactics, Norreys continued to follow the customs of war; he 
avoided massacres and made enemy combatants his prisoners of war.415 
On one occasion, champions from both Rennenburg and Norreys’s camp 
participated in the early modern equivalent of a joust of war.416 The Albanian 
captain of ‘malcontent’ horsemen, Thomas of Alba, issued a personal challenge 
to Norreys, then holding the rank of master of camp, which he declined 
believing that it was insolent for one of such inferior rank to challenge another 
of superior rank. However, to disregard completely a personal challenge could 
be construed as a blight on Norreys and the army’s collective honour, so the 
challenge was accepted by Sir Roger Williams, Norreys’s captain of horse. A date 
for the challenge was set, and military operations suspended for the joust. The 
two parties met, and their champions made several passes with their lances with 
both champions landing ‘fierce blows’, ‘yet niether of them being hurt’. Honour 
had been satisfied, and they concluded the challenge with ‘drinks a carouse’ and 
afterwards returned to their respective camps.417 The joust of war was a type of 
martial courtesy, an honour extended to lawful belligerents. This suggests that 
English volunteers such as Norreys and Williams wanted to see their participation 
                                         
415 CSPF (1581-1582), p. 2 (diverse soldiers were taken prisoner by Norreys); ibid., p. 44 (John 
Brown an English soldier was taken prisoner by the ‘malcontents’). 
416 Suzanne Dalewicz-Kitto and Alex Cantrill, ‘Conservation of a jousting reinforcement, 
belonging to Emperor Maximilian I’, Arms & armour 10 (2013), pp. 172-182, 173-174; Larry 
Silver, ‘Shining armor: Emperor Maximilian, chivalry, and war’, in Artful armies, beautiful 
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in the underhanded wars then going on in the Low Countries as both glorious and 
legitimate. 
Further political developments in 1581, perhaps, contributed more to 
Parma’s conciliatory attitude. Orange’s sovereignty early in the conflict was 
voided, and his rebel status reaffirmed by Philip in 1580, when he declared that 
Orange was a traitor to the Spanish crown. The United Provinces responded to 
Philip II’s declarations against them and their leader by making the duke of 
Anjou ‘prince and lord of the Netherlands’ on 23 January. This was followed with 
the ‘Act of Abjuration’ on 26 July, which asserted that Philip II had abused his 
oath to protect their ancient rights and liberties and concluded that ‘the king of 
Spain has by right forfeited his lordship, jurisdiction and inheritance of these 
provinces’.418 Here the rebel provinces explicitly declared their independence 
and by choosing their new prince, the duke of Anjou, they were beginning to 
flirt with a radical claim to collective sovereignty; one that did not require a 
prince to embody the collective state as was the recognised practice in England, 
France and Spain. However, by choosing a French Catholic, and brother to the 
king, as their titular head, they were establishing ephemeral connections to 
additional outside sources of sovereignty to legitimise their war. Anjou was in 
the direct line of succession to the kingdom of France, and openly courted the 
queen of England; therefore, he had strong personal connections to sovereign 
power. Although none of these connections to sovereignty were direct, they 
could only be dismissed with grave consequences, such as an open rupture with 
either France or England, or perhaps, both. 
Hence when Parma laid siege to the town of Oudenarde, and after 
suffering numerous violations of propriety from the defenders, he nevertheless, 
at the point of the town’s defeat by force of arms, extended once again an 
opportunity for them to surrender upon merciful terms of surrender. After 
arriving at Oudenarde and ordering the army to occupy besieging positions, 
Parma dispatched his trumpeter to present the town with the terms of 
surrender. Oudenarde’s defenders recalling previous Spanish massacres, gave ear 
to the terms, then shot and killed the trumpeter.419 Oudenarde appeared ready 
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to fight until the bitter end just as the defenders of Maastricht had. The Spanish 
siege battery began its assault on 8 June, and twice Parma sent additional 
summons to the town, and twice they were sent back. Parma’s terms were 
compelling, he was willing to ‘grant to them all they would ask in reason’; 
however, the defenders declared that they would sooner die that surrender.420 
Under any of the previous governors, the defenders’ obstinacy would have been 
punished with exemplary terror. Yet on 5 July, Parma again sent forth a parley. 
Oudenarde at this point had been isolated and there was no relief in sight. 
Reason compelled the inhabitants to accept their defeat, and Parma’s gracious 
terms of surrender were accepted; these are worth examining in detail. First, 
the governor and his family were protected from summary execution and were 
granted a safe-conduct and escort to depart with their goods; second, the 
soldiers were permitted to leave with their arms, ensigns, and drums and also 
given a safe-conduct and escort from the town to their ally’s lines; third, the 
citizens were granted a pardon in the king’s name; fourth, those who wished to 
leave were free to do so, and would be granted permission to take their goods 
with them, and given a year to dispose of their real property; fifth, the town 
was placed under an indemnity of 30,000 florins to compensate the governor for 
the siege.421 This would form the future model for Parma’s siege operations, and 
was repeated again at Antwerp in 1585, which secured the Brabant for Spain.422 
While Parma was reconquering the south one town at a time and 
justifying his politic combination of force and diplomacy, the regime in the 
United Provinces was crumbling into chaos. All their hopes of unity had been 
placed upon Anjou, but he, a Catholic, could not inspire the type of devotion 
necessary to lead the army of the United Provinces in a counter-offensive. Anjou 
himself in January 1583 tried to seize power in the rebel provinces by force – the 
French Fury – but failed. The four English regiments commissioned by Anjou 
largely languished unpaid in their garrisons, which wasted the largest number of 
English soldiers mustered to date for Dutch service; a level of English 
                                         
420 Ibid., pp. 73-4. 
421 Ibid., p. 136. 
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commitment that would not be reached again until 1601. Only Norreys’s men 
continued to perform active military operations in 1582. By the end of June 
1583, all of Anjou’s energy had been spent, and he withdrew from the conflict; 
although the United Provinces planned in 1584 to once again entice Anjou with 
their sovereignty in perpetuity the negotiations died with the duke on 10 June. 
The leadership of the United Provinces was further weakened on 10 July 
1584 when the father of the rebellion William of Orange was assassinated by a 
Spanish agent, Balthasar Gérard.423 The loss of both Anjou (1583) and Orange (d. 
1584) made Dutch sovereignty an intriguing question.424 The United Provinces 
had no internationally recognised grounds for further belligerence, and even 
Protestants were beginning to earnestly consider reconciliation. Parma might on 
lawful grounds have restored at this moment an Alba inspired policy of ‘terror’, 
but his successful reconquest justified his strategy and overcame any criticisms 
of his methods. It was with great reluctance that Elizabeth finally committed the 
English kingdom to an open, if limited, war with Spain by signing of the Anglo-
Dutch alliance outlined in the treaty of Nonsuch, 29 August 1585, and declaring 
war against Philip shortly afterwards. The Dutch will to resist Spain’s forces 
waned: the southern provinces had submitted, Antwerp was under siege (1584-
5), and Henry III of France made it clear early in 1585 that France would not 
intervene. This all but compelled Elizabeth to take unilateral action, which 
answered the question of sovereignty, and regular war began, all under the 
umbrella of English intervention. 
The Anglo-Dutch alliance and regular war largely complemented Parma’s 
shift in policy regarding the laws of war, and this helped to cement conventional 
methods of warfare in the Dutch conflict. From Alba to Don John, the Spanish 
crown and its agents had advocated for a policy of brutal suppression for Dutch 
rebels through exemplary acts of terror in the misplaced belief that this, rather 
than compromise and reconciliation, would encourage others to surrender out of 
                                         
423 Lisa Jardine, The awful end of Prince William the Silent: the first assassination of a head of 
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fear. Spanish belligerence and this strategy did more to harden both domestic 
and international opposition against Spanish dominion. English volunteers 
committed to fighting a ‘underhand’ war, on behalf of fellow protestants and 
against Spanish tyranny, was only effectively countered by Parma’s marked shift 
in strategy; after the destruction of Maastricht in 1579, rebellious towns were 
actively encouraged to return to obedience through a forward diplomatic policy. 
The Dutch learned time and again that Parma could be trusted to be merciful in 
victory, which encouraged them to make more timely surrenders than suffer 
utter destruction. 
Open war and the English intervention (1585/6) would foster increased 
respect between the belligerents. English commanders routinely issued terms of 
surrender that factored-in the unique circumstances of each siege. Alba hard-
line policy in siege warfare: ‘those who have been assailed by artillery did not 
deserve pardon.’425 The sacks of Zutphen, Naarden, and the siege of Haarlem 
were foremost examples of this interpretation. Led Gentili, in coordination with 
the earl of Essex, to highlight the Duke’s conduct and then claim that such a 
position was perhaps too inflexible, and ignores ancient precedents to the 
contrary.426 Parma applied a necessary corrective to this interpretation, and this 
policy. Leicester’s command followed a similar policy of conventional warfare 
and transmitted this policy to his successors Willoughby and Maurice of Nassau. 
The years of ‘underhand’ war supported by a cohort of committed English 
volunteers, holding to customs of honour in war, created a shared history and 
contributed to a regularisation of warfare in the Netherlands (figure 19.).427 
 
                                         
425 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 219. 
426 Ibid., pp. 217-8. 
427 Fig. 19: Baudart, Les Gverres de Nassav, p. 375; the image was available online: Frans 
Hogenberg?, ‘Aanslag op Bergen op Zoomverijdeld, 1581’, Rijksmuseum 
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Figure 19. English ‘volunteers’ repulse a Spanish attack upon Bergen op Zoom, 1581. The 
fighting here is limited to soldiers, and there was a notable absence of non-combatants. 
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Chapter 4. 
War between Sovereign States: English intervention and 
regular war in the Netherlands 
 
We should inform of our deliberations the one against whom we have 
decided to make war. 428 
—Alberico Gentili 
 
Alberico Gentili defined war as ‘the just contest of public arms’, which 
was only just when waged between sovereigns. The earl of Essex believed that 
war’s closest analogy was the joust and each man that entered the lists was the 
others equal. Both ideas hinge on the principle of equality and justice under the 
law, which requires a sense of obligation between both sides. Only sovereigns 
had the authority to make war because there existed no superior, no judge, in 
such matters, and therefore war excluded private differences which kept 
hostilities to national interests. War lawfully waged was fought in conformity 
with international law which sought to exclude irregular hostilities.429 Even in 
wars of elimination, the formalities ‘were not omitted’.430 Thus, once Elizabeth 
had committed England to a war against Spain by promising England’s strength in 
a limited war ‘to ayde the natural people of those countries, onely to defende 
them and their townes from sacking and desolation, and thereby to procure 
them safetie’, she was required to declare her intentions to Philip, and this she 
did by publicly publishing her war aims.431 
 A declaration of war would protect her soldiers from the horrors that had 
in the past befell English volunteers, such as those unfortunates slaughtered at 
Rouen because they had illegally entered France to wage war. When the time 
came for direct action on behalf of Dutch Protestants, the queen took steps to 
                                         
428 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 131. 
429 Phillipson, ‘Albericus Gentilis’, i, pp. 109-143; Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 12 
430 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 141. 
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the lowe countries, p. 20. 
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ensure the legitimacy of her soldiers. As a final olive branch before dispatching 
Leicester’s expeditionary army to the Netherlands, the queen sent Sir John 
Smythe, a veteran soldier and diplomat with first-hand experience in Spain, to 
Calais in August 1585. Once in France, Smythe was directed to acquire a Spanish 
passport to officially travel to Parma’s headquarters.432 Smythe’s mission was to 
persuade Parma, who in turn it was hoped would convince Philip, to negotiate a 
settlement with the Dutch that would grant them their ‘liberties and freedom of 
conscience’. If that failed, he was to ask for ‘cessation of arms’.433 Should all 
peaceable steps fail, Smythe was to ‘plainly let him [Parma] understand that we 
[Elizabeth I and England] are determined to employ such means as God has given 
us in the assistance of those countries, to such end is contained in the 
declaration you shall deliver to him.’434 There is reason to believe that Smythe’s 
embassy never in fact left England. 
Nevertheless, the queen’s declaration of limited war, the document 
Smythe was charged to deliver to Parma — A Declaration of the Causes Moouing 
the Queene of England to Giue Aid to the Defense of the People Afflicted and 
Oppressed in the lowe countries — was widely disseminated across Europe and 
would have been readily available to Spanish agents in France, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. The declaration publicly condemned Philip and enumerated Spanish 
crimes perpetrated against the Dutch. England would stand against Spanish 
                                         
432 Smythe’s embassy followed closely after the signing of the Anglo-Dutch alliance proscribed in 
the treaty of Nonsuch, 10 August 1585, and inspired apprehension in the Provinces; hearing 
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tyranny: ‘our intention is at this time, and vpon what iust and reasonable 
groundes we are mooued to giue aide to our next Neighbours the naturall 
peoples of the lowe Countries’.435 The consensus abroad and in Spain was that 
even before the Declaration was issued, Elizabeth’s actions in support of the 
rebels amounted to a declaration of war against Spain.436 But as Gentili noted: 
because some hostile act is committed by such giving of aid, that 
does not necessarily constitute war or make necessary a declaration 
of war; also not another or not a quasi-war. And this it is which the 
Queen of England, in her published correspondence with the Spanish 
king, says that she often did when she supplied either money or arms 
to her neighbours the Belgians against the power of Spain, she at the 
same time informing that king of her whole action and of reasons for 
it.437 
With respect to international law and custom, the queen of England had taken 
the appropriate steps in order that her state could claim all lawfulness in 
entering openly into the Dutch revolt which by way of her actions was manifestly 
a war by 1585. This chapter provides a survey of English law of war doctrine, and 
practices, from 1585-1587 during England’s limited war against Spain in the 
Netherlands. 
 
‘All the acts of war must be just’438 
In the great judicial contest that was sixteenth-century war, perhaps the 
simplest means of tipping the scales in one’s favour was to find and use those 
weapons that advanced ‘the will of the victor as to the punishment of the 
vanquished’.439 Yet, a tradition exists in just war theory that seeks to limit the 
destructiveness of war by prohibiting certain types of weapons that 
commentators claimed were too lethal. For example, in the twelfth-century, the 
second Lateran Council sought to ban, in wars between Christians, ‘that 
                                         
435 England and Wales, sovereign (1558-1603: Elizabeth I), A declaration of the causes moouing 
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436 Parker, The grand strategy of Philip II, p. 176. 
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murderous art of crossbowman and archers’.440 This ban failed utterly, and so 
would future criticisms of projectile weapons, murderous and inglorious weapons 
of the base born and craven. Gentili showed the flaws in this argument. Stephen 
of Poland, while besieging an enemy fortified position, employed siege engines 
that cast incendiary projectiles and set fire to the wooden fortifications of his 
enemy. From behind their burning palisade, the defenders cried ‘that the law of 
war and arms was violated’, but these siege engines, just as archery, Gentili 
argued had legal precedent in the projectile weapons of antiquity.441 Gentili 
used such examples to prove true a maxim of law: ‘the laws of war do not vary, 
although the incidental features of war change.’442 Thus, gunpowder weapons – 
cannons and muskets - were accepted as legitimate tools of warfare, and no 
amount of spilled ink could undo the necessary utility of firearms. 
‘The social argument was that gunpowder was a coward’s weapon which 
destroyed the dignity of knighthood by allowing the common soldier to kill a 
gentleman from afar.’443 Cervantes’s Don Quixote epitomised these fears in his 
vitriolic condemnation of gunpowder weapons: ‘[b]lessed were the times which 
lacked the dreadful fury of those diabolical engines ... an invention which allows 
the base and cowardly hand to take the life of a brave knight.’444 Gentili 
inverted Cervantes’s argument to justify the legality and valour of gunpowder 
weapons: [i]t is not the arms which fight, but men. [...] But if valour is from the 
spirit, these arms of ours will not destroy it, but often will even aid it; since 
they make the strength of the weaker men equal to those of the stronger.’445 His 
commentary is all the more important, since Gentili wrote his second book on 
the just conduct in war in conjunction with the earl of Essex’s personal 
secretary, Thomas Smith, which raises serious questions concerning the shape 
and nature of Elizabethan chivalry as anachronistic and opposed to gunpowder 
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weapons.446 Doubtlessly Essex was influenced by his step-father, the forward 
thinking earl of Leicester, who purchased ‘2 cases of pistols and their furniture’ 
prior to the 1586 expedition and adopted the gunpowder tactics of skirmishing 
and cuirassiers during the same.447 Essex was committed to the modernisation of 
the English military and adopted the most modern tactical doctrines; such as 
fielding smaller companies after the Dutch style, and favouring firearms over the 
bow, as advocated for by the earl’s close friend Roger Williams. Essex’s martial 
designs were further supported in Gentili’s interpretation of the laws of war 
which also advanced the earl’s anti-Spanish political agenda. 
What weapons, if any, then were prohibited in wars? Jurists understood 
the nature of war and that on occasion non-combatants — also known as 
innocents — would be killed in the regular course of military operations: ‘[t]hey 
accepted that it would be lawful to kill innocent people if their deaths were 
anticipated but not intended as in the case of a besieged city which contained 
civilians as well as soldiers’.448 With respect to protecting innocents, the 
weapons that could not be tolerated in just warfare were those that did not 
discriminate between friend, foe, or innocent and which man possessed no 
power to resist. Gentili completely forbade the usage of any poison in wars. The 
term ‘poison’ was an umbrella term that encompassed an entire category of 
weapons; this included various chemical and biological weapons, weapons that 
had had both ancient and medieval precedent in wars. 
The military use of various chemical and biological toxins was known to 
sixteenth-century belligerents. Despite being condemned by some late medieval 
commentators like Christine de Pisan (c. 1365-1429), and in an era preceding the 
widespread use of firearms and gunpowder artillery, toxins were used 
occasionally as decisive weapons. Toxic weapon systems had their supporters 
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too, e.g. Baldis de Ubaldis (1327-1400).449 Froissart recorded their use by the 
Duke of Normandy during his siege of Thin-L’Eveque: 
The ingens without hyd casts in dead horses & beastes stinking: 
whereby they within had great distres then with anye other thynge, 
for the ayre was hote as in the myddes somer: the stynke and ayre 
was so abominable, that they consydred howe that finally they 
coude not longe endure…. 
To save themselves from these grotesque weapons, the town appealed to its 
besiegers for a truce and received it. They agreed that if the town was not 
relieved in fifteen days, it would surrender to the Duke.450 At least one English 
officer, preparing to go to the war in the Netherlands, read about these tactics, 
since he chose to carry Froissart’s Chronicles instead of the Bible.451 
In Holinshed’s Chronicle, there is an account of the Duke of Burgundy, 
preparing to attack the English troops garrisoned in Calais (1410) with toxic 
projectiles: 
[H]e had gathered together serpents, scorpions, todes, and other 
kinds of venomous things which he had closed and shut up in little 
barrels, that when the flesh or substance of those noisome 
creatures was rotten, and dissolved into filthie matter [...] cast the 
said barrels let out of engines into the town. 
In other instances, a fleeing army might dump the rotting corpses of animals and 
men into local water supplies to poison it and deny that resource to their 
enemies. Believing that this was a grievous crime, Gentili condemned the 
practice. He claimed that such actions resulted in ‘more deaths of blameless 
people than of the guilty.’452 His position can be summarised by a quote from 
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Cicero: ‘[i]t is a great shame and disgrace when one with whom there is contest 
for glory is overcome, not by valour, but by treachery [i.e. poison].’453 
Poisons had a negative and unmanly reputation that became more 
pronounced in the sixteenth-century. Spain’s tercios acquired a negative 
reputation for using toxic weapons in their Italian campaigns. At the siege of 
Naples (1495), which Gentili claimed was a most unjust war, the French 
besieging troops were repeatedly poisoned by the Spanish garrison; their water 
supply was poisoned, provisions were made with toxic gypsum, and prostitutes, 
infected with venereal disease were introduced into the French camp.454 The 
Dutch rebels were also known to employ toxic weapons on occasion. In 1566 
while Alba marched the massive Spanish army out of Italy and along the Spanish 
Road to address the growing rebellion in the Low Countries, rebels reputedly 
prepared their route ‘with ointments to spread the plague’. Rumours of the 
rebels’ actions reached Cardinal Granville in France, and he took steps to alert 
his king and condemned the attack. The rumours appeared plausible since 
plague broke out shortly afterwards in those areas that the army had travelled 
through.455 
During the Dutch revolt and the subsequent war, belligerents appeared to 
have largely disregarded the use of poisons in combat operations, perhaps 
because of the hazards were perceived as too great and rewards too small. 
Armies in the Dutch theatre were often beset by naturally occurring plagues and 
any temptation to use them was tempered by an awareness that the plagues and 
toxins could just as easily turn against those deploying them. Honour, next to 
religion, was an essential quality of the Elizabethan soldier, and as such, their 
martial honour could not bear using these repugnant weapons. Some Englishmen 
in the Dutch war, however, suspected that plague or other toxins had been used 
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against them. Working as a diplomat in the United Provinces, George Gilpin gave 
vent to these suspicions in a letter to Walsingham: ‘At Sluys, Ostend, and 
Terneuse, the garrisons are “hardly enough served” of provisions, and the plague 
grows rife, [and reports have surfaced that they have been] infected “by 
practice of an old fellow that had the cunning to do it” and who has been taken 
upon suspicion.’456 Other than this small note these weapons were ignored. The 
lawful weapons of war were those that had the minds of men to purposefully 
select the target and perform the killing action. 
 
The Laws of War in Sieges 
It is difficult to underestimate the importance of fortifications in early 
modern warfare, and particularly in the campaigns in the Low Countries. Towns 
and fortifications, and the territory that they controlled, were not only the basic 
political and economic structures of the state, but were logistical lynch pins, 
which ‘determined not just when campaigns were fought, the pace of operations 
and what might be achieved, but how wars were conducted.’457 Fortifications, 
towns, but also sconces, forts, and villages, were vital to theatre strategies, 
which often hinged upon the ability to preserve an army in the field.458 
Money, supplies, and men flowed into field armies from a series of inter-
linked magazines that were positioned in allied towns and forward bases. 
Reliable logistics directly affected a commander’s ability to meet strategic 
goals, and when supply systems failed, field forces were compelled to cease 
pursuing the enemy and to extract the needed supplies from the countryside.459 
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Logistics therefore ‘acted as a [mechanical] constraint on commanders in the 
sixteenth century’ and would ‘dominate their actions to the exclusion of almost 
all other considerations during the next century.’460 Thus, operational 
commanders directed their military power towards the taking and holding of 
fortifications. 
Leicester’s judge advocate general, Matthew Sutcliffe, wrote from 
experience that ‘[t]ownes are taken diuers wayes: viz. either by siege, or by 
assault, or surprise, or by all, or two of these joined together’.461 Legal 
restraint, he implies featured differently in each method: ‘in euery of which, 
the proceeding is diuers, as the endes are diuers.’462 The purpose of siege-craft 
‘is to strait the town, so that either for want of victualles, water, munition, 
souldiers, hope of succour, health, or other commodity, the same [town may] be 
driuen to yeeld.’463 Taking a town by surprise required the aggressor to 
expeditiously enter a fortification and open a gate which then permitted the 
main body of the force to enter and capture it by violence of action; however, 
on other occasions, surprise meant that a sufficient number of troops had to 
covertly enter a town, without raising the alarm, and take it, for example, 
Maurice of Nassau’s capture of Breda in 1590.464 Assaults used brute force ‘to 
giue us entrance’, and fortified places were captured in a fury of nearly 
uncontrolled violence, which the English often referred to as ‘storming’.465 
Before undertaking any open act of hostility — in sieges and assaults — the laws 
and customs of war demanded that the fortification first receive a ‘summons’, 
this was a formal opportunity to for the defenders to surrender upon contractual 
terms. Yet, surprise attacks remained every-bit as lawful means by which a town 
could be captured: the justice of surprise ‘is not affected by the question 
whether you gain the victory in open combat or by strategy’.466 Therefore, 
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unless a town fell by surprise or assault, the surrender of a fortified place 
usually involved some form of contract between the belligerents that was 
negotiated in parleys.467 
The Elizabethan state declared its war against Spain in accordance with 
the Treaty of Nonsuch (1585); however, the intervention’s combat operations 
did not begin until 1586. The earl of Leicester commanded the English army. He, 
his subalterns, and soldiers, paid attention to the laws of war during sieges. In 
late May 1586, Leicester advanced his army south towards Nijmegen. Along the 
march, scouts discovered a ‘fort which the enemy held there very well maned 
and furnished’.468 As soon as Leicester’s artillery had been emplaced, the fort 
‘sent a gentleman to me with offer to yield up the fort, so [that] they might 
depart with their arms only, without ensign or drum; albeit some other demands 
they made yet I would not yield to any further than this, which was accepted.’469 
Events like these were played out time and again. 
 Besieged belligerents unable, or unwilling, to sustain further resistance 
had only two options in negotiations; commanders could either surrender on 
negotiated terms, or place their lives in the hands of the victor and surrender to 
the mercy of the commander. This is clearly demonstrated in Leicester’s 
campaign in the region known as the Betuwe, with Nijmegen as his operational 
goal. The campaign involved taking of several castles and fortified houses which 
was achieved by a combination of force, threat of force, and compact.470 Lord 
North described the way Nijmegen’s two defensive sconces were taken by 
Leicester’s forces: 
My lord [Leicester] was there until the sconce was yielded on Friday, 
the 20th, the first parley being made with sergeant major [Reade] 
and me [lord North] in the morning. They desired to speak with my 
lord [Leicester], and we agreed to send them in a drum and 
lieutenant and they to send a drum and a gentleman, whom I 
brought to my lord [Leicester], and he granted them to depart like 
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soldiers, with their weapons and such baggage as they could carry, 
“but no drum sounding no ensign displayed.”471 
The second sconce, perhaps harder pressed than the first, ‘“yielded to my lord’s 
mercy”, who so nobly used the soldiers that these [soldiers] of the sconce 
confessed it moved them to yield.’472 To surrender upon the mercy of one’s 
besieger, however, was a risky proposition. In 1580, the papal expeditionary 
force holding the fort at Smerwick chose to surrender upon ‘mercy’ to Lord 
Deputy Grey, and he had ordered all but a handful of the troops put to the sword 
after determining that they were unlawful combatants. 
During operations at Arnhem (1586), the town suffered a light 
bombardment by canon, about ‘8 or 10 shott’, causing them to rapidly send 
forth word to the English besiegers urging a parley. Confident of his position, 
Leicester informed ‘a count’, representing the town during the parley, ‘that I 
would have no condicion at all yeilded, for that thei did suffer the cannon, but 
either simply to yield or ells to prosecute the battery.’ Here Leicester was 
referring to the customary practice that said: ‘if bombards are brought up to 
weak places, no room seems left for surrender’.473 In the end, Leicester gave the 
defenders an ultimatum simply yield upon his mercy or face his artillery.474 In a 
letter to Walsingham, Leicester wrote, almost as an aside, ‘I doubt [not that] 
some must hang, for example.’475 We are left with the weighty implications of 
Leicester’s admission that to yield outright, and unconditionally, upon terms of 
mercy alone, might well result in some executions; the executions were 
regarded almost as a mandatory response to the garrison’s act of defiance in the 
face of the besieger’s cannon. 
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 Threats and terror were integral parts of siege craft, but their aids were 
deception and misdirection. While outright perfidy in war was condemned, 
subtleties of every other sort were lauded. William Pelham, Leicester’s ‘marshal 
of the host’, and William Stanley, the captain of an Irish regiment serving in the 
Netherlands, stealthy entered Deventer (1586). Once inside they made their way 
to the burgomaster’s meeting place and took the council hostage and offered it 
an ultimatum: ‘[n]owe... fetche me the keyes of the gates, and deliver theme 
me, and that strait, or, before God, youe shall all dy.’ The council would have 
seen little in the way of mercy in Pelham’s eyes; a man who was charged in the 
Annals of the four Masters with a bloody campaign that tore through Munster 
killing ‘the blind, the infirm, the feeble, the women, children, [and] idiots’.476 
They had no choice but to turn over the town, and Stanley was given its charge. 
‘The marshall hath shewed himself like a man of valour,’ wrote Leicester 
praising Pelham’s actions to Walsingham, ‘as he is indeed.’ Certainly, Leicester 
felt that Pelham’s terroristic demands were exemplary and not violations of 
international law. 
 The first true surprise assault on a town in the Netherlands came with Sir 
Philip Sidney, prince Maurice and lord Willoughby’s capture of Axel, a town 
neighbouring Antwerp (figure 20).477 Approaching under the cover of night, a 
corps of select men swam the town’s moat with ladders, secretly scaled the 
walls, and entered it. They quickly took possession of the gate, and opened it to 
permit the main body of soldiers to enter.478 The town raised the alarm, but the 
initiative was with the attackers: ‘[they] slue and put to flight foure bandes of 
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footemen’.479 The slaughter, however, was confined to those active defenders: 
‘there were slaine of souldiers of that towne three hundred, besides the 
Bourgers that made resistance, which were likewise slaine.’480 It appears that 
Sidney, Maurice, and Willoughby recognised the law of war that stated ‘[d]eath 
is inflicted upon those who are armed and resist’, and kept their soldiers 
disciplined in their violence.481 
The available sources are brief, but they stress that violence was limited, 
and from this we can infer that non-combatants were protected from the worst 
abuses. Perhaps the cover of night also aided in protecting non-combatants since 
they were in their residences, and not on the streets or guard houses where the 
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Figure 20. An Idealised depiction of Sidney’s capture of Axel. 
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fighting occurred. The town was also not sacked; how did the commanders 
prevent this? There are at least three factors that helped to prevent the abuse 
of the citizens and sack of Axel. First, as the troops were fresh from garrison, 
need and want did not have the necessary time to sour the soldiers’ minds 
against the town, since a sack almost always followed a prolonged siege. The 
second reason helped to reinforce the first, the soldiers were newly impressed 
with their martial obligations, and recently swore to uphold Leicester’s Laws and 
Ordinances Militarie (1586), which placed stern penalties for the abuse of non-
combatants and unauthorised spoil.482 Third, the quick pace of military 
operations limited the soldiers’ opportunity for abuse and spoil because as soon 
as Axel was secured, the army was redirected against the town’s outlying forts 
and moved away from the town in search of enemy forces. These factors limited 
destruction and kept the traditional non-combatants (women, children, elderly, 
and infirmed) safer from the soldiers’ fury in the heat of battle. 
 On several occasions, enemy garrisons signalled that they would accept 
terms when they were presented with the prospect of, or after having already 
met an English assault. A general frontal assault that in turn captured a town or 
other fortification in a single action was uncommon. In Leicester’s vigorous, if 
strategically disjointed, first year of Dutch campaigning in 1586, his forces 
captured several fortifications through assault. Pelham with cornets of horse and 
Irish infantry set fire to an enemy town, and took its outer-works by storm, and 
the entire garrison was put to the sword.483 Despite the army’s initial successes, 
which seemed to promise the queen a rapid victory, the reality of the situation 
was growing grim and unfortunately the successes concealed deeper 
administrative problems.484 
Leicester had some difficulty preserving a certain discontent element 
within his armies. Want of pay, poor conditions, and several months of hard 
campaigning proved to be a convincing argument for some men that the soldier’s 
life was not for them. Shortly after the successful capture of Axel, Leicester 
reported to Walsingham on the growing unrest within the army. His report 
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claimed 500 troops had run away over the course of two days with ‘a great 
manie to the enemye’.485 Loyal English soldiers succeeded in recovering more 
than 200 of these runaways, and Leicester, to further instil discipline among the 
men, had some hanged as an example to the remainder. The earl, however, was 
uncertain of the punishments efficacy. He was conscious of his obligation as a 
leader to care for the needs of his soldiers, and Leicester noted his veterans 
looked like ‘dead men’.486 In his opinion prompt payment of wages would put an 
end to the soldiers’ grumblings; however, if this was not done soon, he feared a 
mutiny and perhaps bloodshed.487 
It is necessary to note here that the organisation of Leicester’s 
expeditionary army broke with late medieval precedent in several ways and was 
of a different order from anything previously attempted by the Elizabethan 
regime.488 The army royal of Elizabeth’s father – Henry VIII – was raised through 
feudal mechanisms: the great nobles assembled an army by drawing upon their 
tenants and retainers.489 These recruitment mechanisms were deemed 
insufficient during the Elizabethan regime, and with the Militia Act of 1558 
military recruitment was shifted away from tenancy obligations towards the 
militia system.490 The expeditionary force raised for service in the Netherlands 
utilised a variety of recruitment mechanisms which altogether enabled the 
crown to assemble by 31 May 1586 thirty-nine companies (6,400 men) in the 
queen’s pay, as well as twenty-one companies (7,500 men) for service in the 
States’ army.491 Among the crown’s companies were certain infantry bands 
raised by Leicester through quasi-feudal relationships whose character and 
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service was different from the remainder of the army.492 Most of the army’s 
soldiers, however, took up military service because it was personally 
advantageous or had service thrust upon them through impressment. A soldier’s 
method of recruitment often encapsulated certain expectations of service. 
Soldiers recruited by a personal relationship with great nobles, like 
Leicester for example, served as a matter of personal honour; whereas, 
volunteers and impressed men served at the pleasure of the crown. The common 
soldier was a common man under arms, and this type of military service had yet 
to develop clear delineations between the rights and expectations of the soldier 
and the civilian. The individual vagaries of service highlighted significant 
differences in the expectations between leaders and soldiers. Leicester 
attempted to counter these expectations by establishing a single standard of 
conduct within the army and set forth in his published Lawes and Ordinances 
Militarie (1586).493 
For the uneducated common man now under arms and the ignorant or 
deluded officer, Leicester’s Lawes and Ordinances provided an essential and 
concise code of conduct for, at the very least the queen’s companies, if not the 
entire expeditionary army and all Englishmen in the service of the States 
General. Leicester’s regulations were the first code of military conduct intended 
for the governance of an army that were not issued by a ruling monarch, and the 
Lawes and Ordinances contained 62 ordinances: 51 were general regulations for 
the army and 11 applied specifically to captains.494 Every soldier was required to 
take an oath of service when he was enrolled into the official muster books.495 
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The oath of service required soldiers to swear obedience to all superior officers 
and the army’s ordinances, which implied an individual commitment automatic 
obedience.496 These regulations functioned like a military sermon, if in form 
they followed more closely statutory regulations, and instructed all soldiers in 
the minimum standards of morality, the laws of war, martial discipline, and 
military administration.497 Leicester ordered all captains and leaders of bands to 
read aloud and publish the Lawes and Ordinances every twenty days.498 Thus, 
the regulations functioned as a tool of indoctrination that conditioned the 
attitudes and expectations of all members of the English army in Netherlands, 
which in turn helped to establish the level of martial discipline necessary for 
operational victory. 
The successful capture of towns and forts achieved by Leicester and his 
captains meant that the English army had to defend their new possessions. 
Defensive warfare in siege, had its own legal conventions, which emphasised the 
duties of the fortification’s commander. Military governors, and captains 
charged with the defence of forts, were independent with little oversight from 
higher command; they held broad responsibility for maintaining their men and 
equipment, stores of provisions, pay (when they had it), and prisoners. A 
commander’s liberal authority came with an equally large responsibility to 
defend their charge against the enemy. It was considered treason for a 
commander to surrender his fortification without certain requirements: William 
Segar, ‘Portcullis’ the herald in Leicester’s St George’s Day celebrations, 
Utrecht, April 1586, later wrote on the subject of military discipline and 
summarised the expectations placed upon a garrison commander: ‘[t]he law 
calleth them Traytors that indeuour to betray their Prince or the libertie of their 
countrey: they are also called Traytors that hauing a charge, doe yield the same 
vp vnto the enemie’. He goes on to say that these crimes ‘ought to be capitally 
punished, or at the least [the offender] discharged’ from military service.499 
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Although Segar implies that a garrison commander was obliged to resist 
until the bitter end, Sutcliffe was critical of such an unrefined view of the laws 
of war, and he advocated for a rational pragmatism: 
They that take on them to defend townes neither well prouided 
nor fenced, howsoever they shew therein courage, yet shewe no 
iote of wisdome in it; for oft times they cast away themselves, and 
hurt their Prince, and countrey both in the losse of so many men, & 
in giuing courage to the enemy. And better it were for them to 
convey them selues into some place of safety, or to yeelde; then to 
holde out without reason. In which case the Prince cannot blame 
them, if they prouide for them selues.500 
A senseless defence of a place deemed poorly fortified or provisioned was thus a 
foolish waste of men and materials. Loyalty, to one’s prince was better 
displayed by preserving the garrison for future engagements. 
Gentili also advocates for a similar degree of pragmatism, but from an 
ethical perspective. He warns that to disregard an opportunity for lawful 
surrender, and fight-on with irrational obstinacy transforms war from a judicial 
process between princes into war of ‘extermination’. Through the example of 
the Saguntines, who were said to have preferred death rather than surrender, 
Gentili provides evidence that obstinate resistance was contrary to the law of 
nature — and reason — and thereby extension, to international law.501 Thus, both 
parties should act with reason; the conquered were obliged to surrender before 
they were on the point of being taken, and the conqueror required to accept a 
lawful surrender. 
Senior English commanders agreed with Sutcliffe and Gentili, and they 
were willing to extend their mercy to an enemy garrison, if it meant adding 
another fortification to their assets. However, the allied captains that 
surrendered upon terms to the Spanish had the terms and circumstances of their 
surrender closely examined. Dutch and English theatre commanders reviewed 
the conditions of surrender made by the captains under their command to 
determine if the surrender was legal or illegal. If the circumstances of surrender 
were thought to have violated the state’s trust in the garrison commander, the 
captain would be court martialled along the lines described by Segar. The 
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accused were charged with treason or cowardice in the face of the enemy. A 
legal surrender absolved the captain of any guilt for his actions, since he had 
acted in accordance with the laws of war. Thus, a besieged captain had two 
competing obligations; firstly, to surrender to the enemy before they were 
overrun, and secondly, to his own command to make a stalwart defence, which 
placed garrison captains in a precarious position. 
During Leicester’s campaign, the first captain forced in to this dangerous 
balancing act was the military governor Baron van Hemert, who held the town of 
Grave, which was thought to be the key to Gelderland. In November 1585, 
Parma dispatched count Charles von Mansfelt with 12,000 soldiers to besiege 
Grave.502 Mansfelt’s soldiers spent their winter circumvallating Grave, and 
erecting four strongly garrisoned forts, so ‘that no vyttell can com to yt’.503 In 
December while the Anglo-Dutch alliance was welcoming the earl of Leicester’s 
arrival and reorganising itself under their new commander, Grave stood alone 
against the Spanish. As the soldiers laboured at their siege works, Mansfeldt 
wrote to Hemert entreating him, as a fellow natural subject of the king of Spain, 
to reconcile himself with Philip and to reject the foreign English interlopers: 
It is as fitting for a prudent, noble and valorous man (such as I hold 
you to be), to foresee evident evil, as to maintain himself 
resolutely in fair safe times. ...the wise man should rather run to 
the arms of his father, stretched out to receive him, then wait until 
the end of his toils, he finds a great dog with gaping jaws ready to 
suck his blood; which is the spectacle you may expect from the 
strangers you are now proposing to assist; preparing the tragedy of 
your ruin and their establishment.504 
The letter sought to couch Grave’s surrender in the rhetoric of loyalty to 
Hemert’s true sovereign, and thus, his terms were those of reconciliation 
instead of the terms of surrender common to war: ‘I declare that if the town of 
Grave will thus return to said obedience, I will continue every man in his charge, 
soldiers as well as citizens, on condition that they take the proper oaths, as we 
others have done.’505 Hemert’s response to Mansfeldt was striking: 
                                         
502 Meteren, A true discourse historicall, pp. 80; the English ambassador thought that there was 
no more than 8 to 9,000 foot and 2,500 horse: CSPF (1585-6), pp. xvii, 157. 
503 Leycester Correspondence, p. 72. 
504 CSP Foreign (1585-6), p. 225. 
505 Ibid., p. 225. 
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[I]n this case, it is not for me in particular that application must be 
made for reconciliation with his Majesty or to restore this town to 
his obedience, but to those to whom I am bound by oath of fidelity 
to procure the good guard and preservation of the town. Wherein I 
am resolved not to fail.506 
He closed with the impertinent ‘pray you not to disturb me hence forth with 
such requests’, which placed his life in peril if the Spanish should successfully 
take the town.507 
 From December 1585 until March 1586, Grave stood alone and surrounded 
by Spanish forces. As the siege of Grave progressed, Hemert proved true to his 
word, and resisted the Spanish, but not without problems. A lieutenant in 
Grave’s garrison secretly conspired with Mansfeldt; the traitors offered to open 
‘the gates at a watch’. Hemert appears to have had the confidence of most of 
his men and uncovered the plot. The twelve principals were summarily 
executed, in accordance with martial law, and another eight were imprisoned 
for later trial.508 The quick actions of Hemert indicate that the young governor 
was disciplined and prepared mentally to make a stalwart defence of Grave and 
fortified the garrison’s morale. 
Ill prepared to personally march on Grave, Leicester ordered Norreys 
along with count Hohenlohe, and a force of 2,000 foot, to relieve and strengthen 
the town’s defences; they were to bring into the town an additional 300 soldiers 
and nine months of provisions, which they accomplished to great relief of the 
States and Leicester’s praise (figures 21 and 22).509 With Grave resupplied with 
victuals and fresh men, Leicester felt the town was strong enough to once again 
                                         
506 Ibid., p. 226. 
507 Ibid., p. 226. 
508 CSPF (1585-6), pp. 368, 364, 447. 
509 Fig. 21. Baudart, Les Gverres de Nassav, p. 73; the image was available online: Simon Frisus 
and Michael Colijn, ‘Beleg van Grave door Parma, 1586’, Rijksmuseum 
<https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/BI-1958-935-180> [accessed on 28 March 28, 
2016]. 
Fig. 22. Frans Hogenberg, Beleg van Grave door Parma, 1586’, Rijksmuseum 
<https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/RP-P-OB-78.784-253> [accessed on 28 March 28, 
2016]. 
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fend for itself for a time, and he wrote to Burghley to say ‘I fear it not; for they 
be now well manned and well victualed’.510 
In May Parma came personally to Grave and took charge of the siege. The 
failure of subterfuge had compelled Parma to take the town by force: ‘[t]he 
enemy made a breach into the base town and entered, but were repulsed and 
lost three or four hundred men ... the Prince [of Parma] lies before Grave with 
strong power, often battering it.’511 The Spanish position was unassailable, the 
strength of Parma’s army kept Leicester’s much smaller force away, and Hemert 
had no hope of succour. Grave’s walls had been breached, and according to 
Leicester not practicable for an assault, it soon would be. Hemert had made his 
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Figure 21. An idealised depiction of Norreys’s corps opposing the soldiers of the Army of 
Flanders, and the English are shown marching under the banner of St. George with quartered 
Tudor Roses. 
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stand, and in accordance with the laws of war and recent precedence, both 
English and Dutch, he should surrender with honour, which he chose to do. 
Following the failed Spanish assault upon the breach in Grave’s defensive 
wall, Hemert dispatched his drum to parley with Parma, and the defenders were 
allowed ‘free departure with arms, flags, and goods.’512Parma met Hemert as he 
marched his men across a bridge over the Meuse River, and repeated Mansfeldt’s 
entreaty to reconcile himself with to the king of Spain, but again the plucky 
young military commander declined. With Grave lost, Hemert travelled to meet 
his commander, the earl of Leicester, perhaps thinking he would be given a new 
assignment in the ongoing war against Spain. He soon realised his true danger. 
Upon arriving at Bomell, he was taken into custody and transported to Utrecht 
where he was to be tried by court martial for the treasonous (i.e. illegal) 
surrender of Grave. 
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Figure 22. English soldiers meet at push of pike a contingent of the Army of Flanders just 
outside Grave. The English company marches under the banner of the Elizabeth I and the 
Tudor English state. 
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Hemert’s surrender had enraged Leicester, and in a furious letter to 
Walsingham he exclaimed that there was ‘[n]oe cause in the earth for women to 
have left [Grave]!’513 Motley claims that Hemert was induced to surrender by his 
pro-Spanish mistress, and this rumour might have contributed to the hard-line 
taken against him. When Hemert arrived at Utrecht, Leicester had proceedings 
for his court martial expedited, and eminent Dutch and English officers were 
appointed to the duty; count Hohenlohe, earl of Essex, lord North, count Philip, 
count Solms, count Newenar, Colonels Norreys, Balfor, and Morgan, Captains 
Digby and Michel, were among those chosen to hear and judge the case. Several 
of Hemert’s captains were also accused with complicity in the treason, and the 
party was arraigned on the 9 June.514 The evidence presented against Hemert 
included statements from captains and soldiers that attested they were ‘most 
willing and ready to have spent their lives there’, and a pair of letters sent from 
Hemert to Leicester declaring he ‘wished his Excellency to do what else he 
thought convenient and to have no care of Grave, for he was well able to defend 
it’. The a few attendant officers cast doubt upon Hemert’s integrity; it was 
argued that the conspiracy between Hemert’s officers and Mansfeldt to betray 
Grave had been done with his foreknowledge. Leicester accused Hemert of being 
a traitor and a coward; he justified this view by citing intelligence concerning 
the breach, which was said to have been entirely defensible.515 On the evidence 
presented, Hemert and his captains were acquitted of treason, but found guilty 
of cowardice and his surrender deemed a violation of martial discipline. Despite 
a Dutch and English coalition’s concerted efforts to have Hemert cashiered, 
Leicester pushed through a death sentence for Hemert, Captain Kobouko and 
Captain du Ban, which was carried out on 17 June 1586.516 
In another more important siege, the Anglo-Dutch alliance proved once 
again impotent in raising the forces necessary for a relief mission, and the 
defenders were compelled to surrender their charge or face annihilation. On 12 
                                         
513 Leyester Correspondence, p. 288. 
514 CSPF (1586-1587), p. 48: lists captains Kobouko, du Ban, Dennis, and Herthoge as those 
arraigned with Hemert. 
515 CSPF (1586-1587), p. 4; Digges, A brief report, sig. B2, Leyester Correspondence, p. 287-288, 
see also CSPF (1585-1586), pp. 364, 368, 447. 
516 CSPF (1586-1587), pp. 32-3, 48. All evidence from the trial was forwarded to the Queen for 
review: ibid., 4. 
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June 1587, Parma repositioned his forces to threaten the deep-water port of 
Sluis; an valuable asset for Philip’s future designs against England. Leicester now 
was not in the provinces because Elizabeth had ordered him back London, but 
the siege of Sluis necessitated his expeditious return.517 In his opening 
manoeuvres, Parma had setup two strong forts near Blankenburg, effectively 
dividing the allied forces and isolating Sluis from relief sent from Ostend. The 
Anglo-Dutch alliance needed a unified and resolute response; however, the 
alliance had fractured and was unable to muster appropriate action. 
The Anglo-Dutch alliance had thoroughly soured under Leicester’s 
leadership. Many Dutch leaders and a few English captains felt Leicester had 
abused his authority and was incapable of working in a coalition; incidents such 
as the execution of Hemert, his disregard of orders to maintain troop numbers at 
affordable levels and the consequent depredations of unpaid soldiers, and 
Stanley and York’s betrayal, provoked the States General into curtailing his 
authority. The states of Holland and Zeeland made Prince Maurice their captain-
general on 24 January 1587, and the post was made to supersede the military 
authority of even the governor-general, and following the resolution of 6 
February 1587: ‘they declared that “whosoever pays their wages”, within the 
provinces of Holland there was nobody, “not even the governor-general”, 
permitted to give orders to troops, this being the preserve of the stadholder of 
Holland as captain-general of the province.’518 
The Spanish had made some movements towards Ostend, but these were 
interpreted as feints. The real prize was Sluis. Arnold de Groenvelt had 
command of Sluis and its garrison of 800 Dutch soldiers. Upon realising that 
Parma’s intended to take Sluis, Groenvelt wrote to Russell (the English military 
governor of Flushing) for aid; he had reviewed the state of his garrison, and 
argued that he needed more men to effectively defend the walls, and he had 
provisions for only eleven days, so he sent forth from the town all the women 
and children he could; perhaps, the non-combatants were evacuated on fleeing 
                                         
517 CSPF (1586-1588), p. 189; appendix, p. 657.  
518 Nimwegen, The Dutch army and the military revolutions, 1588-1688, , p. 152, c.f. J. den Tex, 
Oldenbarnevelt, 4 vols. (Haarlem and Groningen, 1960-1972), i, pp. 322-3, 325; Simon van 
Slingelandt, Staatkundige geschriften, 4 vols. (Amsterdam, 1784-1785), iv, p. 114. 
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ships.519 Russell responded by dispatching Roger Williams with several English 
companies and ‘60 lasts of corn and some ammunition’.520 The supplies of men 
and material from Flushing succeeded in entering Sluis both by sea and overland, 
which brought the garrison to 1,700 (1,150 Dutch and 550 English soldiers); a 
pittance when compared against Parma’s 16,000 troops and siege battery of 40 
cannon.521 
After capturing several Dutch ships, Parma turned them to his own use, 
and by the 7 June, he blockaded Sluis against relief from the sea.522 Parma 
focused his attacks against the town’s south-west side, which was protected by 
St Anne’s fort. Spanish trenches progressed under the cover of Parma’s siege 
battery. Sluis did not have the cannon and munitions with which to counter-
attack the Spanish artillery. The best the garrison could do was to bring their 
muskets against individual targets labouring in the trenches. On 24 June, the 
Spanish trenches threatened St Anne’s fort, and the cannons were repositioned 
to bear directly upon the town. Leicester, alerted to Parma’s advance, had 
sailed prematurely with fresh, and yet unequipped, levies from Margate, and 
arrived at Flushing on 25 June. 
Upon his arrival at Flushing, Leicester rapidly stirred the States into 
action. Leicester’s strategy to relieve Sluis was predicated on causing Parma to 
withdraw. count Hohenlohe was dispatched with a force to raid Bommell in the 
hope that Parma would lift his siege of Sluis to counter a perceived invasion by 
the States into the Brabant. Parma’s answer was to maintain the siege, but a 
contingent was detached to counter Hohenlohe’s thrust. The States’ political 
reorganisation of the army’s command had left Leicester without the authority 
to command Dutch troops directly. If he was to relieve Sluis, he could only count 
on the forces directly under his command, and even here the States opposed his 
efforts. 
A determined Spanish attack was made against St Anne’s fort on 7 July. 
The defenders managed to repulse it but with considerable losses on both sides. 
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520 Ibid., p. 88. 
521 Ibid., pp. xiv, 98, 107, 110. 
522 Ibid., p. xv. 
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It was determined that St Anne’s fort had to be sacrificed to preserve Sluis for a 
brief time longer, and troops withdrew on 8th. Parma took advantage of the 
withdrawal and seized the fort. This caused the Spanish to shift their efforts to 
capturing the Westport. Parma sent terms of surrender to the garrison, but the 
garrison refused to even parley. The siege battery was repositioned to better 
support the advance, and on 14th the town face its heaviest cannonading to 
date, which was followed by a series of frontal assaults. The defenders meet 
each of these and managed to turn them back. 
On 19 July, Leicester had organised his resources and was prepared to 
muster another design to relieve Sluis. The plan was to land at Ostend and 
march the army north against Parma’s forts at Blankenburg. The English 
mustered their army at Ostend with Willoughby commanding 4,000 foot, and 
Russell leading 400 horse. Leicester’s army advanced on 24 July, and discovered 
the Spaniards’ position well prepared, and after a slight show of force, it was 
determined that an attack from this direction could not succeed. In defeat, the 
English withdrew to Ostend. The army was commanded to re-embark, and 
Leicester, in conjunction with the Dutch naval captains, decided that the best 
option was to relieve Sluis from the sea; however, after seeing Parma’s naval 
blockade, the naval captains refused to advance (figure 23.).523 
The defenders were exhausted; their powder stores nearly extinguished, 
and morale near its breaking point. The weather worsened and the Anglo-Dutch 
flotilla sailed away in full view of Sluis’s defenders. Williams gives an account of 
the garrison’s council of war assembled to reconsider surrendering to Parma: 
[S]ixe daies before we gave over the towne, all the Captains and 
Officers met in councell: hauving seene our dangers, and some 
perceiuing the heate of our succours, wee assigned our Articles of 
Composition, swore all to haue them graunted vnto vs or to dye, 
and to burne the Towne and Castle, so escape that could through 
the drowned land.524 
The minutes from the meeting were sent to Leicester and the States, but these 
were intercepted by Parma’s troops. Knowing the disposition of the garrison, 
                                         
523 Fig. 23. Baudart, Les Gverres de Nassav, p. 109; the image was available online: Simon Frisus 
and Frans Hogenberg, ‘Beleg van Sluis door Parma, 1587’, Rijksmuseum 
<https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/RP-P-OB-80.050> [accessed on 28 March 28, 
2016]. 
524 Evans, The works of Sir Roger Williams, p. 50-1. 
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Parma willingly granted the beaten garrison ‘no good conditions’.525 In a letter 
intercepted by English agents, Parma had written to count Charles de Mansfeld 
and Charles count of Barlemont acknowledging that the winning Sluis ‘cost him 
dearer than did Maestricht in respect of the great means and preparations… and 
hath lost forty-five of his best captains and principal soldiers… [a]nd yet hath 
between five and six thousand of his common soldiers slain.’526 And despite the 
Englishmen’s obstinate defence, Parma thought it more useful to deal with them 
favourably. 
 In Leicester’s opinion, the surrender of Sluis mirrored Hemert’s betrayal 
of Grave. Williams, perhaps sensing the defenders’ perilous situation, wrote 
early to Leicester proclaiming the garrison’s loyalty: ‘You may assure the world 
                                         
525 CSPF (1587), p. 260. 
526 CSPF (1587), p. 235. Parma thought that making good terms with the English would have 
second and third order political benefits. 
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Figure 23. The Army of Flanders besieges Sluis (1587) which is defended by English and 
Dutch soldiers. 
 
157 
Chapter 4. War between Sovereign States 
 
here are no Hamerts, but valiant Captains and valiant soldiers’.527 With Sluis in 
the hands of the Spanish, and Leicester thoroughly confounded by his own shame 
at failing to relieve the town, he refused to entertain Williams until he had 
received a full accounting of the surrender.528 English practice required a 
garrison commander to first seek permission from their superiors prior to 
surrendering their charge. After hearing the accounts from the garrison captains, 
Leicester determined that their actions and surrender were lawful. The hearings 
minutes as before were forwarded to Elizabeth and her council for further 
review. Williams also, exhausted from his extended fighting at Sluis, 
accompanied these and personally presented their case to the queen.529 
 
The laws of war in battles 
Sieges had greater bearing on the overall course of the war, but battle was the 
ideal form of war. ‘The preference for frontal assaults and pitched battles on 
the part of the English was evident in the late Elizabethan wars, and this 
remained true through the wars of the Three Kingdoms.’530 Gentili stresses on 
several occasions that regular war consists of pitched struggles (i.e. battle), and 
in doing so he minimises the utility of other military types of military 
operations.531 In English martial and legal discourse, sieges were often viewed as 
an indication of mediocre general-ship; battle, however, was the perceived as 
the more decisive means of waging war.532 The Elizabethans’ love of the battle, 
and its promise of honour and glory, had a long and victorious tradition; pitched 
battles had broken the power of France and the heroic examples of the Hundred 
Years War were lauded — Crecy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415); in 
addition, the battle of Flodden (1514) had greatly reduced the military power of 
Scotland. Battles loomed large in the martial imagination of English soldiers, and 
                                         
527 Motley, The history of the United Provinces, ii, 256, c.f. Williams to Leicester 29 June/ 9 July 
1587. 
528 CSPF (1587), p. 200. 
529 Ibid., p. 218. 
530 Roger B. Manning, An apprenticeship in arms: the origins of the British army, 1585-1702 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 7. 
531 Gentili, DIBLT, p. 14. 
532 Tallett, War and society in early modern Europe, 1495-1715, pp. 52-3. 
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so it could not easily be discarded. It was only when an enemy could not be 
brought to battle that cities should be taken to provoke him to fight.533 
War embodied, in the minds of most officers and soldiers, a valorous 
struggle between men and their arms, and therefore battle should not be 
confined within the artificial categories of either siege or field engagement. 
Sieges had special laws relevant to that environment, but the laws of actual 
combat were universal. The environment, whether in or around a fortification, 
in the field, or an enemy’s camp, did not alter the legalities of bringing weapons 
to bear against the enemy in battle: ‘[a]n enemy is justly killed anywhere.’534 
The English military elite’s passion for battle provoked suspicion in Elizabeth. 
The queen had set out limited military objectives in 1585-7 and always 
sought to restrict military operations to reduce their risks and costs.535 She and 
her council had devised a two-pronged strategy designed to bring Philip to a 
point where a negotiated settlement with the Dutch could be reached. The first 
prong entailed preserving the Dutch. The queen’s goal for Leicester’s expedition 
was to fortify the Dutch provinces against further losses; particularly, Elizabeth 
wanted to preserve Dutch ports, and her cautionary towns, against Spanish 
occupation because she feared that the Spanish would use these ports to launch 
future attacks against England.536 The second prong attacked Philip’s treasure 
ships and thus the finances underpinning the Army of Flanders. Sir Francis Drake 
was chosen to lead a public-private partnership and to attack Spain’s colonies in 
the New World.537 If it had been successful, Drake’s fleet would have captured 
Havana as a forward naval base from which to attack the king of Spain’s vital 
flow of silver. Such a grand strategy required Elizabeth preserve, to the best of 
her abilities, all her precious resources. 
Elizabeth issued clear instructions to Leicester regarding the forthcoming 
campaign: ‘his lordship is directed to bend his course, during his charg there, 
rather to make a defensive then an offensive war, and not in any sort to hazard 
                                         
533 Sutcliffe, The practice, proceedings, and the lawes of arms, p. 150. 
534 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 168. 
535 Hammer, Elizabeth’s wars, pp. 123-4. 
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a battaile without great advantage.’538 Leicester kept to the spirit of the larger 
strategy if not the letter of his instructions. From intelligence reports and 
Parma’s initial attacks, Leicester determined that the Spanish, already in control 
of Groningen and key points in Overijsel and Gelderland, intended to use the 
Ijsel River crossings at Deventer and Zutphen to ‘turn the Dutch eastern flank, 
roll up their main southern defence line along the Maas and Waal [Rivers], and 
reduce them to a position more desperate than that of Holland and Zeeland had 
been in 1575-1576.’539 Leicester knew the States’ eastern approach was weak, 
‘Guelders and Ouerissell stood on fickle tearmes’, and his armies were no match 
for the enemy in the field, Leicester moved to fortify the Ijsel and thus preserve 
the Dutch which had the secondary effect of drawing Parma into a position that 
Leicester believed he could win and relieve the besieged.540 To understand 
Leicester’s actions better, it is necessary to take seriously his chief advocate’s 
declaration: ‘a Generall ought neuer giue battaile to his Enimie, without great 
and apparent reason either of Advantage or Necessitie…. For there is no Enimy 
sooner ouerthrowne, than he that will accept Battlie whensoeuer it is 
offered’.541 
Pitched battles like those fought in the Hundred Years War were a rare 
thing and none occurred during any of Leicester’s campaigns. What Leicester 
and the English armies fought in the way of battles were skirmishes; these most 
often were neither great nor decisive. Skirmishes could include almost any type 
of combat operation in the field: from raiding an enemy’s supply train, fighting 
in no-man’s-land (that strip of terrain between two forces involved in a siege), 
and ambushes against an enemy. The laws of battle had no regard for unique 
circumstances, instead they were a broad set of guidelines for individual 
conduct, and this made the regulations equally applicable to both assaults 
during a siege as well as in field engagements. The most important aspect of 
                                         
538 Leycester correspondence, p. 12; Leicester’s instructions were a repeat of those that Norreys 
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these customs was to differentiate between the ‘hot action’ of immediate battle 
and a distinctly lower intensity state of a ‘general’ martial readiness. 
Gentili understood the impositions on soldiers in the heat of battle, but 
he also sought to delineate the heat of battle from lower intensity operations of 
war.542 The heat of battle permits all manner of violence because there ‘reason 
lies prostrate and the hands, as though intoxicated, do not obey the mind’; 
however grim the necessities of battle may be, it was definitely separate from 
that period where ‘danger is finally averted, the ardour of mind quieted, and 
thoughts restored to peace’.543 Once free from an immediate threats to life and 
limb, the soldier could not rightly slay another in cold blood.544 These he argued 
were the laws and customs of battle handed down from time out of mind. 
Thus, a legal and physical space was created that at the same time 
acknowledged the violent necessities of battle, but also sought to limit the same 
from senseless slaughter. Gentili tried to identify a point in combat operations, 
where the fury of battle ended and intoxicated hands sobered, so that mercy 
might be extended to the defeated.545 Therefore, there was a legal point in 
battle when the law of war asserted itself, and afterwards senseless slaughter 
was potentially illegal. Mercy in the aftermath of battle was very difficult to 
achieve, since at many times the end of a battle was signified when one side 
threw down their weapons and ran away from threat of death; such actions 
excited the ‘chase instinct’ among the victors, and slaughter often followed of 
the disarmed retreating mob, which was no crime but the regular exercise of 
war.546 An individual attempting to surrender was entering into a dangerous 
situation. A soldier faced the greatest risk when attempting to surrender, since 
custom prohibited a soldier from surrendering while he retained his arms. While 
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under arms he must fight: ‘he has gone beyond all crimes and all guilt who has 
allowed himself to be taken with arms in his hands’.547 
Lord Willoughby, while serving as the military governor of Bergen-op-
Zoom (1586-8) led a raid against a Spanish supply column. He received 
intelligence of the column’s route to Antwerp on 23 May 1586, and assembled a 
force of 200 horse and 400 foot, and set a course to intercept and ambush the 
Spaniards’ 450 wagons and their escort of 1,000 foot. The ambush was a success, 
and they put 423 wagons laden with supplies to the torch. The destruction of the 
wagons meant the escort had failed in their duty, and many of them fled the 
battle. This was immediately exploited, and 300 soldiers in the service of Spain 
were slaughtered in their retreat; however, as the fury of the assault diminished 
80 prisoners taken.548 
A similar engagement of this type occurred just beyond Zutphen’s Loor-
Gate and near the neighbouring village of Warnsveld on the 22 September 
1586.549 The ‘skyrmysh’ of Zutphen remains famous in Anglophone historiography 
because it claimed the life of the famous poet-cavalier Sir Philip Sidney, and 
because ‘[t]here was too many indeed at this skirmish of the better sort’.550 In 
military terms, the battle was a Spanish victory. The Spanish held the fortified 
town of Zutphen; however, it was poorly provisioned, and in this state, it could 
not hold out long against the ongoing English siege. Determined to strengthen 
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achievements, illness, and death of Sir Philip Sidney’, Archaeologia 28 (1840), pp. 27-37, 
CSPF (1586-1587), pp.164-166 (Leicester to Burghley, 24 Sept., particularly the postscript); 
Leycester Correspondence, pp. 415-417 (Leicester to Walsingham, 27 Sept.); Arthur Collins, 
ed., Letters and memorials of state, in the reigns of Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, King 
James, King Charles the first, part of King Charles the second, and Oliver’s usurpation, 2 
vols. (London: T. Osborne, 1746), i, p. 104-5 (Leicester to Heneage, 23 Sept.); Digges, A brief 
report of the militarie services done in the Low Countries, sigs.. D1-D2; Meteren, A true 
discourse historicall, pp. 87-91; Stowe, Annals, p. 736; Grimstone, A general historie of the 
Netherlands, p. 798. 
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Zutphen, Parma dispatched a supply convoy with an escort from his camp at 
Borculo. The convoy was massive, and consisted of at least 100 wagons, laden 
with enough victuals to feed 4,000 people for three months. The escort matched 
the convoy in size, and included 600 horse and 2,500 foot, the latter primarily 
musketeers.551 Before the convoy left Borculo at midnight on the 22 of 
September, Parma dispatched a messenger to coordinate with Zutphen’s 
commander Francisco Verdugo; however, the messenger was captured by the 
English on 21 September, and under questioning surrendered the general details 
to Leicester.552 
Leicester acted quickly upon this intelligence, and ordered Norreys and 
Stanley to prepare an ambush for the convoy near Warnsveld. The English force 
consisted of Norreys’s detachment of 300 horse, and Stanley’s 1,600 Irish 
infantry. Leicester’s intelligence was without a doubt insidious and designed to 
draw the English into assaulting a numerically superior foe, in the hope that they 
would be crushed in a Spanish counter-attack.553 An anxious Leicester, along 
with an entourage of England’s leading officers, decided to make a first-hand 
survey of Norreys’s preparations. The Spanish column successfully marched 
through the night, and took up a defensive position to rest near the village of 
Warnsveld.554 While his men rested in preparation for the final leg of the march 
                                         
551 Parma described the escort as 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry: Motley, History of the United 
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Spanish partisan Farnianus Strada, De bello belgico decades duae, 2 vols. (Rome, 1682) 
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Leicester estimated the enemy’s strength at 1,200 horse and 3,000 foot; these came from his 
own large view of the battlefield, as he moved about it, and his interrogation of captured 
officers, namely Captain Giorgio Cresso, in CSPF (1586-1587), pp.164-166, Leycester 
Correspondence, pp. 415-417, and for the number of wagons see Stowe, Annals, p. 736. 
552 Digges, A brief report of the militarie services done in the Low Countries, pp. D1-D2: reports 
that his ‘his Excellencie [Leicester] hauing intelligence that the Prince [of Parma] would the 
next morning send a convoy of victuals into Zutphen’; Collins, Letters and memorials of 
state, i, p. 104: Leicester wrote to Heneage that he had ‘some Intelligence was brought’ to 
him; the claim that it was a captured messenger that informed Leicester, and is found in 
Motley, History of the United Netherlands, ii, p. 44-5, which makes logical sense. 
553 Every source gives different number for the English involved; Leicester writing just after the 
skirmish gives 150 horse and 300 infantry! (CSPF (1586-1587), pp.164-166 and Leycester 
Correspondence, pp. 415-417; however, I am more inclined to trust the numbers given 
Leicester’s muster master Thomas Digges in A brief report of the militarie services done in 
the Low Countries, pp. D1-D2: he gives 300 English horse and 1,600-1,700 foot, but whatever 
the numbers, the English were severely outnumbered by the Spanish. 
554 The rally point near the village of Warnsveld was an important stop in the column’s march to 
Zutphen. The infantry especially would have been tired from their estimated 22 km (14 mile) 
night march from the camp at Borculo, and, so close to the English position (the vanguard was 
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into Zutphen, the column’s commander Marquis de Vasto received word from a 
scout that the English might be laying in ambush along their route. 
The English foot first discovered the Spanish position. The Irish regiment 
to took up positions around a church on the edge of Warnsveld, and the infantry 
under George Touchet, baron Audley, advanced at his flank, where they 
encountered the Spaniards’ picket-line. Spanish musketeers and Audley’s foot 
exchanged fire, and Audley reported that ‘our men fell into the Ambuscade of 
Footemen’.555 Wings of Spanish musketeers were extended against the English 
army’s infantry, while the pike men remained in place preserving the Spanish 
defensive line and to protect the convoy. The Spanish musketeers forced Audley 
to fall back on Stanley’s position, where the infantry exchanged musket fire, but 
the Spanish momentarily established fire superiority. ‘[N]ot liking the hot vollies 
of musket shot’, Stanley order his men to form up into a square, and ‘at the 
push of their pike... put the whole companie [of Spanish musketeers] to 
retreat’.556 After countering the advance of the Spanish musketeers, Stanley 
recalled his men, and ordered them to fall-back out of musket range. The battle 
required the coordinated movement of the foot companies, and their discipline 
prohibited them from taking prisoners during the exchange. Success in infantry 
battle required the squares of pikemen to advance as a single body of men; any 
individual breaking ranks risked execution.557 Indeed there was little opportunity 
to take prisoners amidst the hot volleys of musket fire, and any wounded or 
straggling Spaniards would have been dispatched; the law of battle at this point 
mandated violence of action. 
Nor should we think that the Irish infantry would have been over eager to 
take the enemy prisoners of war when given the chance. Stanley’s foot band 
were recruited in Ireland from his followers during his service there, and they 
had acquired a savage reputation during their short service under Leicester. One 
of Leicester’s personal guard, Henry Archer thought the Irish companies in the 
                                         
located at ‘Gibbet Hill’ and the main force across the Ijssel River – to Zutphen’s western flank 
- but relatively removed from the column’s line of march, which came from the East), they 
needed all the soldiers ready for a fight. 
555 Collins, Letters and memorials of state, i, p. 104. 
556 Stowe, Annals, p. 736. 
557 Dudley, Laws and ordinances miltiarie, p. 4. 
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Netherlands were a hard lot: ‘for none were so ready to burne, nor so ready to 
kill all that few escaped them.’558 Furthermore, Deventer’s magistrates had 
complained to the English Council of State that Irish troops ‘have committed 
every excess’, and they were also accused of accosting a burger’s pregnant 
wife.559 This, however, should not be taken as an outright condemnation. 
Companies were often judged based on the reputation of their captain, and 
Stanley was a respected captain until his conversion to the Spanish cause in 
1587. After Zutphen, however, Leicester praised Stanley’s fortitude and service, 
and considered him as a captain of rare quality.560 The Irish companies far from 
being criminals ignorant of the laws of war, time and again proved their worth to 
Leicester, and he valued there service. The English horse advanced in 
coordination with the withdrawal of the infantry, and they took up positions in 
front of the infantry’s squares. 
Amidst the Spanish convoy, Vasto was not idle, and he commanded his 
cavalry Captains Giorgio Cresso and count Hannibal de Gonzaga to lead their 
coronets of horse against the English position.561 Several exchanges were made 
between these two cavalry corps. Their charges left 30 enemy killed or 
overthrown from their mounts, and among those killed in the initial clash was 
Gonzaga ‘by a deadly wound there slaine.’562 Essex broke his lance in unhorsing 
his first challenger. Norreys, eschewing the lance in favour of the pistol, raised 
it against an assailant but had his weapon failed to discharge, so he set about 
bludgeoning his opponent into submission. It soon became clear that the English 
horsemen had won the cavalry engagement, and those still able members of the 
Spanish cavalry quickly fell-back on the protection of their infantry musketeers. 
The victory, however, was a pyrrhic one. The much beloved Phillip Sidney 
was grievously wounded; a bullet had shattered his femur. Sidney’s wound struck 
a powerful blow against Leicester’s will to fight. The English force was far too 
small to resist the full weight of the Spanish escort and orders were given to 
                                         
558 Stowe, Annals, p. 734. 
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collect their wounded, prisoners, and withdraw from the fight. All was 
accomplished in good order, the English withdrew before the superior Spanish 
force, which could if it moved in force, thoroughly overmatch Leicester’s much 
smaller troop. 
How were prisoners taken then? The key appears to lay in the weapons 
and tactics used by certain types of military formations. Infantry combat by its 
very nature had limited opportunities to take enemy soldiers as prisoners of war, 
and this was illustrated at Zutphen. Where the infantry on both sides employed 
musketeers, these soldiers moved in loose groups but largely each man fought as 
an individual. They gave fire when and where they could, but then each man 
needed to withdraw, seek cover, or receive protection from his fellows while he 
laboriously reloaded his piece. Musketeers were often unarmoured, and the 
wounds caused by these weapons were in many cases fatal even with immediate 
medical treatment as the case of Sidney bears out. The primitive medical care 
available to the common soldier was far inferior to that which Sidney had 
received. Pike men with their somewhat less lethal melee weapons (pikes, 
halberds, swords and daggers) did not fight as individuals but as a group, which 
magnified their killing potential, and by the same processes inhibited them from 
taking enemy combatants prisoner.563 In the cavalry operations, however, many 
English horsemen went into battle with their lances couched, like the earl of 
Essex, rather than pistols blazing, as Norreys had. Those lancers riding on to the 
field that day were armoured better than the footman with at a minimum 
cuirass and helmet. Lancer training conditioned the soldier to delivering the 
point of the lance to the opponent’s chest, which was protected by their armour 
(i.e. cuirass). Thus, the lance tended to knock an armoured enemy from their 
horse, dazed and confused, to the ground. Therefore, a lancer’s principle 
weapon system presented more opportunities to incapacitate an enemy, and 
ultimately take them prisoner, since they were left alive if temporarily 
incapacitated on the battlefield. There is an excellent example of these 
conditions producing prisoners at Zutphen. 
Numerous Spanish lancers were ‘unhorsed’ in the exchanges with their 
English opposites. One case provides insight into the battle and prisoner taking 
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process. When Willoughby’s cavaliers rode into the fray that day, coming shortly 
after Norreys’s cornet, which led the first strike, Willoughby and Cresso perhaps 
lined up with one another. Both would have observed the quality of their 
clothing and armour, and easily identified each other as equals, but it is just as 
likely chance made the match. Nevertheless, Willoughby drove his lance into 
Cresso unhorsing him. Cresso although well armoured was clearly dazed by the 
blow, and cried out from the ground: ‘I yield your prisoner’!564 However, in the 
heat of battle Willoughby did not himself stop fighting to personally take Cresso 
prisoner, instead Willoughby carried the fight to the enemy. Some of the 
dismounted Spanish soldiers had banded together and attempted to capture 
Willoughby. Did some of Willoughby’s cornet take Cresso prisoner? After the 
battle, Leicester and Cresso spoke in the Earl’s tent, and Cresso refused to be 
the ‘prisoner of any but to him who unhorsed him’. At seeing Willoughby, still in 
his armour and returning from the skirmish, enter the tent, Cresso said ‘this is 
the knight that I am prisoner to’.565 There may have been a conflict between 
Leicester’s Ordinances Militarie, which asserted that Leicester had authority 
over all prisoners of war, but Willoughby had Cresso ‘adjudged to be his’.566 The 
course of Cresso’s capture and ransom includes much that is hidden from direct 
inquiry, but some of this can be discovered. 
How were prisoners, particularly those of noble status, taken prisoner? 
Cresso seems to have submitted himself to the English as a prisoner. The taking 
of prisoners in battle had long established precedents in both the law and 
customs of war. Custom held that a prisoner could be taken at any time. In the 
later Middle Ages, all that was required was a verbal promise. ‘“Simple words 
suffice”, says Bartholomew of Saliceto; a man had only to say “I yield myself 
your prisoner”, and a firm bond was established.’567 This is very close to Cresso’s 
exclamation, and he acted according to this custom. He very well may have 
considered himself a prisoner of war at the very point he cried out his 
submission. ‘“Once a man has given his faith”, says Bartholomew of Saliceto, 
“even if he is rescued by his own side while the battle continues, he is not freed 
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from his captivity or from the faith he has pledged.”’568 Cresso, believing that 
his faith was so pledged, was then required to bring himself to the English camp 
to set the terms of his ransom. Therefore, prisoner status among the nobility 
might be as much a mental state — believing oneself to be a prisoner — as it was 
a state of physical confinement. It was not unheard of to grant certain prisoners 
‘liberty’ to move about freely within a town whereas others were ‘straightly’ 
kept confined to a room, prison, or in irons.569 Nevertheless, Cresso’s actions 
were likely anachronistic and his thinking unique to the end of an age. The 
English more commonly equated the status of prisoner with physical 
confinement, and if one escaped confinement, either by his own wit or the arms 
of his comrades, then he was free: ‘[w]ho so is taken in the war, ought by the 
law of Nations to be reputed a lawful prisoner: yet if hee escape and return 
home, he recovereth his former estate.’570 To be a prisoner required one to be 
held in confinement. After a prisoner was taken into custody, what was the 
process of ransom or exchange? 
A prisoner in the later Middle Ages provided his own ransom; he offered 
pledges and sureties so that if he was release on parole, his captor felt assured 
that his prisoner would return the payment, or resume his confinement. 
Returning to Cresso’s experience as a prisoner of war, he put into writing his 
ransome contract which dictated the amount to be paid and described the 
sureties that Willoughby could count upon from him: ‘[m]y intent in this is to 
offer your Lordship a thousand crowns of gold, and I trust that my friends will 
not leave me here, but for myself, I cannot pay a stiver more, if I stay all my life 
in prison.’571 Cresso’s ransom shares many similarities with the medieval customs 
associated with the laws of arms. Gentili does not delve into too much detail 
regarding personal ransoms. Instead, he said a soldier’s personal ransom 
contract should be simple: 
I add that in the same way in the canon law and in the canonical 
courts all contracts are in good faith; for there a plainer and more 
natural justice obtains. Just as with soldiers the law of nations or 
natural justice is observed without the strictness of the civil code, 
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according to the opinion of all the commentators. In fact, a soldier 
ought to know arms and not the law, and it is proper that military 
men should be ignorant of the law. It is a military custom to regard 
as ridiculous and silly the subtleties of the courts.572 
Therefore, a personal ransom contract was between the two parties; the party 
being ransomed and the party holding the captive, and it was placed outside the 
regular actions of war, and it did not involve the state. This was useful because 
the state should be the arbiter in cases of default: ‘soldiers ought to be 
compelled by their sovereign and by the judge to keep the agreements which 
they have made with the enemy’573 A personal ransom, however, remained 
something unique to elites: ‘the richer prisoners are spared with an eye to their 
ransom’, which could not be extended to the common soldiers, who ‘now die in 
greater numbers’.574 
 How were those common soldiers dealt with then? The common soldier — 
the privates, corporals, sergeants, and lower ranked officers — were during the 
years of Leicester’s expedition ransomed and exchanged by colonels and other 
regimental level officers, or perhaps even higher ranked officers within the 
army. The management of prisoners occupied a fair amount of a colonel’s 
time.575 The colonel corresponded with enemy officers of equal, and sometimes 
higher rank, to negotiate the specifics; who was being ransomed and for what 
price or how many enemy personnel were to be exchanged. The regiment’s 
‘drum’, or ‘trumpeter’, served the colonel as his agents in these negotiations, 
and travelled back and forth bearing correspondence to conclude agreements. 
During the campaigns of Leicester formal exchange rates and ransoms for the 
various ranks had not been set which left to commanders the responsibility of 
settling the terms on an ad hoc basis. 
International norms governing the treatment of prisoners was becoming 
institutionalised, and even expanded to better reflect the early modern military 
structure and growing organisation. The ransoming and exchange of prisoners 
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became a matter governed by international agreements. In 1599 the United 
Provinces and Spain established a compact for the formal exchange of prisoners 
called the cuartel (or cartel) general. It stated that captains should ransom their 
prisoners of war within 25 days of their capture. Prisoners of the same rank 
should be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, and in any other case, the prisoners 
should be ransomed at approximately one month’s pay plus the cost of their up-
keep while imprisoned.576 In 1602, a schedule of Dutch and Spanish exchange 
rates and including minimum standards for keeping prisoners of war (their 
‘entertainment’) was agreed to and later printed in English.577 The agreement of 
1602 should be considered a great success because it would be reinstituted in 
1622 following renewed hostilities.578 Therefore each ransom, or exchange, 
during Leicester’s intervention had to individually negotiated, and each 
agreement possessed their own particular characteristics and absent was any 
type of standardisation. 
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Chapter 5. 
‘War upon the rebel’: Elizabethan military conduct in 
Ireland (1569-1584) 
 
The rebellion of subiects against their lawful Princes, is also sufficient 
cause to arme the prince against them, he carieth not the sword for 
other purpose, but to represse the wicked and rebellious. ...for although 
rebels and pyrates, and robbers are not accompted among the number of 
lawfull enemies ... nor were to be vsed as enemeies in lawfull warres; 
yet is the force used against them most lawfull. 579 
—Matthew Sutcliffe 
 
Writing at the height of the Desmond revolt, a despondent Henry Wallop 
remarked to Francis Walsingham ‘[t]here is no way to daunt these people but by 
the edge of the sword’.580 Irish service was viewed by those professional English 
soldiers who experienced it and cared to write on the matter as some of the 
hardest duty. The veteran William Pelham, while locked in a difficult winter 
campaign, felt bold enough to proclaim to the English Privy Council: ‘if I have 
any judgment, all the soldiers of Christendom must give place ... to the soldier 
of Ireland’.581 Pelham, like a few other officers in Ireland at this time, had some 
experience in continental wars and more than a passing experience with the 
laws of war. He participated in negotiating the surrender of Le Havre to the 
French, and to ensure that the terms of surrender set at the treaty of Troyes 
(1564) were fulfilled he was held as a hostage.582 Over the course of continental 
warfare, English captains took notable steps to execute their military operations 
in accordance with acceptable standards of violence and were loath to allow 
brutal actions to dominate their campaigns. Ireland, however, was no war; it 
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was a rebellion and Elizabethan political, legal, and cultural influences 
incentivised soldiers to commit savage acts against rebels. 
 
Shaping Elizabethan Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Laws of Armed 
Conflict 
Conscious of the customs and laws of war as the English were in their 
foreign wars, the Irish wars were something different. The English perspective 
maintained that the so-called Irish wars were actually unlawful wars of 
rebellion. The English military’s purpose in Ireland was to bring the island and its 
peoples - Gaelic Irish, Anglo Irish, and New English - under the civilising laws and 
central government of England. Pelham’s commission appointed him to the 
position of Lord Justice of Ireland; a title that reflected his peace keeping and 
counterinsurgent mission. He had been sent by the queen ‘to protect the peace, 
laws, customs, and all liege subjects, English and Irish ... [and] to do justice to 
all persons according to the laws and customs’583. The commission implies there 
were known domestic legal and customary precedents that directed martial 
conduct in military peace keeping operations, and that these imposed the 
requisite restraints, where necessary, upon counterinsurgency operations. 
 Just as the English campaigns in the Dutch conflict, and particularly 
Leicester’s expedition, became the seeds which grew into the more formal law 
of war doctrines described by Alberico Gentili and Matthew Sutcliffe, so did the 
rebellions of 1569-1573 and 1579-1584 result in William Cecil’s politico-legal 
reframing of rebellion, which Catholics in Ireland called holy war. Most 
Elizabethan’s regarded holy war as something akin to rebellion for the sake of 
conscience, and nothing more than treason. By the 1580s, William Cecil, the 
baron of Burghley, and central figure in the Elizabethan regime, articulated the 
state’s position against religious rebellion in his The execution of justice in 
England, not for religion, but for treason (1583). 
Of which sort of late yeeres, are specially to be noted certaine 
persons naturally borne subiects in the Realme of England and 
Ireland, who hauing for some good time professed outwardly their 
obedience to their Sovereign Lady Queene Elizabeth, haue 
neuerthelesse afterward bene stirred up and seduced by wicked 
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spirits, first in England sundry yeres past, and secondly and of later 
time in Ireland, to enter into open rebellion, taking armes and 
coming into the field against her Maiestie and her Lieutenants, with 
their forces under banners displayed, inducing by notable vntruthes 
many simple people to followe & assist them in their traitorous 
actions.584 
The Elizabethan state viewed the pope’s involvement with English and Irish 
rebels and the Jesuit’s subversive pastoral activities as one conflict: 
The Bishop of Rome, as in fauour of their treasons, not to colour 
their offences as themselues openly pretend to do, for auoyding of 
common shame of the worlde, but flatly to animate them to 
continue their former wicked purposes, that is, to take armes 
against their lawful Queene, to inuade her realme with forreine 
forces, to pursue al her good suiects and their natiue countries with 
fire & sworde.585 
These were all part of an unlawful religious war that unjustly attacked the 
monarchy and sovereignty of England and it was perceived as being directed by 
the papacy. Thus, the queen and her magistrates were duty bound to administer 
justice against these rebels and traitors. Rome had already been the cause of 
two rebellions and these rebels, Burghley declared, ‘haue iustly suffered death 
not by force or forme of any newe lawes established, either for religion or 
against the Popes supremacie, as the slanderous libellers would haue it seeme to 
be, but by the auncient temporall lawes of the realme’.586 Subsequent critics 
asserted that the English state was prosecuting Catholics because of their 
religion, which would have threatened English Protestant view on martyrs and 
their martyrologies, but Burghley countered these by declaring ‘no one was 
called to any captiall or bloody question vpon matters of religion, but all inioyed 
their life as the course of nature woulde: and such of them as yet remayne, 
may, if they will not be authors or instruments of rebellion or sedition’.587 
The state, Burghley claimed, acted out of a desire for justice and the 
maintenance of domestic peace: 
it is of all persons to be yeelded in reason, that her Maiestie and all 
her governors and magistrates of Justice, hauing care to maintaine 
the peace of the Realme ... by all lawful meanes possible, as well 
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by the Sword as by Lawe ... to impeache and repell, these so 
manifest and daungerous colourable practises, and workes of 
sedition and rebellion.’588 
It furthermore outlined the processes which the queen and her agents employed 
in the suppression of rebellion: ‘first to subdue with her forces her rebelles and 
traytours, and nexte by order of her lawes to co[rrect] the ayders & abettors, & 
lastly to put also to the sword such forces as the pope sent into her 
dominions’.589 
 The Elizabethans were clear that the rebellions occurring from 1569-1573 
and 1579-1584 were nothing more than rebellions, and neither holy wars nor just 
wars. Burghley’s political legal arguments reframed the Catholic church’s 
practice of holy wars as rebellion and divorced the act from the question of 
religious liberty. Fitzmaurice’s conspicuous crusading ethic was precisely the 
type of militarised Catholicism that Burghley’s arguments in The Execution of 
Justice in England (1583) sought to disallow. Fitzmaurice played upon shared 
Irish Catholicism to unit otherwise hostile Irish and Anglo Irish ethnic groups in 
common cause against the English crown. This was a tactic pioneered by ‘Silken’ 
Thomas Fitzgerald, during the Kildare rebellion (c. 1534-1535), which went on to 
influenced Hugh O’Neill’s later rebellion. The English government adopted the 
same political and legal position that it had developed during the religious 
revolts in the 1570s and 1580s.590 
 Following the trail blazed by Fitzmaurice, Tyrone issued a proclamation 
declaring his intentions; his rising was not a rebellion, but rather it was a just 
and holy war in defence of the Catholic religion. He announced that his goal was 
to achieve ‘the extirpation of heresie, [and] the plantinge of the Catholike 
Religion’.591 Tyrone’s audience was the Anglo-Irish nobility, and with the carrot 
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and stick, he entreated them to join with him in this war or face destruction: 
‘come and ioyne with me against the Enemies of god and our poore country … 
[or else], I will use meanes not only to spoyle you of all your goods but according 
to the utmost of my power shall work what I can to dispossess you of your 
lands’.592 The Elizabethan regime forcefully responded to Tyrone’s proclamation 
in the manner it had adopted during Fitzmaurice’s rebellions even drawing on 
similar sources.593 
 Thomas Jones, archbishop of Meath, and an integral member of the 
English administration of Ireland, composed a response to Tyrone’s 
proclamation, which the English government regarded as a libel. Jones had 
arrived in Ireland in 1574 and began his Irish preaching as a member of Adam 
Loftus’s, archbishop of Dublin, household, and witnessed much of Fitzmaurice 
and Desmond’s rebellions in 1579-1584.594 He was well placed and experienced in 
Irish affairs and although his response to Tyrone’s proclamation was never 
published, it provides insight into the perceptions of the New English and their 
views on religious rebellion.595 Jones’s response drew on important sources; such 
as the homilies, by recounting the Old Testament story of David and king Saul.596 
Hiram Morgan’s research into the ideology of Tyrone’s Rebellion has shown that 
Jones employed elements from the reformist theologian Heinrich Bullinger’s A 
confutation of the Pope’s bull which was published more then two yeres agoe 
against Elizabeth (1572).597 Jones himself acknowledged additional profits 
derived from Bilson’s, The true difference betweene Christian subiection and 
                                         
proclamation, grant to Tyrone additional legitimacy by recognizing his complaints against 
English rule. 
592 Ibid., p. 18. 
593 Ibid., pp. 21-22; see also CSPI (1599-1600), pp. 279-280. 
594 Helen Coburn Walshe, ‘Jones, Thomas (c.1550-1619)’, Oxford dictionary of national 
biography <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15086> [accessed on 2 May 2017]. 
595 Marsh Library, MS. Z3 1 19 no.7, f. 1-22, c.f. Morgan, ‘Faith and fatherland or queen and 
country’, pp. 23-40. 
596 Morgan, ‘Faith and fatherland or queen and country’, p. 30 and Ronald B. Bond, ed., Certain 
sermons or homilies (1547) and a homily against disobedience and wilfil rebellion (1570), 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 168-170 (Homily on Obedience), 223-225 
(Homily against disobedience and wilfil rebellion). 
597 Heinrich Bullinger, A confutation of the Pope’s bull which was published more then two yeres 
agoe against Elizabeth the most gracious Queene of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, and 
against the noble realme of England, tr., A. Golding (London: Iohn Day, 1572); Morgan, ‘Faith 
and fatherland or queen and country’, p. 8. 
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unchristian rebellion (1585), which was written in coordination with Burghley 
and can be read as the final word on The Execution of Justice in England 
(1583).598 The Irish Privy Council chose to forward Jones’s response to the English 
Privy Council for further consideration and possible publication. Using many of 
the same sources and arguments, the English Privy Council drafted a second 
more polemical response, which was reviewed and amended by Robert Cecil and 
Robert Sackville, but it too was not published.599 Both responses drew upon 
similar sources, and these two tracts collectively highlight the central 
documents outlining the Elizabethan policy against rebels. Therefore, there was 
little doubt among many Anglo Irish and all the New English, at this time, that 
subjects were bound by God to serve and obey their sovereign, and thus, Jones 
could declare ‘Vivitis vos, non exemplis sed legibus [You live not by examples 
but by laws]’.600 
However, how did these policies translate into actions on the ground 
between combatants, or in Lord Deputy Henry Sidney’s words a ‘war upon the 
rebel’?601 This chapter examines how official policies were put into action 
against those rebels drawn to serve under the papal banner in the Irish theatre. 
Military officer commissions from the English army in Ireland often 
described the ‘war upon the rebel’ by the idiomatic phrase for war — ‘fire and 
sword’; this in official documents was essentially the English government 
authorising the use of military force, and in this instance, it was a royal 
command to use military force against rebels.602 The English army in Ireland used 
                                         
598 CSPI (1599-1600), p. 304: ‘I have barrowed some matter and reasons from the Bishop of 
Winchester [Thomas Bilson], out of his learned book against the Jesuits.’ Morgan also notes 
Jones’s use of Bilson; Morgan, ‘Faith and fatherland or queen and country’, pp. 7-8. Bilson’s 
arguments are used to explain the absolute power of princes; see Morgan, ‘Faith and 
fatherland or queen and country’, p. 27. 
599 CSPI (1600-1601), pp. 127-126, and printed in Morgan, ‘Faith and fatherland or queen and 
country’, pp. 41-49. 
600 Morgan, ‘Faith and fatherland or queen and country’, pp. 40, fn. 75 (Morgan’s translation); 
similar conclusions were expanded upon in the English Privy Council’s response, ibid., p. 48. 
601 Cal. Carew (1575-1588), p. 355 (made in Sidney’s memoir of Irish service addressed to 
Walsingham, 1583). 
602 Ayala, DIOBDM, ii, p. 5, uses ‘fire and sword’ as a synonym for war (my emphasis): ‘[a]fter a 
correct declaration of war all peaceable intercourse was prohibited and the soldiery free to 
take up arms, collect forces, lead them against the foe, make raids, drive booty, lay districts 
to waste and ravage them with fire and sword, cutting down crops and burning buildings, and 
generally act as an enemy does.’ Burghley’s chief charge against the pope was that he had 
invaded the Queen’s realm ‘to pursue all her good Subjects and their Native Countries with 
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a combination of conventional military techniques and other more specialised 
counterinsurgency tactics unique to the pacification of Ireland. Also by 
authorising military force for use in Ireland, the English government was 
suspending, to a limited extent, the operation of regular domestic legal 
apparatus in favour of the summary justice of martial law. How then were 
restraints, or their lack thereof, more familiar in the laws of war were applied in 
this complex mission? 
 In a ‘war upon the rebel’, what might be called ‘normal enemy 
combatants’ rights were organised differently than in regular wars. Enemy 
combatants were identified as ‘rebels’, and under English law, they were felons, 
just as were murderers, rapists, and thieves, but their crimes were more closely 
related to treason against their sovereign prince. Rebels, then, were persons not 
worthy of traditional combatant protections; however, limited restraints 
manifested in small ways. In these wars, it was not as might be expected that all 
mutual restraint was entirely absent. Such an unlimited war would be lawful, 
but just as Alba’s counterinsurgency campaign against Dutch rebellion (c.1572-4) 
obeyed certain principles associated with the laws of war, English captains 
applied certain restraints in predictable and methodological ways. In the same 
way that restraint featured in English military operations so too did elements of 
terror. 
Few images from Ireland encapsulate the Elizabethan laws of armed 
conflict in operation or that highlight the twin prongs of limited restraint and 
terror in English counterinsurgency strategy than the famous woodcuts from 
Derrick’s Image of Ireland (1581) (figure 24.). In it, English soldiers triumphally 
return from counterinsurgency operations. At the head of the column marches a 
musketeer carrying, by the hair, the severed head of a woman, indicated by its 
conspicuous lack of a beard.603 Traditionally women were considered non-
                                         
Fire and Sword’: in Cecil, ‘The execution of justice in England’, p. 4. For an opposite 
perspective which interprets ‘fire and sword’ as a specialized unlimited war against the Irish, 
see Roger B. Manning, ‘Irish Wars’, in An apprenticeship in arms: the origins of the British 
army, 1585-1702 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 3-32, 11, 13. 
603 The beheaded woman was perhaps Margaret Byrne, wife of the rebel Rory O’More. Patricia 
Palmer, ‘“An headlesse ladie” and “a horse loade of heads”: writing the beheading’, 
Renaissance quarterly 60 (2007), pp. 25-57, 33 f.n. 47; William Palmer, ‘Gender, violence, 
and rebellion in Tudor and early Stuart Ireland’, The sixteenth century journal 23 (1992), pp. 
699-712. 
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combatants and protected from soldiers, but a state of rebellion removed these 
protections. Nearby, swordsmen display the severed heads of executed rebels 
with their Gaelic forelocks – ‘glibbes’ – shorn off on the point of their swords. It 
was the English practice to ceremonially display the heads of rebels on the point 
of a sword.604 It was an accepted practice across Europe to behead rebels and 
display their remains as an example to others. Furthermore, the English 
government paid bounties – ‘head money’ - for the severed heads of known and 
targeted rebels.605 At the top-centre of the page, a soldier leads a prisoner by a 
halter, or hangman’s noose, tied around his neck. The prisoner is beardless, 
perhaps he was a juvenile son of some suspect rebel given up as a hostage as an 
assurance of obedience to the English administration, or perhaps his future was 
a public execution to the reassurance of the loyal and the terror of the rebel, we 
cannot yet tell, but both fates were common enough that we can be sure that 
his life was in peril. Several pikemen led by a halberdier drive a bounty of horses 
and cattle back to their garrison and another soldier, at the rear of the 
formation, summarily executes a rebel. Under martial law, commissioners were 
‘entitled to collet one-third of all the moveable goods and possessions of those 
he executed.’606 The English state reacted with extreme prejudice against 
Catholic inspired insurgency; against these foes, the Elizabethan soldiers sought 
victory through terror and violence, which at the same time earned him 
monetary rewards. Mercy was only permitted under exceptional circumstances, 
and there were significant financial incentives, by way of head money, 
extortion, and seizure of goods, that motivated soldiers to set aside mercy in the 
pursuit of profits. 
The Elizabethan state’s strategy could be best summarised by Sir Francis 
Bacon’s maxim, from his essay ‘Of sedition and troubles’: ‘Dolendi modus, 
                                         
604 Patricia Palmer, ‘At the sign of the head: the currency of beheading in early modern Ireland’, 
in Cultures of violence: interpersonal violence in historical perspective, ed., S. Carroll (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 129-155, 135. 
605 David Edwards, ‘Atrocities: “some days two heads and some days four”’, History Ireland 17 
(2009), pp. 18-21; Palmer, ‘At the sign of the head’, p. 135; Palmer, ‘“An headlesse ladie” 
and “a horse loade of heads”, pp. 25-57. 
606 David Edwards, ‘Legacy of defeat: the reduction of Gaelic Ireland after Kinsale’, in The battle 
of Kinsale, ed., H. Morgan (Bray: Wordwell, 2004), pp. 279-300, 289-290; and ‘Beyond 
reform: martial law & the Tudor reconquest of Ireland’, History Ireland 5 (1997), pp. 16-21. 
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timendi non item [suffering has its limit but fears are endless]’. 607 A strategy 
that was developed in response to the Northern Rebellion (1569-1570) in 
England, but reached a more brutal climax in Ireland. It enabled England to 
subdue its Irish rebels, prosecute by martial law everyone without exception 
that aided rebels, and ensured all foreign papal soldiers were put to the sword. 
 
Military Operations in the Field 
The Elizabethan army favoured pitched battles and direct operations 
against enemy units: ‘it is not the nature of a good Englishman to regarde to be 
caged up in a coope, & hedged in with some walles, but rather to meete wyth 
hys enemie in the plyne fielde at hand strokes’.608 This preference carried-over 
into operations against rebels. The jurist Alberico Gentili argued pitched battle 
was the ideal method of waging regular war. Battle being a true ‘contest of 
arms’ with straight-forward restraints on violence. In battles, the belligerents 
were all combatants and either side could take prisoners for future ransom or 
exchange. In this instance, these were lawful enemies and by extension the 
servants of the sovereign prince, which endowed them with certain rights under 
the laws of war. Battles were to be further favoured because it limited the 
destruction of property and important infrastructure, which was usually 
protected from destruction; these assets had enduring utility for all 
belligerents.609 However, in English military operations against rebels no quarter 
was offered or expected. When rebels massed for military operations, it was a 
manifestation of their treason, and justice required their execution by the sword 
or the hangman’s noose; therefore, it was important to present a lawfully 
massed army. 
                                         
607 Francis Bacon, ‘Essays, Civil and moral’, in The Harvard Classics, C.W. Eliot (New York: P. F. 
Collier & Son Co., 1909), iii, p. 40. 
608 Paul E.J. Hammer, ‘War’, in The Oxford handbook of Holinshed’s Chronicles, eds., F. Heal, 
I.W. Archer, and P. Kewes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 443 -458, 456. 
609 Spanish commanders and Philip II carried on extensive debates about the lawfulness and 
utility of destroying dikes during the Dutch conflict: Parker, ‘The etiquette of atrocity’, p 
152-153, and Waxman, ‘Strategic terror’, pp. 340-341. 
Gentili discusses the topic in detail in the chapter 23. ‘of devastation and fires’ in his second 
book, and concluded that destruction of infrastructure is permissible under military necessity: 
Gentili, DIBLT, ii, pp. 270-277. 
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 Regular armies signalled their legitimacy through specialist soldiers. 
Standard bearers indicated under whose authority the unit fought by the display 
of various banners. Trumpeters and drummers communicated information over 
distance. They also had special protections that allowed them to travel as 
couriers and negotiators between antagonist forces. The English army in Ireland 
made full use of such specialists; however, during the Desmond revolt (1579-
1584) so too did some rebel armies. On 3 October 1579 John of Desmond’s army 
unfurled their standard bearing the keys of heaven signalling that they were 
assembled under the religious authority of the pope, and at the same time their 
commitment to meet, the lord president of Connaught, Nicholas Malby’s army in 
battle at Monasternagh.610 
What did the rebels communicate by unfurling the crossed keyed papal 
colours on that day? It was not a display of just war but a symbol of their 
crusade against the heretical English dominion of Ireland: ‘[t]herefore now we 
fight not against the lawful sceptre and honourable throne of England, but 
against a tyrant’.611 The rebels’ war was ‘not the warr of man’, declared Dr 
Sanders, the papal nuncio in Ireland, ‘but the Warr of God’.612 Holy wars 
authorised by the pope could come close to wars of extermination because it 
sanctioned unlimited violence against the infidel and heretic.613 In order to 
liberate the souls of the Irish crusaders from the burdens of holy war, Pope 
Gregory XIII provided them with a plenary indulgence, and remission of sins.614 
What follows was an interesting instance where different perceptions of 
                                         
610 Matthew J. Byrne, trans., ‘Philip O’Sullivan Bear, soldier, poet, and historian. Compendium of 
the Catholic history of Ireland (Lisbon, 1621), Journal of the Cork historical archaeological 
society, second series, 3 (1897), pp. 26-30, 182-188, 50: ‘[James Fitzmaurice] explained that 
he had been sent by the Supreme Pontiff to aid the Irish in asserting the rights and liberties of 
the Catholic Church against the heretics. On this account he carried the keys inscribed on his 
banners, because they were fighting for him who had the keys of the kingdom of heaven.’ 
611 Cal. Carew (1515-1574), p. 402 (#268, ‘The proclamation of the right honorable Lord James 
Geraldine [Fitzmaurice] concerning the justice of that which war which he wageth in Ireland 
for the faith’).  
612 HCCI, p. 1269 (Letter of N. Sanders to the Irish people, 21 Feb. 1580) 
613 Russell, The just war in the Middle Ages, p. 210. 
614 Pope Gregory XIII issued plenary indulgences and remission of sin first to Fitzmaurice: HCCI, p. 
1264 (English); original Latin: British Library, Landsdowne MS 96 fol. 53, ‘A genuine copy of 
the bull of Pope Gregory the thirteenth, for indulgences to such as join the Irish rebels 
against Queen Elizabeth, from 1578), and after the death of Fitzmaurice the leadership of the 
holy army was given to John of Desmond and he too was issued with the same indulgences: 
King, HCCI, pp. 1273-1275. 
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legitimacy and the laws of war that led two different ideologies to the same 
conclusion: no quarter. By displaying the banner inscribed with the keys of the 
kingdom of heaven, John of Desmond signalled no quarter would be given to the 
heretics, and likewise, Malby and the crown’s army would never grant mercy to 
rebels mustering in the field and under arms. John of Desmond was waging a 
holy war against heresy, and Malby was preserving the England against rebellion. 
Here two very different legal concepts clashed. Each claimed ironically 
legitimacy from God and absolute authority to destroy the other. 
 Consequently, when John of Desmond mustered his 2,000 crusaders on the 
plain before the Abbey of Neagh, his lines were matched by the Malby’s 750 
crown troops, and there was no confusion on either side regarding the conditions 
of battle.615 The English pike and shot squared off with ranks of gallowglass and 
kern with Spanish officers holding a ditch that ran across the field.616 Several 
times the forces clashed at close quarters; however, English shot on their third 
assault routed the Irish. In close combat, the crown’s troops succeeded in killing 
60 crusaders, but once their lines broke and they fell into an undisciplined 
                                         
615 CSPI (1574-1585), pp. 190 (Malby to Walsingham, 12 Oct. 1579, andSir William Stanley to 
Walsingham, 12 Oct. 1579); Four Masters, v, p. 1721; Irish chronicle, p. 416; Thomas Morsch, 
‘The battle of Monasternenagh, 1579’, Irish Sword 23 (2003), pp. 305-314. 
616 Thomas Leland, History of Ireland, 3 vols. (Dublin: Brett Smith, 1814), ii, pp. 274-5 (book 4 
chapter 2). Gallowglasses were a type of Gaelic heavy infantry that characteristically were 
armed with long handled axes, and the kern were Gaelic light infantry which increasingly 
were associated with the skilled use of firearms, the Gaelic answer to pike and shot. 
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Figure 24. English army forces an Irish rebel army into a retreat. 
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retreat. The English army pursued and slaughtered another 200 men before 
halting their pursuit.617 The English troops were merciless in the exploit of their 
victory as was the practice of the age, and battle in Ireland can scarce find a 
better depiction than the woodprints in The Image of Ireland, (figures 25. and 
26.).618 
No prisoners were taken nor quarter given. The English cannons were 
after the battle turned against the abbey for unlawfully supporting the rebels 
and it was destroyed. In Malby’s after-action report to Walsingham, he 
confirmed that all the enemy captains had been slain. The battle was reported 
as an English victory, Malby regretted his men’s failure to secure the pope’s 
standard. The capture of the papal standard would have signified a complete 
English victory over the rebels. Captured enemy ensigns were highly prized 
trophies and would be sent to the queen as physical proof of success in military 
operations; hence, the crusaders spared no effort in keeping their banner out of 
the heretics’ hands. Rebels in Ireland whenever possible avoided pitched battles 
with the queen’s troops because the crown most often won those engagements, 
and the rebels knew that they could expect no mercy. The practice, however, 
                                         
617 Philip O’Sullivan Bear, Ireland under Elizabeth, tr. M.J. Byrne (Dublin: Sealy, Bryers, and 
Walker, 1903), p. 26: ‘John [of Desmond] hastened to meet them and when he had halted in 
the distance a few of his men charged the enemy in a disorderly manner and drove them into 
the nearest fort. Thence the royal troops again sallying forth, despising the smallness of the 
Catholic forces, boldly attacked and put them to flight, until John came to their rescue.’  
618 Fig. 25. and fig. 26. Derricke, The image of Ireland, plate ix. 
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Figure 25. The infantry battle from figure 25 enlarged to show details. The Irish retreat and the 
English soldiers slaughter the wounded. 
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was not unknown to them, and Irish combatants utilised pitched battles 
occasionally in local feuds.619 The English army found it difficult to bring rebels 
into set piece battles, and instances like the battle of Monasternenagh were 
uncommon events. Irish martial attitudes never idealised the pitched battle in 
the same way as the English, and their historical failure to secure conventional 
victories necessitated a shift in tactics. After all, victory was what mattered 
most in their holy war and not its methods, and there was no need to meet 
heretics on idealised or so-called honourable grounds. Thus, rebels in Ireland 
developed high facility in fighting their war with ambuscades; a tactic that did 
not lend itself to restraint. Ambuscades were remorseless affairs. 
 The rebels showed themselves at times as merciless as any of the crown’s 
soldiers when they gained the upper hand. The newly arrived Lord Deputy Arthur 
Grey was anxious to prosecute his war upon the rebels. August 1580, Lord 
Deputy Grey led a search and destroy mission into Glenmalure Valley against 
rebels commanded by the viscount of Baltinglas, Feagh O’Brian. Grey’s military 
experience to date consisted of company level cavalry tactics, and he was ill 
prepared for the brutal fighting in Ireland. With a cavalryman’s bravado, Grey 
decided to flush the rebels from the valley with his infantry and then to ride 
them down with his horsemen staged at the entrance to the valley.620 Francis 
Cosby, general of the queen’s kern, knew the terrain and warned Grey against 
the endeavour; however, the advice was dismissed.621 Grey ordered the crown’s 
army into the valley. Many veterans felt that they were marching to their death, 
but they were compelled forward by the military and social hierarchy of 
command, and go they did. 
Hooker describes the wooded valley as a fastness made by ‘nature so 
strong as might be ... Vnder foot it is boggie and soft, and full of great stones 
and slipperie rocks, verie hard and euil to pass through’.622 The English infantry 
                                         
619 In private wars between the Irish the rights of prisoners might be respected. At the battle of 
Affane, the earl of Desmond was taken prisoner by the earl of Ormond: G. Butler, ‘The battle 
of Affane’, Irish Sword 8 (1967), pp. 33-47. 
620 Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish wars, pp. 136-7; Bagwell, Ireland Under the Tudors, iii, p. 61. 
621 Colm Lennon, ‘Cosby, Francis (d. 1580)’, Oxford dictionary of national biography 
<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6368> [accessed on 5 November 5, 2015]. 
622 Irish Chronicle, p. 435; Sir William Stanley confirms Hooker’s description: Daniel MacCarthy, 
ed., The life and letters of Florence MacCarthy Reagh (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, 
and Dyer, 1867), p. 252. 
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were divided into two battles; a vanguard led by the corpulent Berwick soldier 
Colonel George Moore and a rear commanded by William Stanley. The earl of 
Baltinglas had taken a piece of high ground approachable only by ascending a 
steep slope, and the kern were hidden ‘with their peeces amongst the trees’.623 
After a rough march over more than 4 miles and across ‘stones, rocks, and bogs, 
and wood’, the vanguard encountered a steep hill ‘a long mile in height; it was 
so steep that we were forced to use our hands, as well to climb, as our feet’, 
and ‘we [of the rear guard] must of necessity folloue’.624 As the English soldiers 
crept up the difficult terrain, the rebel musketeers launched their ambush and 
‘assaileth them with shot, and in verie short time did kill the most part of the 
voward’.625 The fury of the fighting prompted Stanley to remark that it was the 
‘hottest piece of service for the time, that ever I saw in any place.’626 
There was no mercy or restraints for the English soldiers trapped in 
Glenmalure. The fresh English levies garbed in their new red or blue coats made 
easy targets, and the kern displayed their marksmanship by putting holes into 
those new coats. Many of the soldiers were so exhausted from their climb that 
they were easy prey.627 Sir Peter Carew, in one such example, assaulted the hill 
in full armour with the vanguard, but the weight of his armour exhausted him 
and he was captured. In full view of the English army, Carew was disarmed, and 
‘one villaine most butcherlie’ used the knight’s own sword to execute him.628 A 
few lucky soldiers survived by making a flying retreat down the valley and along 
the route, which they had earlier traversed to be saved by Grey’s cavalry. 
Belligerents did not see much value in sparing either wounded or captives taken 
in battle: ‘the place was so very ill that were a man never so slightly hurt he was 
lost… [s]ome died being so out of breath that they were able to go no further, 
being not hurt at all’.629 Men unable to keep up during the withdrawal were left 
                                         
623 Irish Chronicle, p. 435; MacCarthy, The life and letters of Florence MacCarthy Reagh, pp. 
252-3. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Irish Chronicle, p. 435. 
626 MacCarthy, The life and letters of Florence MacCarthy Reagh, pp. 252-3. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Irish Chronicle, p. 435. 
629 MacCarthy, The life and letters of Florence MacCarthy Reagh, pp. 252-3. 
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behind to be slaughtered by the Irish. Field operations consisted of more than 
battles and ambushes.630 
Elizabethan theatre strategy advocated for punitive raids against known 
or suspect rebel communities in Ireland. The Elizabethan just war theorist 
Gentili discouraged military operations that targeted crops, buildings, religious 
places except where these became obstacles to victory. Moreover, in conflicts 
against the ‘cruellest of enemies’, sixteenth-century martial honour professed 
that it was both honourable and lawful, to return like for like, and to subdue the 
foe ‘by subjecting them to their own customs ... by fire and sword’.631 A 
justification was used by Churchyard in defence of Gilbert’s Munster campaign 
(1569): [w]hiche course of gouernemente maie by some bee thought to cruell, in 
excuse whereof it is to be aunswered. That he did but then beginne that order 
with theim, which thei had in effecte euer tofore used toward the Englishe.’632 
In Ireland, the crown and rebels made bloody punitive expeditions against one 
another. 
After the appointment of William Pelham to the office of lord justice of 
Ireland, he and Thomas Butler, earl of Ormond, made a punitive expedition 
against Gerald Fitzgerald’s, earl of Desmond, castles, lands, and tenants in 
Munster. The crown’s forces assembled at Rathkeale on 10 March 1580, and 
divided into two armies of more than 500 men each. Marching westward along 
parallel tracks through Connello and into Kerry, the armies sparred only those 
lucky few that submitted ahead of the army, everything else was put to the 
sword or burnt.633 Pelham reported that his men had ‘marched all day without 
offence of the enemy, wasting and spoiling to the foot of the mountains of 
Sleulougher.’ The Irish fled before the army and attempted to take refuge in the 
mountains. A detachment was then sent into the mountains after them, and 
upon their discovery ‘the fury of the soldiers’ left more than 400 massacred.634 
Irish chroniclers record the expedition’s terror: ‘[Pelham] sent forth loose 
                                         
630 MacCarthy, The life and letters of Florence MacCarthy Reagh, pp. 252-3. 
631 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 271. 
632 Churchyard, A generall rehearsall of warres, sig. Qiv. 
633 CSPI (1574-1585), p. 213. 
634 Cal. Carew (1575-1588), p. 236. 
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marauding parties ... wheresoever they passed, shewed mercy neither to the 
strong nor the weak. It was not wonderful that they should kill men fit for 
action, but they killed blind and feeble men, women, boys, and girls, sick 
persons, idiots, and old people.’635 The deaths were not without a purpose. 
Terror brought about the submissions of the Thomas Fitzmaurice, baron of 
Lixnaw and Kerry, Donough MacCormack, and several other leaders along with 
their bands. The laws of war, Gentili argued, permitted armies to destroy farms 
and attack farmers when they aided the enemy: ‘[t]o aid the enemy with 
supplies is to be guilty of treason.’636 Attacks on farming and infrastructure were 
to be limited to only those targets of military necessity in regular wars, but the 
tactic of devastation was deemed an essential counter insurgency tactic. English 
commanders used devastations extensively against rebellious communities.637 
The basic rule of warfare also held true in counterinsurgency operations: ‘the 
usages of war may always be conformed to the character of the enemy’.638 Thus, 
an enemy, or rebel, that attacks farms and farmers or farmers that provide 
material support to the enemy, or rebels, were deemed legitimate targets for 
English military force. 
                                         
635 Four Masters, v, p. 1731. 
636 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 267. 
637 Vincent Carey, ‘“What pen can paint or tears atone?”: Mountjoy’s scorched earth campaign’, 
in The battle of Kinsale, ed., H. Morgan (Bray: Wordwell, 2004), pp. 205-216; S.J. Connolly, 
Contested island: Ireland 1460-1630 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 267-268.  
638 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 275. 
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The Irish had a similar tradition of economic warfare that David Edwards 
described as ‘war by incursion’.639 In Ireland the practice was to use mounted 
columns or mobile light infantry to capture enemy livestock, destroy stock piles 
of corn, pillage tenants, and burn villages, all while avoiding pitched 
engagements (figure 27.). It was not uncommon for belligerents (English and 
Irish) in these types of attacks to specifically target non-combatants, which in 
regular warfare was discouraged. More to the point, the English strategy had the 
veil of legitimacy, since Europeans accepted a monarch’s right to make punitive 
incursions against rebellious peasantry. The Irish practice, on the other hand, 
from a sixteenth-century legal perspective looked like brigandage: the chief 
criminal action attributed to rebels. Furthermore, Irish economic raiding was an 
accepted form of compensation for military service in lieu of cash payments. A 
practice not to dissimilar to the compensation that martial law provided to 
Elizabethan soldiers. 
Fitzmaurice’s rebellion of 1569-1573 began with one such devastation. 
Rebels under the command of James Fitzmaurice sacked the English colony at 
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Figure 26. A group of rebel Irishmen burn a community in Ireland and capture their cattle during 
devastation operations. 
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Kerrycurrihy ‘and after spoiling and gathering an infinite number of ... cattle, to 
the utter undoing of all her majesty’s subjects’, they captured and sacked St 
Ledger’s Castle of Carrigaline.640 With the plantation at Kerrycurrihy destroyed, 
and its inhabitants killed or scattered into the countryside, Fitzmaurice was left 
unchecked by the crown and able to lead his army north to the gates of Cork and 
besiege the crown’s principal town in Munster. Fitzmaurice’s Butler allies, the 
brothers of the loyalist Earl of Ormond – Edward, Piers, and Edmund – led a rebel 
army from Cork to devastate Waterford and Idrone.641 
The Butlers burned the lands along their own expedition’s route. Edmund 
Butler captured an Englishman named Robert Mannering and led him about the 
country side with a noose tied around his neck and to the terror of witnesses.642 
The rebels further terrorised the countryside when they captured some English 
colonists, and stripped them naked – men and women - and then drove them 
‘tormented’ and ‘with cruel pains’ into the town of Waterford. The terror and 
devastation culminated with an attack on the Enniscorthy annual Lady Day Fair, 
where the soldiers of Fitzmaurice and the Butlers slaughtered Anglo-Irish 
merchants and raped the ‘young maidens and wifes before their parents and 
husbands faces’.643 These targets had no strategic purpose other than to 
highlight the queen’s inability to protect her subjects. 
 
Siege warfare against rebels 
During the Desmond revolts, many rebels continued to occupy their 
fortified houses and castles against the crown. English theatre commanders 
determined that these fortifications were strategically important and could be 
used to control the lands around them and thus extending the crown’s supply 
lines into rebel held territory. When Fitzmaurice led the Desmond earldom 
against the English crown in late June 1569, Lord Deputy Sidney organised a 
                                         
640 CSPI (1509-1573), p. 409; HMC Salisbury, i, p. 413. 
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counter attack against Fitzmaurice’s ally Edmund Fitzgibbon, the White Knight. 
In August 1569, Sidney with a small force attacked the White Knight’s lands.644 
Before the Old Castle, Sidney ordered his trumpeter to summon its ward. 
He then asked the ward to submit to the queen’s authority and surrender the 
castle to him.645 The rebel commander denied Sidney’s command by stating 
‘they helde that castle of none but God, James Fitzmaurice, and the White 
Knight; and unless one of them would come [and order them] they would never 
render it.’646 The ward’s response was striking since in his declaration he asserts 
his lawful commission and under whose authority he held the fortress, but he 
also rejected the authority of the queen’s agent to exercise authority to 
command him, ostensibly on religious grounds. The dialogue between the 
besieged and besieger here was nevertheless very conventional. 
Officers commanding fortifications and towns as a matter of etiquette 
were all but required to reject the first call to surrender in regular warfare, and 
the ward of Old Castle obeyed this convention. There is little doubt that Sidney 
would have expected as much, and he ordered his troops to actively besiege the 
castle: ‘I went, and encamped verey nere it, and planted such artillery as I had 
... to it. ...the next morning the artillery kept up such play at the battlements 
... and my small shott at their lopes and windows’. The rebel defenders made a 
good fight and repelled the first assault made by the English. Believing that the 
defenders knew well the truth of his intention and ability to take the castle by 
assault, Sidney again offered them his terms of surrender. He would allow them 
to yield it and then to safely depart it; however, the ward again declined. The 
following morning, the English made another assault and succeeded in taking it. 
Capture of a castle by assault permitted the victor to slaughter, and the Sidney’s 
                                         
644 Edmund Curtis, ‘Extracts out of herald’s books in Trinity College, Dublin, Relating to Ireland 
in the 16th century’, The journal of the royal society of antiquaries of Ireland, seventh series, 
vol. 2 (1932), pp. 28-49, 37-8; Sir Henry Sidney, ‘Sir Henry Sidney’s memoir of his government 
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is calendared in Cal. Carew (1575-1588), pp. 334-360; Ciaran Brady, ed., A viceroy’s 
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Press, 2002)., 349 
645 Sidney, ‘Sir Henry Sidney’s memoir of his government of Ireland. 1583’, pp. 349 
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189 
Chapter 5. ‘War upon the rebel’ 
 
troops ‘left nothing alyve in it’.647 Vignettes like this were acted out with 
regularity in the Irish theatre. 
On 28 March 1580, during the second Desmond revolt (1579-1584), Lord 
Justice Pelham ordered cannons emplaced to batter the Earl of Desmond’s 
Carrigafoyle Castle. There was a rather significant garrison holding it for the earl 
of Desmond; the garrison was commanded by Captain Julian, an Italian, 16 
Spanish soldiers, and 50 others, including an Englishman. The crown forces, once 
they were joined by the earl of Ormond would have been near to 1,000 men, and 
given their recent devastation of Connello through to Kerry and up to the mouth 
of the Shannon River, the crown’s captains were not in a compromising mood. 
Ormond’s lands in Tralee were burnt and ravaged by the rebels.648 Nevertheless, 
Pelham still dispatched a messenger to present his terms of surrender to Captain 
Julian. The defenders in familiar style rejected his first call for their surrender, 
but ended any chance for mercy, when they ‘railed against her Majesty, and 
declared that they kept the castle for the King of Spain.’ These insults 
galvanised the English officers’ will to fight, and ‘every man had a desire to 
salute the Spaniards.’ After two days of battering the castle’s walls were 
breached and ready for assault. No second offer to surrender would be sent, and 
Captain Humphrey Mackworth led the assault. 
Several Irishmen and the Englishman tried to escape by swimming the 
Shannon to freedom, but they were shot dead in the water. Ten of the Spaniards 
made a desperate charge against the English assault team, but they too were cut 
down. The assault had as much secured the castle’s ground floor, when Captain 
Julian with a guard of six Spanish soldiers signalled their surrender and were 
taken into custody with several women. Pelham immediately ordered their 
execution saving Julian who was to be examined (i.e. tortured) for intelligence, 
but afterwards he too was executed by hanging.649 Further down the Shannon 
River there were another pair of Desmond castles (Askeaton and Balliloghan) 
that Pelham brought under his control. 
                                         
647 Sidney, ‘Sir Henry Sidney’s memoir of his government of Ireland. 1583’, p. 349. 
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649 Ibid., p. 241. 
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News of the Lord Justice’s cannons and the bloody end of Carrigafoyle’s 
rebel garrison caused the garrisons at Askeaton and Balliloghan to rethink their 
tactical disposition. The rebels decided that it would be more useful to raze 
their fortress and take to the field, so they attempted to burn or blow-up the 
castles at Askeaton and Balliloghan. Pelham interpreted the abandonment and 
attempted destruction of the castles as a victory, which he in turn used to 
justify his methods: in a letter to the queen, he proclaimed that the rebels had 
run away ‘fearing the example of the execution of Carrigafoyle’.650 These were, 
however, not necessarily English victories but grasping attempts to insult the 
English army since the Irish waited to destroy the forts in full view of the 
Pelham’s army. The act displayed the rebels’ continuing resolution to continue 
fighting for at least another day but upon better ground of their choosing rather 
than in a defensive action that favoured the crown. Pelham’s perhaps excessive 
use of force unintentionally prolonged the conflict by causing the rebels to cease 
defending fortifications in favour of ‘woods and mountains, which, as they were 
proper places for outlaws and thieves’ and these became ‘their natural 
fortifications and castles’.651 
Humphrey Gilbert in Munster 1569 waged the most notorious campaign 
against Irish rebels, and ‘[w]ith only 500 troops in the field Gilbert subdued a 
force perhaps eight times larger in six weeks.’652 His success was purchased 
through the strategic use of terror causing him to be labelled by one modern 
historian as an ‘Elizabethan terrorist’.653 Placed in its English historical context, 
it was a triumph that earned him a knighthood, and Hooker sang his praises: 
‘[Gilbert] in short time broke the hearts, and appalled the courages of all the 
rebels in Munster ... for all yéeld vnto him’.654 Nevertheless, the analysis of 
Gilbert’s campaign tends toward one side focusing on his terrible methods and 
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ignores his limited restraints but both Gilbert’s use of terror and restraint 
require an elaboration of the circumstances that gave rise to them. 
Elizabeth would not permit the pardon of English rebels in the field during 
the Northern Rebellion (1569), but Gilbert offered both rebels in the field and 
within fortifications a chance to submit and receive the Queen’s pardon.655 John 
Ward, Gilbert’s junior officer, described the colonel’s methods of besieging 
rebel strongholds: 
[I]f any castle do not yield unto him upon the first summoning, he 
will not afterward harken to no parley, but win it perforce, how 
many of his soldiers soever it cost him, and put man, woman and 
child to the sword, so that I think they are so well acquainted with 
his conditions as that I think they will not defend the castle against 
him.656 
It was a grievous insult to refuse such mercy extended in the name of the prince 
‘as it ought to bee taken when it is offered and not to be had when it is 
asked.’657 Therefore, Gilbert believed his actions were lawful in exacting terrible 
retribution for such insults. The wholesale slaughter of all life within a 
stronghold was not prohibited among the laws of just warfare, and Gilbert’s 
commission supported his actions which directed him ‘to execute any soldier, or 
any other, within the limits of his commission, excepting all lords and captains 
of countries’.658 It furthermore urged him to bring the maximum amount of 
military force against the common people, but it limited his freedom of action 
against elites the full force of his power. 
Gilbert’s purpose was to compel through terror the submission of rebel 
leaders. Upon entering the unconquered territory of a rebel lord, he would 
devastate the lands, waste and consume all useable resources of corn and 
livestock, and slaughter the lord’s tenants. Non-combatants serving Irish lords in 
rebellion were identified as legitimate counterinsurgent targets.659 English 
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doctrine was uncompromising in its methods which were designed with perverse 
incentives to compel rebel lords and their captains to submit, and ‘verie many 
yeelded without blowes, bloodshed, or losse, either of their partes or his.’660 
Without a doubt Gilbert’s methods were brutal, but his goal was to bring 
about a rapid end to the rebellion not genocide.661 It was Gilbert’s belief, 
learned over the better part of four years of military service in Ireland ‘that no 
conquered nation will ever yield willingly their obedience for love but rather for 
fear.’662 Fear and terror were essential parts of the English regime’s strategy 
against all rebels, and there was a desire amongst the highest leaders to see it 
performed in Ireland. During the suppression of English rebels in the Northern 
Rebellion, Cecil, not yet baron of Burghley, ordered that those hanged for 
rebellion were to be left ‘hanging for terror’ of others, and ‘the bodies were not 
to be removed, but to remain till they fell to pieces where they hanged.’663 
Queen Elizabeth herself desired mass executions of English rebels, and when her 
commanders failed to perform as expected, she reprimanded them.664 Through 
terror and mercy, Gilbert rapidly pacified Munster; his campaign succeeded in 
securing the surrender of more than 25 castles, and at the conclusion of his 
campaign, he returned to the lord deputy bringing with him sundry personages of 
good account, namely McCarthy Mor, the earl of Clanrcare, second most 
powerful chieftain after the earl of Desmond.665 Terror was used as a strategic 
weapon, and the means to an end; however, it was one side of the crown’s 
strategy which was to extend a measure of mercy to the rebels. Were the rebels 
ever able to come to terms with English besiegers as part of the course of 
military operations? 
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Whenever English captains targeted a castle, or other such fortification, 
there was little the rebels could do to resist them and keep them from 
eventually capturing it. Lord Deputy Sidney was not above accepting composition 
with rebels when it suited him. Edmund Butler, while in a rebellious alliance 
with James Fitzmaurice (c.1569), garrisoned a castle in Tipperary. The garrison 
in a pre-emptive strike meant to deprive the English army comfortable billeting, 
burnt the village outside the castle gates. These overt anti-government actions 
were a challenge to Sidney’s authority. Sidney’s first action was to organise his 
forces and besiege the castle. Seeing the crown troops preparing to assault, the 
rebel’s captain signalled that they were willing to surrender upon terms, and a 
composition was soon made between the rebels and crown. The castle was then 
surrendered and an allied captain appointed to keep it. The rebel defenders, we 
are left to conclude, by the use of the term ‘composition’, were permitted to 
depart with at least their lives if not also their weapons and baggage.666 
The lord president of Munster and Gilbert’s successor, John Perrot 
struggled to take Castle Maine from the rebels’ grip. Perrot first attempted it 
over the summer of 1571, but the siege had to be abandoned after the supply of 
powder was exhausted.667 Not to be long detoured, he returned in the summer 
of 1572 determined to capture Castle Maine. The castle would be his by 
conquest or composition. The president was determined to see justice served 
and had gallows erected and prominently depicted on his siege map (figure 
28).668 Castle Maine was skilfully defended, and Perrot could not overcome them 
by force of arms. It was his siege that eventually compelled the rebels to seek 
terms. A starving rebel captain signalled Perrot, and the two of them set the 
terms of composition.669 Irish annals confirm the crown’s composition with the 
rebels: ‘[t]his whole army continued besieging the castle for the space of three 
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months, and finally took it through want of provisions, not at all for want of 
defence’.670 Perhaps Perrot’s willingness to set terms was additionally motivated 
by a political need to draw his Irish allies closer, which indicates English 
commanders retained the ability to adjust the crown’s policy against rebels 
when the need arose. 
Perrot disliked fighting irregular warfare. The President’s strategy in 
Munster endeavoured to bring the rebels into a pitched battle, but Fitzmaurice 
used all his guile to avoid a direct confrontation with the crown.671 If Perrot 
could have had his way, he would have settled the matter between the crown 
and Fitzmaurice by a duel. Frustrated by his inability to bring about a battle 
with the rebels, Perrot challenged Fitzmaurice to a duel in November of 1571. 
Ever the fox, Fitzmaurice toyed with Perrot by issuing ever changing demands. 
By first requesting to duel him in the Irish, rather than the English, style, and 
then, Fitzmaurice demanded a set piece judicial combat and went so far as to 
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Figure 27. The siege map from Perrot’s second and successful siege of Castle Maine. The 
gallows were erected prominently in the Lord President’s camp, within full view of the castle 
and its rebel garrison. 
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outline the forces that each would bring to the challenge. Ormond saw only the 
potential for duplicity, and in an alarmed letter to Lord Justice William 
Fitzwilliam, he exclaimed that Perrot’s challenge had brought him to his wit’s 
end.672 Nothing came from the challenge but proof of Fitzmaurice’s deviousness, 
which asks, how did the rebels conduct themselves when holding towns? 
Early in 1570, Fitzmaurice captured Kilmallock, an important staging point 
for the English crown, and before the rebellion politically aligned with the 
Desmond earldom; however, with the rising of Fitzmaurice’s rebellion (1569-
1573), Kilmallock attempted to navigate a path between the two sides. 
Fitzmaurice’s rebels surprised the inhabitants in a pre-dawn assault, and was 
likely supported by confederates in the town.673 The assault began with the 
rebels overcoming the town’s walls, but rather than running amok and 
slaughtering the inhabitants’ pell-mell, Fitzmaurice kept tight control over his 
men limiting the blood-shed. He had the mayor and a few key officials executed 
in the market square.674 After the executions, the rebels thoroughly sacked 
Kilmallock capturing a great deal of booty that secured for the time the service 
of Fitzmaurice’s mercenaries.675 Kilmallock needed to be kept out of the hands 
of the English, and the rebels drove the citizens out, its walls were broken, and 
the buildings put to the torch.676 
The hanged officials were left hanging as a warning to future 
collaborators, and Sir John Perrot, recently sworn-in as lord president of 
Munster, arrived to take possession of Kilmallock’s burnt and spoiled remains. He 
issued a proclamation commanding its citizens to return to their homes. Despite 
the English officials’ charges of treason, the inhabitants were granted royal 
pardon. Perrot thought more needed to be done to reassert the crown’s 
influence over the town and asked the queen for £200 for their relief.677 The 
rebels had not left the area entirely, and after a rebel raid that spoiled homes 
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673 CSPI (1509-1573), p. 439; Mainchín Seoighe, The story of Kilmallock, 2nd edition (Cork: 
Kilmallock Historical Society, 2012), p. 62. 
674 Perrot, The history of that most eminent statesman Sir John Perrot, p. 50. 
675 Four Masters, v, p. 1653. 
676 Ibid. 
677 Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, ii, p. 184. 
196 
Chapter 5. ‘War upon the rebel’ 
 
near the town, Perrot acted to make a symbolic demonstration of royal 
authority. He met the rebels with a cavalry troop near a bog. The order was 
given for the men to make a head-long charge against rebels on foot with their 
horsemen’s staves as pikes. The troop killed fifty rebels in the bog, and Perrot 
brought their heads, presumably on the point of a sword, back to Kilmallock 
where their heads were displayed in the same market square that Fitzmaurice 
had left the executed officials.678 Fitzmaurice’s crusade often singled out 
royalists and Englishmen for exemplary punishment. 
Nevertheless, the arch-traitor had a code which he followed in sieges, and 
nor was he wholly ignorant of the laws of war. Following Fitzmaurice’s death, 
Churchyard remembered him recalling that he ‘was thought wise, valiaunt, 
strong, learned, experimented in Marshall affairs’.679 Kilmallock had been 
threatened before, in July 1569 Fitzmaurice threatened the Kilmallock with 
destruction if they did not meet his terms, which required the mayor to swear 
an oath permitting only Catholic services and to provide him and his men with 
victuals when they required it, which they accepted.680 Fitzmaurice captured 
and sacked Carricklyne castle, and the small garrison holding Tracton Abbey-
Castle was either put to the sword during the assault or executed shortly after it 
was taken.681 
Fitzmaurice failed to capture Cork in June 1569, but during the attempt, 
he offered terms to the mayor that won him no credibility from English military 
officers nor did he appear as an unstained just combatant. Richard Grenville, 
the Sheriff of Cork, and Warham St Leger had left their wives in Ireland to 
advocate in England for an increased English intervention; however, the rebels’ 
devastation of the plantation of Kerrycurrihy sent Lady Ursula running for 
sanctuary behind Cork’s walls. With a powerful force of 2,000 men, Fitzmaurice 
set his troops into siege positions outside of the city, and demanded that the 
mayor surrender Lady St Leger and Grenville’s wife, along ‘with the rest of the 
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English’, and the town’s prisoners.682 Foremost among Fitzmaurice’s demands 
was the expulsion of all heretics and the restoration of Catholic religious 
practices.683 
Yet, not every rebel was so consumed with the doctrine of crusade and 
holy war. The earl of Desmond did not profess so devout an adherence to the 
crusader ethic that marked Fitzmaurice’s leadership; instead he appeared more 
focused upon the survival of his house.684 Desmond held a long-standing 
grievance with the earl of Ormond over the lucrative royal wine monopoly 
imported through Youghal. Perhaps this drew Desmond’s ire so that when he 
planned the course of his rebellion, he targeted Youghal where he personally 
defaced the queen’s arms.685 Under a feigned royal allegiance, he approached 
with his army and encamped near the town in November 1579.686 In secret 
Desmond’s agents found confederates inside Youghal, and his men scaled the 
walls in a surprise attack that captured the town. The rebels’ victory culminated 
in a desperate sacking, and Youghal’s walls were broken at key points and many 
houses were torched (figure 29.).687 
Ormond viewed the sacking of Youghal as a personal affront, and took a 
interest reasserting the crown’s authority there. During his journey to Youghal, 
Ormond took into custody the mayor, Patrick Coppinger, and after an official 
inquiry, Ormond found Coppinger culpable for the loss. The evidence against him 
stated that previously he had given assurance to the crown that he, with only 
the town’s guard, could hold the town ‘against all men’ and subsequently 
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refused an English garrison.688 Worse still, it was discovered that Coppinger held 
conference with the rebels and certain citizens, and it looked as if he had allied 
with the rebels.689 Ormond with Chief Justice Walshe arrived on 26 January 1580 
to an abandoned Youghal. There were no inhabitants fit for public execution 
other than Coppinger, and he was left hanging outside his own home.690 An 
English garrison remained when Ormond and Walshe departed to repair its 
broken defences and hold it for the crown’s use in future operations against the 
rebels. 
The royalist officers were mostly inclined to offer mercy when rebels 
occupied fortifications or towns. Crown captains could justify mercy in this 
situation in military terms. By making a composition with a difficult garrison, 
officers bought with their mercy the fortifications that would have been 
otherwise bought with blood, and these extended their operational ability. 
Terror at the destruction of rebel garrisons was always desirable but such bloody 
displays ultimately prolonged the conflict, and convinced rebels of the futility of 
holding fortifications against the crown troops. The rebels on the other hand, 
held conflicting ideas about extending mercy to the crown troops or to the 
various citizens in Ireland. Rebel captains showed an awareness that their cause 
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Figure 28. The town of Youghal (c.1600). Note its extensive walls. 
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was an event with an external audience, just as the earl of Essex attested to, 
and they tailored their actions for that audience. 
Fitzmaurice held the crusaders zeal for destroying heresy. Mercy for him 
was to be extended to those that were willing to return to the Catholic faith. 
The heretical English and their allies were not to be forgiven. The rebels always 
had to consider the means to pay necessary to maintain their private mercenary 
armies; therefore, mercy might be coloured with the crusading ideals, but their 
base purpose was also to finance the cause by sacking their enemies. 
 
Prisoners and captives in counterinsurgency operations 
Officers and soldiers in counterinsurgency operations faced moral tensions 
that were not present in conventional military operations. Comrades died in 
war, this was the reality, and soldiers at all levels understood it or ceased 
following the drum. No soldier ever actively seeks out his own death; however, 
contemporaries believed death in a just war held certain honours. The 
Elizabethan officer corps had an additional purpose other than administration. 
Their secondary purpose was to serve as examples to their men and to inspire 
courage among them, which meant that officers often made up a higher 
proportion of the casualties.691 There was no shame in their deaths. In fact, their 
deaths became a testament of both their individual and collective honour; 
however, the crown’s peace keeping mission in Ireland did not hold the same 
honours. 
There were few honours to be won in fighting against rebels. Rebels were 
criminals not enemies, which meant royalist soldiers, killed in action, did not die 
honourably but were murdered. Therefore, soldiers that died in action became a 
clarion call for vengeance, which further suppressed martial restraint in actions 
against rebels. The two moral positions were identifiable in contemporary 
popular culture. Shakespeare’s Henry V celebrated the soldiers’ death in just 
war. In Pistol’s exhortation amidst the chaos of battle, he cries out: 
Knocks go and come; God’s vassals drop and die; 
And sword and shield, 
In blood field, 
                                         
691 Manning, An apprenticeship in arms, p. 7. Carlton, This seat of Mars, p. 95. 
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Doth win immortal fame.692 
Just as the Bard’s The tragedy of Julius Caesar pivots on treason’s call for 
vengeance: 
Woe to the hand that shed this costly blood! 
Over thy wounds now do I prophesy, 
... A curse shall light upon the limbs of men; 
Domestic fury and fierce civil strife 
... Blood and destruction shall be so in use 
And dreadful objects so familiar, 
That mothers shall but smile when they behold 
Their Infants quartered with the hands of war 
All pity choked with custom of fell deeds.693 
In this manner, Sir Philip Sidney’s death was immortalised at the battle of 
Zutphen 1586, and Sir Peter Carew’s execution at Glenmalure became a 
motivation for murder. 
 In full view of the English army, Peter Carew had been taken prisoner and 
then executed. The murder scarred his brother George Carew, and reflecting 
upon his experience against the rebels in Ireland, George wrote to Walsingham 
in November 1580: ‘[t]he loss that I have sustained by this wicked nation is too 
grievous to remember, if hope of revenge did not breed me comfort.’694 George 
believed he had honoured his brother by killing his murderer; however, while at 
Dublin during the summer of 1583, rumours reached George that Owen O’Nasye 
was publicly boasting that he had a hand in the death of Peter, whether true or 
not did not matter to George. 
O’Nasye, and his partner Brian Cavenaughe, may have been rebels at an 
earlier date, but like many of their countrymen, their allegiance was fluid. At 
this moment, they found it profitable to serve the Irish Council at Dublin, an 
epicentre of Elizabethan government in Ireland. The two mercenaries had 
captured Walter Eustace, brother of the rebel Viscount of Baltinglas, and 
returned him as a prisoner for an English bounty. Indigenous agents were 
difficult for the English regime to acquire which complicated matters for 
                                         
692 William Shakespeare, The life of King Henry the fifth in The complete works of Shakespeare, 
ed., D. Bevington, 6th ed. (New York: Pearson Education, 2009), act 3, scene 2, lines 7-10. 
693 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar in The complete works of Shakespeare, act 3, scene 1, lines 260-
271. 
694 Cal. Carew (1515-1574), p. xiv. 
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George. Finding O’Nasye ‘in the street of Dublin’ and in full public view, George 
grabbed the man and demanded his name, ‘immediately upon the naming of it, 
thrust his dagger into his bosom, and presently one of his men shot him in with a 
pistol and two bullets, and gave him many wounds, whereof he presently 
died.’695 George’s sole motivation was vengeance, since Cavenaughe was not 
harmed, but was left alive to stand witness to his friend’s murder. After the 
killing, George left Dublin before authorities could take him into custody. 
The murder of O’Nasye illustrates two salient points relative to prisoners 
and captives in the Irish conflict. The first, the incident provides compelling 
evidence of the vengeful mind-set of both the crown’s soldiers and the rebels, 
and highlights the difficulties present in restraining the crown’s men of war. The 
second, the English government of Ireland attempted to bring George Carew to 
justice, even if it came to nothing, which shows that the administration had a 
policy on the use of violence, where and when it was acceptable.696 Violence 
had to be state sanctioned. 
The experience of English fighting men in Ireland did not lend itself to the 
restraint necessary for the taking of prisoners. Prisoners might be worth as much 
dead as alive with the latter being more desirable. Had the rebels believed and 
acted as if they fought a just war, there is the possibility that mercy could have 
become more useful to both the leaders of the English army in Ireland and the 
rebels. The English experiences proved contrary since on those rare occasions 
the rebels did take prisoners, their conduct only served to confirm English 
prejudices. 
September 1577, Munster was largely quiet, yet in Leinster Rory Oge 
O’More fought a minor rebellion. Henry Sidney, appointed his nephew Henry 
Harrington to the lieutenancy of King’s County, and gave him orders to suppress 
O’More. Harrington had some limited success and O’More sent him a message 
                                         
695 CSPI (1574-1585), p. 454 (calendared); Cal. Carew (1515-1574), pp. xvii-xviii (transcribed). 
696 John Hill was with George Carew when he murdered O’Nasye, but he did not depart with 
George from Dublin. Hill pled ignorance of George’s intentions, but he was imprisoned in 
Dublin Castle. See the Council of Ireland’s report to the Privy Council in Cal. Carew (1515-
1574), pp. xvii-xviii. Walsingham wrote to Burghley greatly displeased at Carew’s conduct: ‘I 
am verie sorrie for this act, and, though I love the gentleman well, yet do I wishe some 
exemplarie punishment done on him for this fact.’ Thomas Wright, Queen Elizabeth and her 
times, 2 vols. (London: Henry Coburn, 1838), ii, p. 203. 
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that he was willing to parley for a truce. O’More used the parley as a cover to 
capture Harrington and those others attending him. Once O’More’s custody the 
English prisoners were not treated according to the laws of war. Sidney claimed 
Harrington was treated ‘like a slave’, or in Hooker’s words: O’More had his 
prisoners ‘handfasted togither ... and carried as his water spaniels’, evoking an 
image of Mannering’s imprisonment, led about as he was by Edward Butler with 
a noose tied about his neck (figure 25.).697 
Sidney professed affection for Harrington that equalled the love he held 
for his own son Philip. Motivated to secure Harrington’s release, Sidney sent 
O’More enquiries seeking his ‘enlargment’; however, ‘nothing prevailed without 
such conditions as I would not have enlarged Philip my own son.’698 The matter 
had begun as a matter of law enforcement but had, since Harrington’s 
mistreatment, became a matter of blood, honour, and vengeance. Sidney 
acquired intelligence as to where O’More made his winter home, and ordered 
Robert Hartpole with a company to rescue Harrington. The noisy approach of the 
soldiers alerted O’More, and in the cabin’s darkness, he attempted to fulfil his 
threat to kill the prisoners. With Harrington’s sword in hand, O’More ‘gave 
[Harrington] in a moment dyvers Woundes, though none deadlye or Mayme vnto 
hym, save onely the Losse of his little Finger on the left Hande.’699 The cabin 
                                         
697 Vincent P. Carey, ‘John Derricke’s “Image of Irelande”, Sir Henry Sidney, and the massacre at 
Mullaghmast, 1578’, Irish historical studies 31 (1999), pp. 305-327, 318; Sidney’s commentary 
has been left out of the 19th century edited version of his memoirs; MSS TNA SP 12/159/1: Sir 
Henry Sidney, ‘Narrative ... to Sir Francis Walsingham’, 1 Mar. 1583; for printed versions: Sir 
Henry Sidney, ‘Sir Henry Sidney’s memoir of his government of Ireland. 1583’, Ulster journal 
of archaeology first series 3 (1855), pp. 33-44, 85-90, 336-57; 5 (1857), pp. 299-315; 8 (1860), 
pp. 179-95; another version of the narrative is calendared in Cal. Carew (1575-1588), pp. 334-
360; Ciaran Brady, ed., A viceroy’s vindication? Sir Henry Sidney’s memoir of service in 
Ireland, 1556-1578 (Cork: Cork University Press, 2002). Irish chronicle, p. 396. It may have 
been the practice in Ireland to lead prisoners via a halter: refer to fig. 24. Also consider that 
the Spaniards’ prepared halters to be used on English ‘volunteers’, described in p. 107. 
698 Cal. Carew (1575-1588), p. 355. 
699 Collins, Letters and memorials of state, i, pp. 230 (Sidney’s report to the Privy Council); 
Sidney recalled a much more terrifying version of Harrington’s beating in his memoirs: ‘the 
villainous rebel fell upon my dear nephew, being tied in chains, and most shamefully hacked 
and hewed with my nephew’s own sword, to the effusion of such quantity of blood as were 
incredible to be told. He brake his arm with that blunt sword and cut off his little finger of 
one of his hands, and in sundry parts of his head so wounding him, as I myself in his dressing 
did see his brains moving.’ Cal Carew (1575-1588), p. 356; Sidney, ‘Memoir of his 
government’, 8 (1860), p. 186. Henry Harrington’s imprisonment and abuse became part of 
the English lore that surrounded Rory Og O’More’s legacy as an inveterate wood kern and 
rebel, and the story quickly spread among the both the English and Irish soldiery; George 
Carew, John Derricke, as well as William Camden would recall the story forever painting the 
Irish, and in particular the Gaelic Irish, rebels as the most treacherous opponents. 
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was no easy target. The rebels had 26 picked men inside in addition to O’More, 
his marshal (Shane MacRorye Reogh), Cormac O’Connor, and the wives of O’More 
and his marshal. The soldiers held the initiative and slaughtered everyone inside 
and took the marshal’s wife prisoner. O’More and Reogh managed to escape. The 
crown finally killed O’More and the remains of his army at Mullaghmast (1578), 
ironically in a reciprocal false parley. 
Sidney assigned the destruction of the O’Mores and the Leinster rebels to 
Francis Cosby, and in the furtherance of that mission, Cosby was granted the 
authority of martial law. Royal commissions in Ireland often contained important 
directions for their recipients, and Cosby’s directed him ‘to follow and attack 
with fire and sword Rory oge, the O’Conors, and their company, and all other 
traitors and rebels in any place where they may be found’.700 Thus, Cosby’s 
charge required him to make unrestrained war upon the rebels. Military 
counterinsurgency operations offered almost no room for the taking of prisoners, 
and it was the practice among the crown’s officers to refuse quarter to rebels in 
the field, and exceptional circumstances were necessary for them to make 
compositions with rebel held fortifications. All these factors contributed to a 
combat environment which further limited the taking of prisoners in military 
operations. 
The Irish conflicts produced a complex legal environment regarding 
prisoners that was governed by an ad hoc mixture of domestic and martial law, 
and the conventions more reflected the legal doctrines used in the Northern 
Rebellion than the customs of just war. English soldiers serving in Ireland 
thought that the rebel combatants were not their social equals, and very few 
captains accepted ransoms in exchange for the rebels held in their custody. Nor 
would the more unscrupulous captains permit such activities to be documented. 
Nicholas Malby turned down more than one great ransom. Instead he held the 
perpetrators for trial and placed the crown’s justice over the possible profits 
from ransom, but at the same time, the crown’s justice brought in its own 
profits.701 Ransoms traditionally supplemented a soldiers’ income; however, 
                                         
700 Francis Cosbie commission of martial law is calendared in: ‘Calendar of Fiants of reign of 
Queen Elizabeth’, The report of the deputy keeper of the public records in Ireland, vol. 11-
13 (Dublin: Alexander Thom, 1879), p. 25, #2997. 
701 Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, iii, p. 93: Malby refused a £1,000 ransom for William Burk, 
the son of the earl of Clanricard, and another £1,000 for Turlogh O’Brien; CSPI (1574-1585), 
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captains holding commissions of martial law had alternative extortions available 
to them. 
The constable of Carlow (1567-1594), Robert Harpoole held Carlow, and 
its neighbouring lands, for the crown while ‘remunerating themselves 
handsomely.’702 Prisoners in the Irish conflict as in the Northern Rebellion 
divided-up according to social status.703 The division depended upon a captive’s 
inheritance. In Ireland execution under martial law was commonly limited to 
‘persons not having 20s. of hereditaments’.704 Criminals possessing such wealth 
were to be tried by a jury.705 Sundry convicted prisoners were compelled to 
purchase pardons, while others without the means to do so were executed.706 
Rebels convicted under martial law had their property seized with two-thirds to 
the crown and remaining third to the commissioner. Thus, there were profits to 
be had in the suppression of rebels and the loss of ransoms resulted in no great 
loss to profits. 
Nevertheless, royalist soldiers took some selected rebels prisoner. In an 
attempted to keep Irish nobles from rebellion, their relations were surrendered 
and held as political hostages to ensure the compliance of their family members; 
however, the Irish were appeared on serious occasions quick to sacrifice their 
relations when their needs dictated it. Desmond and Clanricare hostages did not 
prevent their rebellions. Although hostages were not prisoners of war, the 
manner of their custody more resembled it than it did not. Hostages, according 
to Gentili, were ‘those who are given to a sovereign or to the leader of an army 
for the purpose of binding the public faith’.707 A sergeant major, suppressing 
rebels in Leinster during the last year of Fitzmaurice’s rebellion, wrote to 
                                         
pp. 308, 320 (Burghley’s approval); Four Masters, v, p. 1753 (Irish perception of their 
execution). Ransoming combatants might have been frowned upon but that does not mean 
exchanges were not made; however, their documentation was rare: CSPI (1509-1573), p. 485 
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702 Rapple, Martial power and Elizabethan political culture, p. 221-2. 
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officials that he had taken the sister of Simon McDavid prisoner, and ‘whom if 
she do not stand me in steed I meane to execute.’708 Their lives were human 
insurance of obedience, if faith was broken, they were exposed to the danger of 
execution as punishment for their relation’s rebellion. 
Just as submissions were acted out as high political theatre designed to 
amplify the power of the state, so were executions used to bolster the 
appearance of sovereign authority. When so-called ‘arch-traitors’ – i.e. the 
principal military leaders of rebellion – were captured alive, their subsequent 
trial and execution provided the prince with powerful examples of law and 
order. Leading rebels were publicly executed and their bodies openly displayed. 
Even their corpses could fulfil this role and both John of Desmond and the earl 
of Desmond’s bodies were displayed for this purpose. But how much more 
powerful was the example of Desmond’s brother James? 
During the summer of 1580, James’s company raided livestock in 
Muskerry, county of Cork. A sheriff of Cork was a Gaelic Irishman, Cormac 
MacTiege, who roused a response force from his tenants, and they encountered 
James. The crown troops surprised the rebels and fought them at close quarters. 
James’s rebels were overwhelmed, while his men attempted to surrender, their 
pleas were disregarded and the men were put to the sword. In the melee, James 
was wounded then bound and dumped in some bushes. After MacTiege’s 
company finished their slaughter, James was recovered and taken to as a 
prisoner to Cork.709 Speedily James was brought before a tribual, tried and 
convicted. ‘[U]pon judgment [James was] drawen, hanged and quartered: and 
his bodie being quartered, it was together with the head set on the town 
gates’.710 
Even the prisoners of the lower social classes were taken up as the 
crown’s companies, sheriffs, and seneschals swept over the countryside for one 
crime or another and dumped en masse into jails of key walled towns. Once 
there these rebels would have their cases reviewed by justices of the peace or 
commissioners of martial law and a judgement rendered upon them from this 
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206 
Chapter 5. ‘War upon the rebel’ 
 
evidence. Nicholas White recorded the lord deputy’s circuit of Leinster ‘took 181 
prisoners, 48 were executed by trial, two principal gentlemen of the Kavanaghs 
who were attained.’711 And the earl of Ormond delivered to the jail of Kilkenny 
164 malefactors for execution.712 Local sessions allowed the administrators of 
justice to issue punishments ranging from fines to execution. 
The last group only slightly qualifies as a prisoner; these were generally 
military officers and administrators captured during military operations, but 
they were dead men walking and were kept alive to be tortured for intelligence 
and afterwards executed. The last sort of prisoners were namely rebel officers 
and administrators; these men were captured during military operations. They 
were held for interrogation and on the chance that captains might wrest from 
them actionable intelligence. These captive rebels were suffered to live and did 
so at the whim of their captors. Pelham used the Italian Captain Julian, captured 
at the siege of Carrigafoyle Castle, for this purpose. 
Additionally, papal support for the Desmond rebellion meant that priests 
and mendicant brothers were drawn into military roles. Dr Sanders was a prolific 
recruiter for the rebel cause from 1579-1581. Sanders’s writings provided 
judicial as well as religious grounds for a crusade against the English. Dr Allen 
had been in the front ranks encouraging the kern and gallowglasses to fight at 
Monasternagh (1579). The Kilmallock garrison, while on patrol in August 1580, 
captured James O’Haie, a Franciscan brother. O’Haie confessed to having served 
as Fitzmaurice’s standard bearer. Furthermore, O’Haie gave extensive testimony 
condemning the earl of Desmond as the chief architect of the current 
rebellion.713 
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I justified every kind of cruelty against these most cruel foes. For this 
was so before the victory, with the purpose of gaining it; but we are now 
considering the time when the victory is won. And this is like the 
distinction between torture and punishment’. 714 
—Alberico Gentili 
 
Throughout Elizabeth’s long reign (1558-1603), military conflicts — 
‘underhand’ and ‘secret’ wars, regular just wars, or ‘war[s] against the rebel’ — 
threatened to consume the kingdom. France had reclaimed Calais in 1558 from 
England, and by 1560 soldiers bearing the fleurs-de-lis were lodged in Scotland 
and threatening England’s northern border. European political and military 
alignment was fundamentally changed when Philip II of Spain decided to send a 
powerful army to the Low Countries (1566), and the duke of Alba led the army 
out of Italy marching overland into the provinces of the Low Countries (1568). 
Alba’s orders tasked him with suppressing the growing Protestant rebellion 
there, and this Spanish reorientation would establish an enduring and significant 
Spanish presence in the region. The English viewed the Spanish occupation of the 
Low Countries as an eminent threat. As a Protestant state, England interpreted 
Spanish imperialist aggression in the Low Countries as part of a wider Catholic 
attack on Protestantism and a prelude of invasion. The English feared that once 
Protestantism had been extirpated from the provinces, Catholic Spain would 
turn against the heretics in England. England and its dominions were not free 
from religious strife. Religious tensions in England and Ireland came to a head in 
1569, Catholics in both kingdoms rebelled against Elizabeth’s Protestant 
monarchy. England acted decisively against militant Catholicism in Northern 
England, but in Ireland, Catholicism would become a key element in an 
emergent proto-nationalist ideology which linked loyalty to Ireland with the 
Catholic religion. Irish leaders hoped to use this ideology to unify the fractious 
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ethnicities inhabiting Ireland against English dominion and Protestant heresy. 
The ideology failed to achieve Irish unity but spawned several rebellions 
(Fitzmaurice Rebellion, 1569-1573; Desmond Rebellion, 1579-1584; Tyrone’s 
Rebellion, 1598-1603). Unrest at home did not stop England’s peoples from 
becoming increasingly interested in the continent’s religious conflicts, and 
Elizabeth at times both covertly and openly supported English mercenary 
participation. English ‘volunteers’ would serve in France and the Low Countries 
throughout her reign until 1585 when the queen declared war against Spain. 
With a formal declaration of war, Elizabeth openly intervened and sent royal 
forces to the provinces to fight against Spain. Despite the multiplicity of threats, 
the Dutch and Irish theatres remained top among regime’s concerns and 
demanded ongoing commitment of blood and treasure. England, although spared 
open warfare on the home island, would not have peace in either Ireland (1603) 
or on the continent (1604) until after Elizabeth’s death. 
The ever-present threat of war posed significant challenges to the 
Elizabethan regime. Far weaker than the world-spanning empire of Spain and the 
European powerhouse France, English resources were insufficient to address all 
their threats head-on, but the need to meet them in some fashion served as a 
crucial catalyst that militarised the Elizabethan state.715 The wider strategic 
situation has been well studied, as well as has the technological and financial 
developments occurring at this time; however, the attitudes of the soldiers and 
their officers towards military operations, the English martial culture of honour 
and its customs of restraint, and the permissibility of wars of elimination. This 
thesis has followed up on previous historical surveys of the early modern 
European laws of war by focusing on the perceptions and practices of 
Elizabethan England, and it begins to illuminate a series of complex relationships 
that formed the contextual environment surrounding the state’s conflicts, and 
described their influence on the soldiery’s application of the laws of war or 
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armed conflict. The most important relationships included the monarchy, Church 
of England, and Privy Council’s role in culturally defining conflicts, the 
professional soldiery’s martial customs, attitudes, and expectations in executing 
different military campaigns. This thesis examined these relationships and the 
extent to which these and the laws of war moderated military violence. 
The thesis began by recognising the importance of the sword and the law 
in political discourse and iconography. All Elizabethan men of war would have 
agreed with Lord Deputy Perrot’s guiding principle: ‘[t]he sword and the law he 
made the foundation of his gouernement’.716 Perrot’s arguments have their 
origins in Tudor interpretation of St Paul’s letter to the Romans, which 
Englishmen believed was divine law and God’s mandate granting temporal 
supremacy to secular authorities. ‘The prince by gods ordina[n]ce beareth ye 
sword’, repeated Bilson time and again.717 The magistrate’s sword was an 
important religious, intellectual, and political concept that established and 
defined the temporal authority’s supremacy and fundamental powers: ‘God hath 
giuen them the sworde to maintaine iustice: and if that be refused, to offer 
force both at home and abroade’.718 Thus, God’s gift of the sword to secular 
rulers imbued them, and them alone, with the right to declare war and keep the 
peace within the realm. This idea was fundamental to the Elizabethan world 
view, which all members of their society both knew and understood; it formed 
the core cultural lens through which they interpreted and understood conflict. 
Chapter 2, ‘The legal foundations of the Elizabethan laws of armed conflict’, 
observed how a conflict’s wider political-legal context influenced an individual 
commander’s actions and their appreciation and application of the laws of war. 
The English monarchy’s raison d'être was defence of the realm, the 
church, and the preservation of domestic peace. To these ends, the crown could 
raise armies and lawfully command its military agents to act, if not always in a 
proscribed fashion, then a least in a predictable manner given a specific set of 
external circumstances. The defence of the realm was a problem rightly 
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addressed through the mechanisms contained in a developing body of 
international law and war. The defence of the church was historically 
accomplished through the medieval tradition of holy war and crusade, but 
following the English Reformation, defence of the church became equated with 
the defence of the state, which meant that the Church of England’s defenders 
were either the instruments of regular warfare in the case of external threats or 
the application of domestic law within the kingdom. The Elizabethan political-
legal reframing of holy war was significant. Medieval interpretations of holy war 
could justify rebellion by subjects against their sovereign if Catholic authorities 
vouchsafed it. In contrast, Elizabethans argued to take up arms against one’s 
lawful sovereign for any reason threatened God’s divine ordering of society. The 
divine hierarchy was unassailable, and the chronicler John Hooker summarized 
the state’s position: 
[I]n a commonwealth, when euerie subiect is dutifull to his prince, 
obedient to his magistrate, and liueth according to his vocation and 
calling, the same prospereth and flourisheth; but let the wicked be 
left at libertie, and vnpunished, the whole state is disturbed, & the 
commonwealth ... in perill and danger to be ouerthrowne. The best 
commonwealth in all ages then prospered best, when the wicked 
were well punished, as the good conserued. And experience 
teacheth, that a theef, murtherer, a traitor, & such malefactors doo 
neuer better seruice to their prince & commonwealth, then when 
they be hanged on the gallows.719 
Thus, English contemporaries considered rebellion, regardless of its religious 
justifications, a capital crime, and magistrates were expected to use their 
swords to mete out justice. Whatever the conflict, be it regular war regulated 
by the laws of war or ‘war against the rebel’ and its merciless code of conduct, 
the Elizabethan soldier closely obeyed the dictates of complex systems of law 
and honour. 
In just wars, university trained jurists like the Protestant refuge Alberico 
Gentili and the military lawyer Matthew Sutcliffe articulated comprehensive 
doctrines on the laws of war that took into consideration European martial 
customs as well as international legal norms. Commentators in the just war 
tradition disagreed on technical points of war, but sixteenth-century jurists were 
unanimous that war was by definition international; this is belligerency between 
                                         
719 Irish Chronicle, p. 383. 
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states and not private individuals. These same jurists also attributed a common 
set of characteristics to wars. Firstly, all just wars had to be fought under the 
authority of a of sovereign head of state. A conflict that lacked sovereign 
authority was something other than war and was illegal under international law. 
Secondly, warfare served a judicial function; it was a tool to adjudicate between 
sovereigns and their states when no other solution was available or desirable. 
Thirdly, since the belligerents were equals under the law, their military agents 
were also acknowledged as equals and possessed customary rights and 
protections. Lastly, because war was between sovereign states and their agents, 
international law sought to keep violence confined to soldiers and to limit war’s 
impact on non-combatants. War, therefore, was a public event performed in the 
open according to customary law, and in order that internal and external 
observers can witness its conduct, judge its merits, and render either glory to 
the virtuous or condemnation to the cruel. 
The public quality of just war was essential to the proper operation of the 
laws of war. Elizabethan just war doctrines described the prevailing ‘war’ mind-
set among the soldiery, and this shared perception of war led soldiers to take 
enemy prisoners of war, capture enemy banners, and offer the defeated enemy 
terms of composition. Lawful conduct in just wars won the professional soldier 
honour and glory in proportion to their actions and status. Honour and glory was 
often the product of attaining the correct balance between violence and 
restraint. For example, Essex was duly regarded by peoples in England and Spain 
for his army’s conduct during the English capture of Cadiz (1596). The English 
army had assaulted the town, penetrated its defences, and by the end of the 
first day controlled most of the town. The glory of Essex’s victory would have 
been greatly reduced, if Essex had not magnanimously entreated the town to 
yield, which it humbly did. Once Cadiz had surrendered, the English army’s 
purpose changed from combat to occupation. There would have been no honour 
or glory if Essex had ordered his soldiers to execute all the inhabitants, and 
allowed the soldiers to sack the town without restraint. The English had roundly 
condemned the Spanish for their cruelty in the Low Countries; therefore, there 
was a strong correlation between the legal restraints imposed by the laws of war 
on military operations and the honour and glory sought after by professional 
soldiers. Violence and mercy were factors closely intertwined and inseparable 
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from just war and the rewards of honour and glory made soldiers stakeholders 
with a strong interest in the practice and perceptions of the laws of war. 
Where the politics and laws of international warfare were largely uniform 
across Europe, religion as a justification for war was less easily defined or even 
agreed upon across the region’s divergent Christian theologies. Catholic theology 
advanced the view that the Roman church had the right to declare holy wars 
against heretics and infidels, but even among Catholics there were debates 
concerning the precise legal framework of so-called holy wars. The exile 
Cardinal William Allen believed strongly in a Roman Church centred 
interpretation of holy war; in his view, the church had sole discretionary 
authority to declare holy wars. Allen’s interpretation described a ‘war of 
elimination’ which had no religious or legal requirement for restraint. By way of 
papal bull, official church sanction legitimated all formulations of conflict; for 
example, a prince’s punitive campaign against popular heresy or popular 
rebellion against heretical princes, and all faithful Catholics were required to 
lend support or service. Protestant English writers condemned this interpretation 
of holy war because it used religion to promote tyranny and rebellion. It is 
interesting to note, the adjutant general for the Army of Flanders, Balthazar de 
Ayala, while acknowledging the pope’s authority to depose heretical monarchs 
via excommunication, and thus, the church’s authority to legitimise popular 
uprisings against heretical governments, he did not think the pope alone could 
lawfully declare international holy wars. Ayala recorded in his treatise that just 
wars could be fought for certain religious causes, but the pope was required to 
coordinate with temporal princes and kings.720 In this instance, Ayala’s holy wars 
between states was regular war with religious casus belli, and because it was a 
just war, it was limited by the laws of war; however, the conflict in the 
Netherlands, since it was a rebellion inspired by heresy, does not fit within this 
rubric. 
                                         
720 Ayala, DIOBDM, ii, pp. 19-21. The late Elizabethan legal synthesizer William Fulbeck noted: 
‘the late king of Spaine Phillip, did pretende this defence of his warres (as some testifie) that 
they were against Infidels, and Heretikes. Yet a Doctor of his owne sect Baltasar Ayala 
thinketh that warre is not leuied against Infidels, because they be Infidels, although the 
Emperor or Pope should command it.’ Fulbeck, The pandectes of the law of nations, f. 40v. 
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Similar debates concerning holy war occurred in England. Most Protestants 
in England and Anglicans advanced holy war doctrines that either incorporated 
holy war within just war theory or rejected religion as lawful cause for war. In 
both cases, all wars remained under secular control and limited by the laws of 
war. Most Elizabethan sermons addressed ‘the problems of war and the virtues 
of peace on a broader theological and philosophical level, and were usually 
attentive to pragmatic policy concerns.’721 Dr Lowe’s research on religious war 
and the ‘common peace’ found that ‘[t]o say that even most strong, evangelical 
Protestants were clamouring for holy wars and radical religious restructuring 
cannot be sustained and intimates that too much attention is probably being 
paid to those who made the noise.’722 Perhaps a speculative extremist Protestant 
minority wanted holy wars authorised and directed by Protestant theologians 
and waged without restraint, but such a position was antithetical to prevailing 
Elizabethan religious practices and secular views.723 Religious and legal writers 
acknowledged religion could provide justifications for wars; however, these 
arguments did not amount to a declaration of holy war or crusade against the 
infidel or heretic. Wars justified on religious as well as natural law were not to 
be fought without regard to customary restraints. War commentators argued 
clearly that wars should be fought with mercy: ‘[a]lthough the saints in arms 
may be called to take drastic actions for which they are equipped with “a 
special habit” of cruelty, they are not to engage in wanton violence 
indiscriminately or to rejoice in the spilling of innocent blood.’724 
Holy war outside the just war framework had the potential to weaken or 
at least challenge the secular authority. In defence of secular power, English 
authorities limited theological power in temporal affairs which protected and 
preserved secular supremacy. Elizabeth jealously guarded her monarchical 
                                         
721 Lowe, ‘Religious wars and the “common peace”’, p. 418. 
722 Ibid. 
723 Even religious reformers in the puritan tradition did not abandon the just war framework: 
Timothy George, ‘War and Peace in the Puritan tradition’, Church history 53 (1984), pp. 492-
503, 495. 
724 George, ‘War and Peace in the Puritan tradition’, p. 502-503; Edward Vallance, Revolutionary 
England and the national covenant: state oaths, Protestantism and the political nation, 1553-
1682 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005), pp.40-42. 
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power against any encroachment.725 This led her to reject her more radical 
Protestant calls for religious war against Spain, and consistently the Elizabethan 
regime pursued a just war policy with regards to foreign wars. Radical 
Protestants outside England developed biblical justifications that permitted 
active resistance against an idolatrous, i.e. Catholic, regime. The most well-
known of these in England was the Scottish Calvinist John Knox. Knox developed 
arguments that sanctioned rebellion for religious causes under certain 
circumstances which amounts to another type of Protestant holy war.726 In a 
letter written in 1560 to the English commander Sir Henry Percy then fighting in 
Scotland, Knox wrote ‘[w]e mean neyther sedition, neyther yit rebellion against 
any just and launchfull authoritie, but onlie the advancement of Christes 
religion, and the libertie of this poor realm.’727 However, Knox had almost no 
currency in England, and even puritan commentators remained distant from 
reformist doctrines of resistance.728 This enabled the Elizabethan regime to 
propagate and maintain its law and order policy against internal decent and 
rebellions. 
When considering religious and ideological factors in England’s conflicts, 
it is necessary to recall that the Elizabethan regime acted most often according 
to the realpolitik considerations of the moment.729 The regime could both 
condemn and support Catholics as easily as it did their fellow Protestants; it 
promoted prayers for the survival of the Knights of St John during the siege of 
Malta (1565) and celebrated the victory at Lepanto (1571). The regime also 
cultivated relations with the enemy of Christendom - the Ottoman empire - 
following Elizabeth’s excommunication.730 If Catholics were idolaters and the 
Turks infidels, we must conclude that the regime was exceedingly pragmatic and 
                                         
725 The most powerful example of this was Queen Elizabeth’s anger at the earl of Leicester’s 
assumption of the sovereignty of the United Provinces, a grant of power that she had 
previously turned down. 
726 Richard L. Greaves, ‘John Knox, the reformed tradition, and the development of resistance 
theory’, The journal of modern history 48 (1976), pp. 1-36. 
727 Ibid., p. 25. 
728 Greaves, Society and religion in Elizabethan England, p. 539; George, ‘War and Peace in the 
Puritan tradition’, p. 502. 
729 Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the revolt of the Netherlands, pp. 126-128. 
730 Lisa Jardine, ‘Gloriana rules the waves: or, the advantage of being excommunicated (and a 
woman)’, Transactions of the royal historical society 14 (2004), pp. 209-222. 
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could be most often predicted to act in its political interests rather than the 
more restrictive dictates of faith. 
English commanders viewed Spanish and Irish militarised Catholicism 
negatively, and through the lens of their own national theology which influenced 
their approaches. As a Protestant state opposed to Spanish expansion, England 
was all but forced to choose its geographic neighbour and confessional ally in the 
Dutch revolt and their war for independence. Religion would influence the 
English colonization of Ireland; it was, however, not always antagonistic, and 
underwent alternating periods of conciliation and forwardness.731 As Dr Trim has 
noted: the defence of international Protestantism was an important motivation 
among the soldiers serving in Elizabeth’s wars and the conflicts in Ireland.732 He 
often referred to these as Protestant ‘holy wars’, but Trim never specifically 
defines what this meant either legally or theologically to the English Protestants. 
This thesis has speculated and identified the initial outlines of a policy that was 
advanced by key members in the Elizabethan regime and long serving veterans 
who either rejected traditional interpretations of religious war out of hand or 
viewed holy war as one more just cause of regular war which retained customary 
limitations on violence. At the same time, the politico-legal reframing of 
rebellion, even when it was sanctioned by a religious authority, permitted 
English officials to summarily execute anyone suspected of treason or rebellion 
without any substantial legal hindrance. 
English law of war theorists like Gentili or Sutcliffe might debate about 
whether wars could be justly waged solely upon on religious grounds, but they 
agreed that this manifestation of war, in legal and ethical terms, should be 
executed in the same manner as just and regular war. If Elizabethan Protestants’ 
had an applicable doctrine of holy war, soldiers and theorists alike held that it 
                                         
731 Hutchinson, ‘Reformed Protestantism and the government of Ireland, c. 1565-1580’, pp. 71-
74. 
732 Trim, ‘Fighting “Jacob’s war’s”’; idem, ‘“Put all to the sword”: the effects of reformation on 
the ethics of war in sixteenth-century Germany and England’, in Sister reformations II: 
Reformation and ethics in Germany and in England, eds., D. Wendebourg and A. Ryrie 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), pp. 271-298; idem, ‘Conflict, religion, and ideology’, in 
European warfare, 1350-1750, eds., F. Tallet and D.J.B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 278-299; idem, ‘[Book reviews] Holy war and English culture 
under Elizabeth I: rhetoric and reality’, Journal of early modern history 4 (2000), pp. 447-
451. 
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was a part of international law’s just war doctrine, and its conduct should not 
deviate from the customs of regular war. Where the notion of Protestant holy 
wars can be seen to depart from the conventions of just war was in ending war. 
Belligerents, infused with the ideological certainty that their side was on the 
right side, were far less willing to accept a compromise peace with those they 
saw as heretics or infidels, or as Essex, and the anti-Spanish hawks, would argue 
such a peace could never be trusted since their enemies viewed them as 
heretics, and Catholics could violate oaths made with heretics.733 Wars in this 
case could not hope for an enduring peace and the belligerents forced to accept 
an armistice for a time. Just wars fought for religious causes, then in other 
words, did not alter materially the basic principles of international warfare or 
the laws of war. Furthermore, the English purposefully emphasized the need for 
increased obedience to the laws of war in international wars. The English had 
severely criticised Spanish conduct in the Low Countries claiming it was 
tyrannical and cruel. This position also represents that of a weaker power, and 
one that understood its soldiers faced a greater likelihood of defeat and capture 
at the hands of the enemy, but it also played to the Elizabethan regime’s 
broader focus on the rule of law. 
William Cecil, Lord Burghley, among others within the regime, argued 
that English actions against both foreign enemies and domestic insurgents were 
entirely grounded in sound legal precedents. Central to this view was Lord 
Burghley’s The execution of justice in England (1583). This document was a key 
position paper, which the regime used to counter Catholic criticisms that it had 
persecuted Catholics because of their religion. The regime countered these 
claims by asserting that it acted in accordance with the law which required 
rebels and traitors to be punished. The regime’s law and order policy provides 
an important departure point separating rebellion and holy war from just war. 
This approach rejected a subject’s right to religious resistance, or holy war, 
against infidel or heretical monarchs. Furthermore, by making law and order the 
pivotal point in England’s military campaigns, the regime skilfully sidestepped 
                                         
733 Camden, Annals (1635), p. 493; this was an argument that Essex himself employed in 
Devereux, Apologie, sigs. [no sig. Divv]-Er. 
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theological debates and positioned England as the defender of justice both 
domestically and abroad. 
This was the main reason that the Elizabethan Irish campaigns were more 
harshly prosecuted than continental wars. Just war doctrine had developed in 
accordance with the growth of centralised European states, but laws and 
theories related to domestic law enforcement and governance were simply 
different from those used in regular war. The jus ad bellum of just war doctrine 
could not be used to justify rebellion; a fact which Dr Johnson has noted in his 
research, and if jus ad bellum could not be used to justify rebellion then as ‘the 
Irish case illustrates … jus in bello was not perceived to apply in suppressing 
rebellion either.’734 From government officials to common soldiers, all agreed 
that rebels were criminals and to whom ‘the Law of Armes is not to be 
obseured’.735 Commentators on the laws of war provided slight advice regarding 
the soldiers conduct against rebels. What advice that was given was clear and 
simple: soldiers could and should kill rebels without restraint; oaths made to 
rebels, particularly if made under duress, were not binding; additionally, there 
were no non-combatant protections. Hence Gilbert and Pelham’s attacks on non-
combatants were licit, and Grey’s massacre of the papal garrison at Smerwick in 
1579, the regime justified on multiple levels but foremost among these was the 
preservation of law and order. 
Appointed a colonel, and holding a commission of martial law, Gilbert 
waged a war upon the rebel. His army had standing orders to offer rebels one, 
and only one, opportunity to surrender to the queen’s mercy, and if they 
resisted, the inhabitants of the fortification were to be ‘put man, woman and 
child to the sword’.736 He could not afford to waste his limited resources taking 
‘euery pettie forte’, so each instance of resistance had to serve as an example 
to every other potential rebel.737 Gilbert’s policy was not his own novel 
invention. It was a practice with precedence in wars and certainly in ill-defined 
                                         
734 Johnson, Just war tradition and the restraint of war, p. 58. 
735 Fulbeck, The pandectes of the law of nations, p. 81. 
736 Edwards, Campaign Journals of the Elizabethan Irish wars, p. 16. 
737 Churchyard, A generall rehearsall of warres, sig. Q. iir. 
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conflicts.738 The Duke of Alba had exercised a similar policy in 1572 during the 
Dutch rebellion and again in 1580 to unify the crown of Portugal with that of 
Spain. Cruelty of this sort, Gentili ascribed to the defender’s obstinacy and not 
to the innate bloodthirstiness of the commander, who was bound by duty to take 
such a course739. Rebellions would not survive without popular support, so it was 
an accepted practice to slaughter peasants that had either willingly or 
unwillingly proffered material support to the rebel armies. Therefore, Pelham’s 
attacks against non-combatants were fundamentally attacks on the logistical 
underpinnings necessary for rebellion. Grey had determined that the papal 
troops did not have a lawful commission, and English doctrine did not 
acknowledge the pope as a sovereign, and thus, he could not declare war. The 
Italians and Spaniards openly professed that they had come to aid rebels, and, 
thus, they were counted as rebels themselves, just as Gilbert and Pelham had 
slaughtered non-combatants because they had materially supported the rebels. 
Furthermore, the surrender of Castello del Oro was made upon terms of ‘mercy’, 
a specific type of composition that put the lives of the surrendered — for life or 
death — into the hands of the victorious captain. A similar composition of 
‘mercy’ was given to the earl of Leicester during his expedition to the Low 
Countries, which he acknowledged necessitated the execution of additional 
enemy combatants to serve as an example to others considering an obstinate 
defence. English soldiers had themselves been slaughtered for similar cause, and 
the veterans knew the risks when they entered foreign conflicts covertly and 
without lawful commission; participation in this manner was construed as 
supporting rebels, and devoutness in religion did not protect Protestant 
adventurers and nether would it shield Catholics. 
Waging war without a lawful commission from a prince made the 
adventurers participation in war unjust and unlawful soldiers were liable to gross 
abuses. Elizabeth on occasion purposefully allowed her subjects to covertly 
serve foreign princes without providing them royal commissions. This problem 
was addressed in chapter 3, ‘“Underhand” and “Secret” Warfare between 
States: the conduct of English volunteers in the Dutch Rebellion’. In early 
                                         
738 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 214. 
739 Ibid. 
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Elizabethan expeditions to France (1562), the English had dispatched both 
volunteers as well as soldiers commissioned by the queen to aid the Huguenots 
then in rebellion. The French were merciless towards the English volunteers 
because firstly, they were illegal combatants and secondly, understanding their 
unlawful status, the English had made an obstinate defence of Rouen. Even the 
wounded were slaughtered in a fashion that foreshadowed the destruction of the 
papal garrison at Smerwick (1580): ‘[the] great number of English soldiers … hurt 
and laid together in a house, [who] a short time before the [royal] soldiers 
departed hence had their throats cut and were thrown into the river’.740 Yet, in 
this same revolt, the Army Royal commissioned by the queen and led by the earl 
of Warwick captured Le Havre (called Newhaven by the English), which they 
lawfully surrendered 28 July 1563.741 English soldiers were divided into 
legitimate and illegitimate cohorts based in part on their commissions; this 
permitted Warwick’s Army Royal to be treated in accordance with the laws of 
war, and the volunteers at Rouen to be slaughtered. 
During the years that England fought a ‘secret war’ against Spain (1572-
1584) in the Low Countries, the laws of war were not technically in effect, which 
resulted in a certain degree of confusion among the belligerents. Successive 
captain-generals of the Army of Flanders considered the Dutch to be rebels, and 
anyone that came into the conflict with the intention of aiding them was equally 
guilty of the same crimes. A contemporary chronicler recalling one Spanish 
massacre noted that the Spanish killed ‘as many French, English and Scots as 
Walloons’, but the Protestant combatants’ willingness to return atrocity for 
atrocity made law of war practices more attractive over time.742 English 
volunteers perceived the conflict in the Low Countries to be a just war, despite 
king Philip and his governors’ views to the contrary. The English emphasis on just 
war and lawful conduct better served their position, since they were always 
outnumbered and against a superior military organisation. The reasons are 
                                         
740 Trim, ‘The “Foundation-stone of the British army”? The Normandy campaign of 1562’, p. 86 
c.f. CSPF (1562), p. 434. 
741 CSPF (1563), pp. 471 (Warwick rejects calls for his surrender claiming that he had no 
commission from the queen to do so), 480 (Smith receives commission from the queen to 
surrender Le Havre), 480-1 (Terms of Le Havre’s surrender). 
742 Trim, ‘Put them all to the sword’, p. 295, c.f. Baudart, Les Gverres de Nassav, p. 117. 
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somewhat murky but the Spanish appear generally less inclined to massacre the 
English mercenaries in Dutch service. Over time a grudging respect was 
established between the Army of Flanders and the English volunteer companies. 
Slowly the Dutch revolt transitioned into a regular warfare. Perhaps one reason 
for this was the enduring presence of English mercenaries. 
Despite the use of terror strategies, or perhaps because of them, Spain’s 
victories in the Low Countries remained ephemeral until more conventional 
strategies were adopted by Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma. Chapter 4, ‘War 
between Sovereign States: English intervention and regular war in the 
Netherlands’, closely examined how Elizabeth’s declaration of war and the 
dispatch of an Army Royal to defend the Dutch further altered the Spanish 
military’s operational environment in favour of the Dutch. English officers 
conducted warfare in the Low Countries with a high degree of ritual and 
formality. The set piece nature of field battles and sieges created a ritual space 
for the performance of certain actions; for example, taking prisoners, hearing 
parleys, and receiving surrenders. Slaughters generally occurred when one side 
manifested a clear military superiority, and caused the other side to retreat in 
chaos. During these instances, the common soldiers’ role was to be an 
executioner, and the victor acted within the bounds of the laws of war when the 
routed soldiers were killed en masse.743 In the same manner, a town, or other 
type of fortification, taken in an assault could be likewise marked by lawful mass 
killings. Military necessity required these types of mass killings, and it was 
neither desired nor desirable to halt such actions.744 The secondary means of 
waging war, for example skirmishes, ambushes, surprises, or other less 
conventional tactics were not strictly governed by the laws of war;745 however, 
martial honour, and thus the laws of war, persisted even in these environments 
which helped to moderate violence. Opportunity and inclination permitted 
soldiers in these circumstances to execute so-called guerrilla operations with 
                                         
743 Gosson, The trumpet of warre, p. 32. 
744 Grossman, On Killing, pp. 127-129, which helps to describe the psychological element in these 
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745 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 13. 
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varying degrees of restraint. Nevertheless, the laws of war only had their full 
weight during conventional military operations: sieges and set piece battles. 
There was no greater threat in the Tudor imagination than the dangers 
associated with rebellion. A divided English kingdom was more likely to be 
defeated by the Catholic anti-Christ and its servants. Chapter 5, ‘“War upon the 
rebel”: Elizabethan military conduct in Ireland (1569-1584)’, returns to the 
subject of rebellion and the conduct of Elizabethan soldier serving in the Irish 
theatre. It is important to stress the point made by earlier researchers that the 
English army in Ireland often had as many Irishmen as they did English and 
Welshmen under arms.746 Rebellions endangered the health of the 
commonwealth, and in response, political commentators argued for no 
restraints, and men from all parts of the commonwealth served against the 
rebels. Mercy for rebels promised greater pains in the future: ‘[e]very chief 
rebel’s pardon is a hundred men’s death’.747 Many officers and administrators 
serving in Ireland thought that the crown had too often held back when it should 
have punished more harshly. A frustrated Sir Henry Wallop advised Walsingham: 
‘[t]here is no waye to daunt these [rebellious] people but by the edge of the 
sworde, and to plant better in there places’.748 Ireland’s geographic isolation 
inhibited continental Catholics from rendering the kind of aid that might alter 
the legal environment, and the Elizabethan regime’s aggressive 
                                         
746 The ethnic composition of the English military establishment in Ireland is a subject that needs 
further research; however, initial research shows that in March 1598 the army’s ethnic 
composition was: 20% of horse and 37% of foot were English born (which appears to include 
soldiers from Wales); 55% of horse and 25% of foot were Palesmen/Anglo Irish; and 25% of 
horse and 28% of foot were Gaelic Irish, c.f. David Edwards, ‘Ireland: security and conquest’, 
The Elizabethan world, eds., S. Doran and N. Jones, the Routledge worlds (London: 
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Morgan, ‘From soldiers to settler: the Welsh in Ireland, 1558-1641’ (unpublished doctoral 
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counterinsurgency strategy successfully prevented the Irish from transforming 
their conflict into a regular war. 
It might appear as if there were no opportunities to restrain the sword of 
the magistrate and his ‘men of war’ in Ireland’s frequent rebellions; however, 
restraint did manifest on occasions. Lord Deputy Sidney and Lord Justice Pelham 
had offered terms of composition to the garrisons at Old Castle and Carrigafoyle 
Castle respectively, and the massacres that followed were licit according to 
contemporary ideas concerning laws of armed conflict. When rebels accepted 
terms with crown officials, the terms of these agreements were most often 
fulfilled. Sidney granted terms of composition to the rebel garrison holding a 
castle in Tipperary, and, while acting as the military governor of Munster, Perrot 
made a composition with the garrison of Castle Maine. In both instances, the 
rebels departed their fortifications with at least their lives if not more. In many 
sieges with rebels, however, the ritualised space that permitted prisoners to be 
taken or fortifications and towns to surrender was simply ignored. Restraint 
typically became a feature of English operations when regional operations were 
upset by prolonged localized considerations, and the commander condescend to 
accept terms with rebel garrisons; these were done out of necessity rather than 
desire. Restraint was unthinkable in field battles with rebels. By accepting 
battle, every rebel soldier under arms had shown themselves to be traitors to 
the crown, and therefore the crown and its servants would brook no mercy, and 
every rebel under arms were liable to be killed. Yet, the question of slaughter or 
mercy ultimately had to be determined and on occasion justified by the 
commander in the field. Commanders in counterinsurgent operations had the 
same latitude as other officers in regular warfare, but there were increased 
social pressures to withhold restraint. 
Social status also played a key role in determining the level of restraint 
exercised by the regime. During the Northern Rebellion, the Elizabethan regime 
took steps to preserve wealthy rebel subjects from which the state sought 
punitive extortions, while the commonality was slaughtered and displayed ad 
terrorem. The submission or execution of notable rebels was an important 
feature in Elizabethan wars against the rebel. In the aftermath of Fitzmaurice’s 
rebellion (1569-1573), Elizabeth granted mercy and life to Fitzmaurice and his 
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entourage once they formally submitted to Perrot. Their surrender was 
performed in Kilmallock’s church. With his lieutenants on their knees and 
hangman’s nooses placed around each of their necks, Fitzmaurice swore an oath 
of fidelity to Queen Elizabeth, in both English and Irish, while Perrot witnessed 
and held his sword point over the traitor’s heart. An oath which Fitzmaurice 
broke when he left for the continent in 1575. Fitzmaurice undoubtedly believed 
that an oath to a heretic was no oath at all. The submission of rebel leaders 
included their followers as well, and the calendars are filled with the names of 
pardoned rebels. However, with each rebellion and the rising costs in blood and 
treasure, the crown felt compelled to hardened its position, and submission 
could not in every case guarantee life. 
The regime employed public executions to instruct the populace on the 
futility of rebellion. These were tangible expressions of the crown’s power over 
life and death. By submitting to the queen’s agents, rebels were often publicly 
displayed, and many had their deaths used to show their folly. The theatre of 
law featured prominently in these executions; for example, after the powerful 
Anglo-Irish lord John of Desmond was taken prisoner, his criminal case was heard 
and a council determined him guilty of treason. Shortly after his judgment, 
Desmond was publicly executed and his body publicly displayed. In the larger 
Irish towns, the gallows were kept full, and throughout Ireland, the severed 
heads of rebels were mounted on the city walls or otherwise displayed to serve 
as a grim warning against the perils of rebellion. 
Thomas Newton poetically described the discipline of a soldier through an 
allegory employing the scales of justice; wherein, the soldier’s actions were 
balanced against justice. In just wars, the scales of justice were weighted in 
favour of mercy. Soldiers that obeyed the laws of war were rewarded with 
honours and glory. In rebellion, the determiners of legitimate actions were 
reversed. Mercy was viewed as weakness, and soldiers were expected to 
mercilessly enforce the law of the land. The scales of just action during times of 
rebellion therefore were weighted against mercy when compared to regular war. 
The arguments presented in this thesis have implications for future 
researchers. Early modern martial culture influenced military methods and 
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strategies, and the thesis has shown that contemporary debates concerning the 
morality of violence directly influenced the actions of belligerents. While the 
levels of disorganisation among sixteenth-century armies is alarming to current 
readers, in matters of violence and restraint, the Elizabethan military possessed 
a clear cultural understanding of right and wrong. Future researchers will 
benefit from a more nuanced and less superficial understanding of the wide 
range of influences acting upon men of war. 
Although the laws of war did not technically bear upon the Irish conflicts 
since they did not fit within the Elizabethan theories of just war, their principles 
were regardless carried into other types of armed conflict. The career soldier 
and veteran officer, whose lives were spent and fortunes were made in the wars, 
would have found it difficult to completely disassociate themselves from all 
martial customs and traditional honour codes connected with war when engaged 
in operations other than war. For theorists, the law was clear cut and iron clad: 
‘[t]he question is not, what can be done with such men [that are rebels and 
brigands], or even what has usually been done, but what must be done.’749 
However, under fire or in the press of arms, commanders on the ground and in 
the fight had to make difficult choices that were not always so clear. 
Contemporaries clearly understood military operations through traditional 
honour codes and customary martial practices which formed the basis for the 
laws of war; however, circumstances might compel a commander to act in a 
manner that was beyond what the laws of war might actually permit. 
During military operations, the senior military official had the latitude to 
determine where and when to restrict the soldiers’ fury. In Ireland, English 
captains applied certain customs of regular war against rebels, but what is 
seldom discussed are the external influences and their direct effect on military 
operations. Just as a commander in the field could situationally determine 
whether to apply customary restraint or not, they were subjected to other 
outside influences as well. The English state fostered a popular culture that 
thoroughly condemned rebellion, while the regime accepted compromises with 
rebels only when doing so presented additional benefits beyond displays of 
                                         
749 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 23 (emphasis added). 
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mercy. Officers would have certainly felt influenced by the state’s political-legal 
policies and larger military considerations to more often reject mercy. 
Furthermore, an officer could have his position undermined if he was thought 
overly friendly with the Gaelic Irish. Writing to Lord Burghley, Andrew Trollope 
noted ‘Captain [Warham] Sentleger proffesseth himself to be an earnest 
Protestant, and I think he meaneth well, yet being married to an Irish woman, 
overmuch favoreth her countrymen … and I have heard and seen him speak 
earnestly for a rude Irish kerne’.750 Here Trollope exhibits the Elizabethan’s 
well-known contempt for Irishmen. 
Perceptions of the enemy are without a doubt important factors because 
soldiers find it easier to kill a dehumanised enemy.751 The Gaelic Irish, in 
contemporary Elizabethan propaganda, were characterised as barbarous and 
uncivilised which led English officers to pursue so-called genocidal strategies 
against the Irish.752 These views were a significant departure from the 
perceptions of the enemy promulgated in just war theory, which argued a 
sovereign possessed equal status with other sovereigns, and therefore, soldiers 
of one state, acting in the service of their sovereign, held the same and equal 
status with the soldiers of another state. This state of equality between 
belligerents, it was believed, necessitated restraint between belligerents.753 The 
English believed their activities in Ireland would civilise the barbarous Irish; 
Gentili claimed ‘[e]ven if you are governing ... savage and barbarous peoples, it 
is part of humanity to look out for their welfare and safety.’754 However, good 
governance required that the law be kept, and it was detrimental to the health 
                                         
750 CSPI (1586-1588), p. 429. Note, the Calendar records ‘Anthony St. Ledger’ as the captain in 
question; however, more recent research has identified him as Sir Warham St Leger (d.1600); 
Terry Clavin. ‘St Leger (Seintleger, Sallinger), Sir Warham’. [Cambridge University] Dictionary 
of Irish Biography <http://dib.cambridge.org/viewReadPage.do?articleId=a8225> [accessed 
on 7 June 2017]. 
751 Grossman, On killing, see sections IV ‘An anatomy of killing: all factors considered’, pp. 141-
194, and V ‘Killing and atrocities: no honor here, no virtue’, pp. 197-229; Gray, The warriors, 
p. 133. 
752 Murphy, ‘Violence, colonization and Henry VIII’s conquest of France, 1544-1546’, pp. 13-51; 
Edwards, ‘Tudor Ireland’, pp. 23-37; Kiernan, ‘The English conquest of Ireland, 1565-1603’, 
pp. 169-212. 
753 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, pp. 12, 13, 25; Sutcliffe, Practice, proceedings, and lawes of armes, ff. 11-
12 (implied); Gosson, Trumpet of war, ff. 36 (wrong intentions of the soldier), 37 
(magnanimity in victory). 
754 Gentili, DIBLT, ii, p. 292. 
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of the state permit violations of the law to go unpunished. Thus, by promoting 
an image of the Irish as barbarous, English culture further reduced the human 
being’s natural inhibitions against killing.755 
Elizabethan commentators often employed arguments promoting 
civilisation over barbarity to justify English policies in Ireland: ‘the vulgar sort 
[of Irish], through their dull wits and their brutish education, cannot conceive 
what is profitable for themselves and good for their country’.756 However, such a 
view cannot be extended to Elizabeth’s just wars. English soldiers respected the 
soldiers serving Spain in the Army of Flanders. The veteran commander Lord 
Willoughby remarked, when considering reforms for the Berwick garrison: 
Though as an Englishman I love not the Spanish nation, yet their 
martial laws are the best, and “if charge and trial may breed 
perfectnes, they have had it in more royall manner then any nation, 
savinge our nation of late.” [...] There is no man so “silly” that has 
been in the Low Country wars ... who would not receive such law 
and reformation as a “puritane” soldier’.757 
Sir Roger Williams’s A breife discourse of warre (1590) was little more than an 
extended dialogue praising the merits of the Spanish discipline. English 
propagandists routinely argued for a perception of the Spanish as boundlessly 
ambitious and at times unnaturally cruel.758 Yet, English soldiers continued to 
respect the troops mustered under Spanish banners, but their respect was a 
soldiers’ measured respect. Renowned for their discipline, the Army of Flanders 
provided the English men of war a fitting challenge which explains why the Low 
Countries remained the ‘school of war’. As this thesis has shown, the laws and 
customs of the soldier were important determiners that often accurately 
                                         
755 James P. Meyers, ed., Elizabethan Ireland: a selection of Elizabethan writers on Ireland 
(Hamden: Archon Book, 1983) provides samples from the Elizabethans themselves on the 
Irish. The semi-official propagandist and authority on Irish affairs Barnabe Rich described 
‘From whence it proceedeth that the Irish are so repugnant to the English’, in his New 
Description of Ireland (1610): ‘Now to speak of their dispositions, whereunto they are 
addicted and inclined: I say, besides they are rude, uncleanly and uncivil, so they are very 
cruel, bloody-minded, apt and ready to commit any kind of mischief.’ Idem, p. 130. 
756 Meyers, Elizabethan Ireland, p. 131. 
757 CBP (1595-1603), ii, p. 641. 
758 Mark G Sanchez, ‘Anti-Spanish sentiment in English literary and political writing 1553-1603’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Leeds, 2004), pp. 102, 124-125. 
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explained Elizabethan military conduct, and provides useful insights into the 
factors most important to the veteran soldier. 
The laws of war and military conduct provides an excellent pathway for 
future research. An area that would benefit from further inquiry, if not 
necessarily practicable, is increased attention to the day-to-day management 
and functioning of specific English military units. Captains and other 
commanding officers were responsible for achieving operational goals as well as 
making immediate determinations in the field regarding mercy and restraint. 
Conflict archaeologist have been making important discoveries into actual 
practices of battle and siege which has the potential to shed additional light 
upon their relationship to military law and the laws of war in practice, and it is 
necessary to incorporated these elements into future narratives.759 These men 
were often occupied with their own interests and needs, but their importance to 
war is largely neglected because of the limitations of the documentary record; 
however, one area that has been neglected and has room for further research 
were the public-private military partnerships utilized in the colonisation of 
Ireland. 
Semi-private wars were given official sanction through public-private 
partnerships, and on several occasions these formations were deployed against 
the Irish. Preceding the tumultuous Desmond Rebellion, Irish colonisation was 
prosecuted via public-private partnerships between the English state and private 
adventurers. Walter Devereux, earl of Essex and Robert’s father, embarked on a 
particularly brutal campaign to establish an English colony in Ulster. The private 
army raised by the 1st earl of Essex performed some of the most infamous 
atrocities associated with the so-called Elizabethan reconquest of Ireland. 
Another Ulster colonisation scheme was put forth by the junior Thomas Smith in 
1571. Smith’s promised ‘to obtain Arde and other lands thereto adjoining at 
their own charge and perils’, but his plans came to naught and Smith was killed 
                                         
759 For example: The current research being conducted by Damian Shiels and René R. Gapert in 
Ireland, and studies such as Andre Schürger, ‘The archaeology of the battle of Lützen: an 
examination of 17th century military material culture’ (unpublished doctoral thesis,  
University of Glasgow, 2015); Marnix Pieters, et al, ‘De materiële bronnen over het beleg van 
Oostende of de archeologie van een in de vroege zeventiende eeuw zwaar geteisterde stad’, 
in De val van het Nieuwe Troje: het beleg van Oostende, 1601-1604, ed., W. Thomas (Leuven: 
Davidsfonds, 2004), pp. 139-145. 
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in 1573.760 These public-private colonial adventures have not had their conduct 
scrutinised in relation to the laws of war. Perhaps a better understanding of 
military instructions and commissions will help to answer some of the questions 
regarding public-private military partnerships while also illuminating the conduct 
of English counterinsurgency practices. 
There is some evidence that leads to speculation that an English officer 
bearing a commission to execute operations against rebels by ‘fire and sword’ – 
conventional military methods – perhaps understood that he was commanded to 
conduct measured operations. The same commission appended with an 
authorization for the use of martial law suggests that the recipient was further 
compelled more vigorously destroy rebellion by whatever means necessary. 
Notably, Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s commission was latter type. This however might 
be a dead-end. Commissioned officers often interpreted their instructions in a 
manner that fulfilled their own desires or were simply ignored. Further research 
into martial conduct during the Eighty Years War has the potential to determine 
how the Dutch rebellion evolved into a regular war. 
The sources consulted for this thesis were insufficient for determining the 
precise causes that transformed the Dutch rebellion into the Eighty Years War. 
War in the strict legal sense only existed between England and Spain from 1585 
to 1604 but the alliance made between England and the United Provinces - the 
Treaty of Nonsuch (1585) – perhaps extended belligerency rights to the Dutch. 
Furthermore, the intervention of Elizabeth I – an acknowledged sovereign prince 
- in 1585, and perhaps, the dangerous assumption of Dutch sovereignty by the 
earl of Leicester, the queen’s subject, perhaps helped to settle the legitimacy 
question. These conclusions must be tempered with an awareness of the pivotal 
change in Spanish attitudes ushered in during the tenure of Alexander Farnese, 
Duke of Parma and captain general of the Army of Flanders. 
Spanish perceptions of the Dutch appeared remarkably consistent. The 
Duke of Alba and succeeding governors from Don Luis de Requesens to Don John 
                                         
760 Hiram Morgan, ‘The colonial venture of Sir Thomas Smith in Ulster, 1571-1575’, The historical 
journal 28 (1985), pp. 261-278, 264. 
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of Austria maintained that the Dutch were rebels, which prompted the 
continuation of a policy of little or no quarter. Although the English were 
alarmed by Spanish cruelties, English soldiers were subjected to very few 
atrocities at the hands of the Army of Flanders. The Duke of Parma’s 
appointment to governor general led to a major change in Spanish conduct. 
Parma reorganised the leadership of the Army of Flanders and introduced policy 
changes. Following his own experiences with terror, Parma determined it to be a 
flawed strategy, and he used reconciliation to achieve the Reconquista of the 
southern provinces. Prior to the 1585 intervention, the Dutch themselves 
believed their legitimacy required bolstering, and certainly after witnessing the 
Duke of Alba’s terror tactics in 1568 and again in 1572, there was no doubt that 
Philip II thought that Dutch opposition was criminal rebellion. 
William ‘the Silent’ of Orange struggled during his lifetime to achieve just 
recognition of Dutch combatants, but his assassination in 1584 left a power 
vacuum, which Leicester attempted to fill. Leicester’s government of the 
Netherlands has been characterised as one of failures and defeats, but before 
rendering our final judgement on Leicester’s success or failure, consider that 
during Leicester’s government the United Provinces, the war’s shift towards 
conventional military operations continued and perhaps quickened. Without a 
doubt, Parma achieved notable successes after he rejected the laws of armed 
conflict relating to wars on rebels in favour of conventional military strategy. 
Despite political set-backs and in-fighting among his officers, Leicester practised 
regular warfare, and Leicester and Parma prosecuted their military operations 
with increased adherence to the laws of war. 
Not enough is known about Dutch conduct during the period of rebellion 
or the war, nor are the contributions of the French Huguenots and German 
reiters well understood. These aspects of the Dutch conflict need to be further 
studied to properly weight Leicester and the English soldiers’ contributions. 
Huguenot perceptions of war and its laws certainly influenced English readers, 
but whether these ideas were applied by the Huguenots themselves during their 
campaigns will require further inquiry. Although Leicester’s victories were often 
reversed, he and his officers were always ready to negotiate a composition with 
forts flying Spanish colours. The English disciplined their soldiers’ greed and 
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surrendering towns were not exposed to the same violent sacks that the Duke of 
Alba and the Prince of Anjou, the later, sadly fighting on behalf of the Dutch, 
had done or Requesens’s suffered. The worst side of the English officers was 
shown when Stanley and Yorke sold-out Deventer and the Zutphen sconce for 
Spanish silver, albeit under the cover of religion. Stanley and Yorke had also sold 
their citizenship and would never be allowed to return to England so tainted 
with treason. As leaders, they alone bore this stain, and some subaltern officers 
did apply for and received pardons to return to England. It has been noted that 
the English contribution of men never surpassed twenty-five percent of the total 
men in Dutch service, but their significance exceeded their numbers. It would be 
a significant shift in the historiography of the Eighty Years War, if it was English 
intervention in 1586 in conjunction with reoriented Army of Flanders that 
completed the Sisyphean challenge and shifted the rebellion towards regular 
war. 
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